Pro Se Litigants Case Law

Non-Lawyer pro se litigants not to be held to same standards as a practicing lawyer

Many pro se litigants will use this in their pleadings; "Pleadings in this
case are being filed by Plaintiff In Propria Persona, wherein pleadings are
to be considered without regard to technicalities. Propria, pleadings are
not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as practicing
lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner 92 Sct 594, also See Power 914 F2d 1459 (11th
Cir1990), also See Hulsey v. Ownes 63 F3d 354 (5th Cir 1995). also See In
Re: HALL v. BELLMON 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991)."

In Puckett v. Cox, it was held that a pro-se pleading requires less
stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer (456 F2d 233 (1972 Sixth
Circuit USCA). Justice Black in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 at 48 (1957)
"The Federal Rules rejects the approach that pleading is a game of skill in
which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the
principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on
the merits." According to Rule 8(f) FRCP and the State Court rule which
holds that all pleadings shall be construed to do substantial justice."

Defense against dismissal of complaint under Rule 12-B

There is legal sufficiency to show Plaintiff is entitled to relief under his
Complaint. A Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond a doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. See Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) also Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S. Ct.
1827, 1832 (1989). Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance dismissals based on a
judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations. In applying the
Conley standard, the Court will "accept the truth of the well-pleaded
factual allegations of the Complaint."

On Judicial Immunity

Civil Rights Vol 4, US Supreme Court Digest
Page 555 Judges not totally Immune

87 SCT 1213 Pierson v. Ray

94 SCT 1683 Scheur v. Rhodes

96 SCT 984 Imbler v. Pathtman

98 SCT 2018 Monell v. Social SVS

98 SCT 2894 Butz v. Economov

On Absolute Immunity for Judges

A complaint is actionable against Judges under Title 42 U.S.C. 1985 (3),
whose immunity does not extend to conspiracy under color of law. Section
1985(3) reaches both conspiracies under color of law and conspiracies
effectuated through purely private conduct.


On Judges violation of oath of office

Many judges have a total disregard for their oath of office under Title 28
Section 453, All judges take this oath of office swearing to uphold the U.S.
Constitution.


Arbitrary Exercise of Government Powers

Missouri v. Mackey, 127 US 205, 8 S Ct 1161

Minneapolis v. Herrick, 127 US 210, 8 S Ct 1176

Lepper v. Texas 139 US 462, 11 S Ct 577

Giozza v Tiernan, 148 US 657, 13 S Ct 721

Duncan v Missouri, 152 US 377, 14 S Ct 570

Pro Se litigants entitled to Fees:

Pro se litigants may be entitled to Attorney fees and costs under the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fee Award Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, as amended 42 USC 1988
U.S. Constitutional Issues:

The Fifth Amendment, provides in pertinent part that "nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..." Due process is
denied when a meaningful hearing is denied as in this cause.

The Seventh Amendment, provides in pertinent part that "In suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right
to trial by jury shall be preserved..." This language does not include a
single reference to "manipulation" of a jury by the Court in a conspiracy
with lawyers to design a verdict suitable to the Court through the use of
lawyer rules, judicial rules, court rules, or otherwise trumped-up legal
technicalities and instructions which effectively "handcuffs" the jury. All
of these activities are no more or less than a denial of the right to a jury
of peers with the constitutional authority to judge both the facts and law
in a case.

The Thirteenth Amendment, provides in pertinent part that "Neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime....., shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction".
These judges through their private conduct in conspiracy with the lawyer
defendants, caused the Court to effectuate this Plaintiff to "Compulsory
Involuntary Servitude", an act punishable under Title 18 1584 as a criminal act.

The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and Equal Protection clause
(Section 1), expressly declares no state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law..."

The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 3, provides in pertinent part that "No
person shall hold any office, civil or military, under the United States or
under any State.....who, having previously taken an oath,....as an executive
or judicial officer of any State to support the Constitution of the United
States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same...."

USC 14th Ammendment (Deprived of the use of property)

Tracy v. Ginzberg 205 US 170, 27 S Ct. 461

Wagner v Leser, 239 US 207, 36 S Ct 66

Fuentes v. Shevin 407 US 67, 92 S Ct 1983

Leis v Flynt, 439 US 438, 99 S Ct 698, 11 Ohio Ops 3rd 302

Kent.Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 US 454, 109 S Ct 1904



What constitutes property protected under constitution?

Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall 36

Buchanan v Warley, 245 US 60, 38 S Ct 16

Liggett Co. v Baldridge, 278 US 105, 49 S Ct 57

Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 564, 92 S Ct 2701



On Due Process Violation 5th and 14th

Butler v. Perry, 240 US 328, 36 S Ct 288

Brinkerhoff- Faris Trust v Hill, 281 US 673, 50 S Ct 451

Curry v. McCanless, 307 US 357, 59 S Ct 900

*Rochin v California, 342 US 165, 72 S Ct 25, Alr2d 1396

*Ivanho Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 US 275, 78 S CT 1174

*Bartkus v Illinois, 359 US 121, 79 S Ct 676

*Gault 387 US 1, 87 S Ct 1428

*Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US 539, 94 S Ct 2963

**Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 US 357, 98 S Ct 663

**Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 US 57, 101 S Ct 2646

**States v. Goodwin 457 US 368, 102 S Ct 2485

**Colorado v. Connelly, 479 US 157, 107 S Ct 515

**DeShaney v. Winnebago, 489 US 189, 109 S Ct 998

**Collins v Harker, 112 S Ct. 1061

Jurisdiction of the case (Basic element of due process)

Powell v. Alabama, 287 US 45, 53 S Ct 55, 84 ALR 527


Sense of fairplay shocked is not due process (Congress Barred)

Galvan v Press, 347 US 522, 74 S Ct 737

Groban 352 US 330, 77 S Ct 510

Kinsella v United States, 361 US 234, 80 S Ct 297

Bodie v Conneticut, 401 US 371, 91 S Ct 780

Ross v Moffitt, 417 US 600, 94 S Ct 2437

United States v. Salerno, 481 US 739, 107 S Ct 2095


14th Ammendment is the due process denial right

Collins v. Harker 112 S Ct 1061

Hebert v Louisiana, 272 US 312, 47 S Ct 103

Georgia Power v Decatur, 281 US 505, 50 S Ct 369


Discrimination as Violation of Due Process (5th Ammendment)

Bowling v Sharpe, 347 US 497, 74 S Ct 693

Schneider v Rusk, 377 US 163, 84 S Ct 1187

Shipiro v Thompson 394 US 618, 89 S ct 1322

United States v Moreno, 413 US 528, 93 S Ct 2821

Johnson v Robinson 415 US 361, 94 S Ct 1160

Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 96 S Ct 612

Mathews v De Castro, 429 US 181, 97 S Ct 431

Fullilove v Klutznick, 448 US 448, 100 S Ct 2758

Lyng v Castillo, 477 US 635, 106 S Ct 2727

Fourteenth Ammendment and 42 USCS 1983

Statutory requirement under color of law: Lugar v Edmondson Oil, 457 US 922, 102 S Ct 2744

Civil Rights Issues:
A Continuance of Constitutional Issues

Title 42 USC 1983 provides in relevant part that: "every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State....subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. ..shall
be liable to the party injured...."

A Title 42 1985 action which seeks compensatory and punitive damages in
conjunction with equitable relief as in this case is considered a legal
claim, entititling Plaintiff to a jury trial. See An-Ti v. Michigan
Technological Univ., 493 F. Supp. 1137.

Plaintiff alleges a "class based", invidiously discriminatory animus is
behind the conspirators' action as the Court records reflect. That the
actions were clearly a product of bias and prejudice of the Court. See
Griffen v. Breckridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)

The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic 113 S.Ct.753 (1993) that the standard announced in Griffen was not
restricted to "race" discrimination. It is therefore reasonable to assume
that 1985 (3) may be used for "class-based" claims other than race which is
alleged in this case.

The defendant lawyers acting in conspiracy with state actors under color of
law have become state actors in this case. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled
that "private parties", lawyers in this case, may be held to the same
standard of "state actors" where the final and decisive act was carried out
in conspiracy with a state actor or state official. See Dennis v. Sparks,
449 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct., 183 also See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 90 S.Ct. 1598.

Plaintiff's Complaint is based in part on discrimination and political
affiliations by lawyers and lawyer-judges, under 42 USCA 1983 & 1985. See
reversal case Acevedo-Diaz v Aponte (1993, CA1 Puerto Rico) 1 F3d 62,
summary op at (CA1 Puerto Rico) 21 M.L.W. 3212, 14 R.I.L.W. 389.

Section 1985(3) under Title 42 reaches both conspiracies under color of law
and conspiracies effectuated through purely private conduct. In this case
Plaintiff has alleged a class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus is
behind the conspirators' action as the court records reflect. That
actionable cause is the treatment of a non-lawyer pro se litigant as a
distinct "class-based subject" of the Court, wherein denial of equal
protection of the laws and denial of due process was clearly the product of
bias and prejudice of the Court. See Griffen v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,
102 (1971).

The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic 113 S.Ct. 753 (1993) that the standard announced in Griffen was not
restricted to "race" discrimination. It is therefore reasonable to assume
that 1985(3) may be used for "class-based" claims other than race as alleged
in this case. It is also important to note in Bray the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation of the requirement under 1985(3) that a private conspiracy be
one "for the purpose of depriving... any person or "class" of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws, which the Court said mandates "an intent to deprive persons of a
right guaranteed against private impairment.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Griffen emphasized 1985(3)
legislative history was directed to the prevention of deprivations which
shall attack the equality of rights of American citizens; that any violation
of the right, the animus and effect of which is to strike down the citizen,
to the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights as contrasted with his
and other citizens' rights, shall be within the scope of remedies... Id. at 100.

Supreme Court has ruled that "private parties" may be held to the same
standard of "state actors" in cases such as the instant cause where the
final and decisive act was carried out in conspiracy with a state official.
See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 101 S. Ct., 183 and Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S. Ct. 1598.

Jurisdictional Issues:
It is proper for this District Court to take Jurisdiction of any civil
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person. See Title 28 Section
1343 (1)(2)(3)(4) .

Jurisdiction is proper under Title 28 Sections 1332, 1335, 1357, 1441 and 1603.

The First issue is "Convenience" and second issue is the "interest-of-
justice" standard under 28 USCA 1406.

Dismissal Issues:

The Complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears to a certainty that
Plaintiffs would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts that
could be proved in support of the claims. See Gomez v Toledo (1980, US) 64 L
Ed 2d 572, 100 S Ct 1920.

The allegations of a Complaint prepared by a state prisoner acting pro se
are generally taken as true for purposes of motion to dismiss. See Hughes v
Rowe (1980, US) 66 L Ed 2d 163, 101 S Ct 173.

RULE 60

The final judgement of this Court should be vacated under Rule 60(B). The
Court is requested to weigh the interest in substantial justice against the
simple need for preserving finality of the judgement. See Expenditures
Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Institute, 1974, 500 F.2d.
808, 163 U.S. App.D.C.140. See also Brown v. Clark Equipment Co., D.C. Mc.
1982, 961 F.R.D. 166.

Court -a judgement to dismiss because of some trumped up technicality giving
excuse to dismiss a non-lawyer pro se litigant's complaint with merit in a
lawyer dominated Court hearing. In support of Plaintiffs Motion to vacate
Judgement, the following cases are offered; Picking v. Pennsylvania Railway,
(151 F2d.240) Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

The ruling of the court in this case held; "Where a plaintiff pleads pro se
in a suit for protection of civil rights, the court should endeavor to
construe the Plaintiff's pleading without regard to technicalities." In
Walter Process Equipment v. Food Machinery 382 U.S. 172 (1965) it was held
that in a "motion to dismiss", the material allegations of the complaint are
taken as admitted."

Rico Case Law:

The defendants constitute an illegal enterprise in acts or threat of acts in
violation of Civil Rico Federal Racketeering Act USC 18, 1961-1963 et seq.
The following are particular violations:

18 USC 241: Conspiracy against Rights of Citizens:

18 USC 3: Accessory after the fact, knowing that an offense has been
committed against the United States, relieves, receives, comforts or assists
the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment.

18 USC 242: Deprivation of Rights color of law of rights protected under the
Constitution of the U.S.

18 USC 512: Tampering with a witness

18 USC 1341: Mail fraud

18 USC 1343: Wire fraud

18 USC 1503: Obstruction of justice

18 USC 1510: Obstructing of criminal investigation

18 USC 1513: Retaliating against a witness, victim or informant

18 USC 1951: Interference with interstate commerce

18 USC 1621: Perjury

18 USC 1001: Fraud

Continued statute of limitation in ongoing activity (conspiracy) (bankruptcy fraud)

============================================================================
TOPIC: Judicial Notice: definition
==============================================================================

Judicial Notice is discretionary. With Judicial Cognizance, the judge is BOUND to act:
See Black's Law, 6th Ed, pg 847


Judicial cognizance. Judicial notice or knowledge upon which a judge is
bound to act without having it proved in evidence.

Judicial notice. (pg. 849) The act by which a court, in conducting a trial,
or framing its decision, will, of its own motion or on request of a party,
and without the production of evidence, recognize the existence and truth of
certain facts, having a bearing on the controversy at bar, ....

============================================================================
TOPIC: Reasons to Vacate Void Judgments - Lack of Jurisdiction
=============================================================================

Reasons to Vacate Void Judgments - Lack of Jurisdiction

(http://www.amatterofjustice.org/amoj/ library/0008reas ons.htm)
(http://www.amattero fjustice. org/amoj/ cases/d046469. pdf)

January 2, 2004 Void Judgments Understanding Void Judgments

Definition of Void Judgment: any judgment which a court renders while lacking jurisdiction, either of the subject matter or the parties.

* Wahl v. Round Valley Bank 38 Ariz , 411, 300 P. 955(1931),
* Tube City Mining & Millng Co. v. Otterson, 16 Ariz. 305, 146p 203(1914); and
* Millken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S. CT. 339,85 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1940).

Subject matter jurisdiction can never be presumed, waived, or constructed,
even by mutual consent of the parties, and it has two parts:

(1) the statutory or common law authority for the court to hear the case, and

(2) the appearance and testimony of a competent fact witness - in other
words, sufficiency of pleadings.


When we examine a judgment, the following indices tell us whether a court
had subject matter jurisdiction. Successful litigants will know each and
every one of them by heart. Subject matter jurisdiction usually fails
because of one of these reasons:

(1) No petition in the record of the case, Brown v. VanKeuren,
340 Ill. 118,122 (1930).

(2) Defective petition filed, Same case as above.

(3) Fraud committed in the procurement of jurisdiction, Fredman
Brothers Furniture v. Dept. of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 486 N.E. 2d
893(1985)

(4) Fraud upon the court, In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill,
App. 3d 393(1962)

(5) Judge does not follow statutory procedure, Armstrong v.
Obucino, 300 Ill 140, 143 (1921)

(6) Unlawful activity of a judge, Code of Judicial Conduct.

(7) Violation of due process, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
58 S.Ct. 1019(193 ; Pure Oil Co. v. City of Northlake , 10 Ill.2d 241, 245,
140 N.E. 2d 289 (1956); Hallberg v Goldblatt Bros., 363 Ill 25 (1936), ( If
the court exceeded it's statutory authority. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 278
F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)

(8) One or more actions violated 11 U.S.C. 362(a), in re
Garcia, 109 B.R. 335 (N.D> Illinois, 1989).

(9) No proper pleadings presented a justiciable issue to the
court, Ligon v. Williams, 264 Ill. App 3d 701, 637 N.E. 2d 633 (1st Dist.
1994)

(10) A complaint states no cognizable cause of action against that
party, Charles v. Gore, 248 Ill App. 3d 441, 618 N.E. 2d 554 (1st. Dist.
1993)

(11) A person/law firm prohibited by law to practice law in that
jurisdiction represented a litigant before the court.

(12) The judge engaged in bribery (the Alemann cases, Bracey v
Warden , U.S. Supreme Court No. 96-6133(June 9, 1997)

(13) No one properly issued a summons.

(14) No one made service of process pursuant to statute and Supreme
Courth Rules, Janove v. Bacon, 6 Ill. 2d 245, 249, 218 N.E. 2d 706, 708
(1953)

(15) Someone did not comply with the rules of the Circuit court.

(16) Someone did not comply with the local rules of the special
court (one where the judge does not act impartially, Bracey v. Warden, U.S.
Supreme Court No. 96-6133(June 9, 1997)

(17) The statute is vague, People v. Williams, 638 N.E. 2d 207 (1st
Dist. (1994)

(18) The movant did not give proper notice to all parties, Wilson v.
Moore, 13 Ill. App. 3d 632, 301 N.E. 2d 39 (1st Dist. (1973)

(19) A judge based an order/judgment on a void order/judgment,
Austin v. Smith, 312 F 2d 337, 343(1962);English v. English, 72 Ill. App. 3d
736, 393 N.E. 2d 18 (1st Dist. 1979) or

(20) Someone violated the public policy of the State of Illinois,
Martin-Tregona v Roderick, 29 Ill. App. 3d 553, 331 N.E. 2d 100 (1st Dist.
1975)

(21) A judge does not validly hold office because of the absence of
or a defect in one or more of the following:

a. qualification as a candidate (typically include American
citizenship, bar membership, registered voter status, a number of years of
service as an attorney, filing of a financial statement that shows
compliance with law, not serving in any other branch of government),

b. appointment or election to office (illegal campaign contributions or
other illegal financial entanglements can disqualify),

c. acceptance of appointment or elected position (some never bother to
accept the appointment or elected position),

d. one or more loyalty oaths associated with qualification and service
(a typical judge must swear the following loyalty oaths, evidenced by the
signature of a person duly authorized to take acknowledgements):

i. Elector's (voter registration) loyalty oath

ii. Bar member's oath

iii. Pre-appointment/election candidate's loyalty oath

iv. Candidate's oath

v. Public Officer's or Judge's loyalty oath

vi. Public employee's loyalty oath.

About Loyalty Oaths and Appointments

Many public employees have serious defects in their oath and appointment
documents, and many do not have those documents on record as required by
law. The wise litigant will obtain certified copies of all such documents
for all officers of the court (judges, clerk, prosecutors or opposing
counsel, and bailiffs), and move for the disqualification of any and all for
whom valid oath and appointment documents do not exist.

The judge validly holds office if and only if a copy of the judge's oath of
office exists, and you can rightly demand that the proper final oath sworn
or affirmed upon taking office situates in the judge's chambers. You can go
to his office and demand to see a copy of his oath of office at any time.

The federal laws covering judges and other public officials are to be found
at 5 U.S.C. 3331, 28 U.S.C. 543, and 5 U.S.C. 1983. States typically have
similar laws. A judge trespasses upon the court unless he complies with all
of the provisions of relevant law. Once a proven trespasser upon the court
(upon the law) not one of his judgments, pronouncements or orders have
validity. All constitute nullities and have void status.

Upon discovering such a trespass, you will face serious difficulty getting
the trespasser removed from office, and the fact that so many litigants give
up in the process explains why so many criminal trespassers still function
in public office.

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TOPIC: Powe v. US: what does "citizen" mean?
============================================================================

Powe v. United States, 5 Cir., 1940, 109 F.2d 147, certiorari denied, 309 U.S. 679, 60 S.Ct. 717

I finally found it. It's quoted a bit different than the opinion quoted:

In Powe v. U.S. 109 F2d 147, 149 (1940) the court determined the term
`citizen,' when used in federal laws, excludes State citizens.

The court was specifically speaking about 18 U.S.C.A §51 in its
deleiniation of citizens, however, that does not mean it does not apply to
other stautory areas.

Interesting note: Appeals from the District Court of the United States

Proper quotes below:

"In its construction [18 U.S.C.A. § 51] it is proper to apply the rule that
criminal laws are to be construed strictly, and to bear in mind that other
rule that a construction is to be avoided, if possible, that would render
the law unconstitutional, or raise grave doubts thereabout. In view of these
rules it is held that "citizen" means "citizen of the United States", and
not person generally, nor citizen of a State; and that the "rights and
privileges secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States" means
those specially and validly secured thereby. Thus limited, this section has
been enforced as constitutional. " POWE v. UNITED STATES, 109 F.2d 147 (5th
Cir. 1940)


OR


"In its construction [18 U.S.C.A. &Sect; 51] it is proper to apply the rule that
criminal laws are to be construed strictly, .... In view of these rules it
is held that "citizen" means "citizen of the United States", and not person
generally, nor citizen of a State; and that the "rights and privileges
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States" means those
specially and validly secured thereby. Thus limited, this section has been
enforced as constitutional. " POWE v. UNITED STATES, 109 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.
1940)


OR taken out of context (perhaps)


"... it is held that "citizen" means "citizen of the United States", and not
person generally, nor citizen of a State; ... POWE v. UNITED STATES, 109
F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1940)

United States 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Reports

POWE v. UNITED STATES, 109 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1940)

POWE et al. v. UNITED STATES.

No. 9130.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

January 17, 1940.
Page 148 Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the
Southern District of Alabama; John McDuffie, Judge. Sam B. Powe and
others were convicted for conspiring to injure, oppress, threaten and
intimidate a named citizen of the United States in the free exercise of his
right and privilege as such
citizen to speak and publish his views in certain newspapers, and they
appeal. Reversed and remanded with direction. Harry T. Smith, D.R.
Coley, Jr., and George A. Sossaman, all of Mobile, Ala., for appellants.
Francis H. Inge, U.S. Atty., of Mobile, Ala., for appellee. Before
SIBLEY, HUTCHESON, and McCORD, Circuit Judges. SIBLEY, Circuit Judge.
The five appellants were indicted (with another who was acquitted) for
conspiring to injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate a named citizen of
the United States in the free exercise of his right and privilege as such
citizen to speak and publish his views in certain newspapers. Their several
demurrers were overruled and appellants Page 149 were convicted and
sentenced. Of the numerous rulings
asserted to be error on this appeal we need consider only the judgment
upon the demurrers. The grounds of demurrer to each count include
these: That no crime against the United States is charged; that the right
of free speech and free press is not secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States against infraction by individuals, but only by federal
or State action; and that the counts are too vague. The eight counts are
varying statements of the same conspiracy. Some of them say the conspiracy
was to prevent future publications; others to oppress and injure because of
past publications. Some counts state the nature of the publications, and
the means to be used to oppress the writer; others fail so to state, baldly
alleging in the words of the statute a conspiracy to injure and oppress the
citizen of the United States in the exercise of or for having exercised his
privilege of free speech and free press. One of the fullest statements is the
second count, which charges that the conspiracy was to injure and oppress
the executive editor of the Mobile Register and the Mobile Press,
newspapers published in Mobile, Alabama, he being a citizen of the United
States, in his exercise of his right and privilege secured to him by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, to write and print in said
newspapers his editorials exposing and condemning various forms of illegal
gambling and illegal lotteries in Mobile County, Alabama, and calling upon
the officials of the City of Mobile and County of Mobile, charged with the
suppression thereof, to take action to suppress the same and to punish the
offenders; the plan being to procure a photograph of the editor in a lewd
or obscene act and to use the same in threatening to show the photograph,
and in threatening
to use it as evidence in prosecuting the editor, and thus to stop his
publications; numerous overt acts to carry out the plan being alleged. Do
these facts make an offense against the United States? The statute
relied on in support of the indictment originated as Section 6 of the Act
of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 141 , entitled "An Act of enforce the Right of
Citizens of the United States to vote in the several States of this Union,
and for other Purposes." It appeared in the Revised Statutes with some
alteration as Section 5508; was carried without change into the Criminal
Code as Section 19; and now appears as Section 51 of Title 18 of the United
States Code, 18 U.S.C.A. § 51. The applicable language is: "If two or more
persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in
the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised
the same * * * they shall be fined not more than $5,000 and imprisoned not
more than ten years, and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to any
office, or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or
laws of the United States." Some of the Sections of the Enforcement Act of
1870 were repealed in 1909, but Section 6, as then reenacted, stands good
for whatever it properly covers. United States v. Moseley, 238 U.S. 383, 35
S.Ct. 904, 59 L.Ed. 1355. In its construction it is proper to apply the
rule that criminal laws are to be construed strictly, and to bear in mind
that other rule that a construction is to be avoided, if possible, that
would render the law unconstitutional, or raise grave doubts thereabout. In
view of these rules it is held that "citizen" means "citizen of the United
States", and not person generally, nor citizen of a
State; and that the "rights and privileges secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States" means those specially and validly secured
thereby. Thus limited, this section has been enforced as constitutional. Ex
parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 4 S.Ct. 152, 28 L.Ed. 274; United States v.
Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 5 S.Ct. 35, 28 L.Ed. 673; Logan v. United States, 144
U.S. 263, 12 S.Ct. 617, 36 L.Ed. 429; United States v. Moseley, supra. In
the Yarbrough case the right involved was that to vote in a Congressional
election, as it was in the Moseley case; in the Waddell case it was the
right to make a federal homestead entry; and in the Logan case it was the
right to be secure from
lawless violence while a prisoner in the hands of a United States Marshal.
These matters, all within the federal power, Congress could protect under
the general authority to pass "all necessary and proper laws", under
U.S.C.A. Constitution, Art. 1, Sect. 8, Par. 18. But Section 5519 of the
Revised Statutes, which undertook similarly to punish conspiracies against
any person to deprive him of the equal protection of the laws, or Page 150
to prevent State authorities from affording such protection, was held
unconstitutional, because neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other
part of the Constitution put the matter of conspiracies by individuals
touching such matters within the power of Congress, but only gave power to
correct wrong action by the State or its officers. It was so held in United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 1 S.Ct. 601, 27 L.Ed. 290, where the person
mobbed was in the custody of a State Sheriff; and in Baldwin v. Franks, 120
U.S. 678, 7 S.Ct. 656, 763, 30 L.Ed. 766, where the rights of a Chinese
under a treaty of the United States were involved. It was again held that
the power of Congress was not extended to protect against violations by
individuals of the general rights of persons and citizens by the mention of
such rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S.C.A., in the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835. The reasoning of these cases,
though opposed by some dissents, is full and convincing, and the conclusion
reached as to the effect upon federal power of the Fourteenth Amendment has
stood for more than two generations. Pursuing further the application
of the statute now
before us, in Baldwin v. Franks, supra, it was held the word "citizen"
means citizen of the United States in a political sense, and did not
include a resident Chinese. Again in Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1,
27 S.Ct. 6, 51 L.Ed. 65, the section was invoked against conspirators who
were charged with interfering with citizens in their right or liberty of
contracting to work in a lawful occupation, but the court held that this
was a common right of all persons, and the Fourteenth Amendment did not put
it under federal protection except against State action; and the fact that
the persons there involved were negroes did not bring the matter within the
special ambit of the Thirteenth Amendment. Similarly in United States v.
Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 41 S.Ct. 133, 65 L.Ed. 270,
the right invaded by the conspirators was the citizen's right to remain in
the State of his choice, and to remove only at his own will. The Court
conceded the right to be fundamental and to belong to the citizens of each
State, and to be guarded in part against State interference by Art. 4,
Sect. 2 of the Constitution, but held that no federal offense was involved
in an abduction done by individual conspirators. The only case cited to us
in which a conspiracy against the right of freedom of speech was involved
is United States v. Hall, in the Circuit Court of Alabama, 26 Fed.Cas. 79,
No. 15,282. Justice Woods there upheld the indictment, but this was in
1871, before the decision of any of the above cited cases in the Supreme
Court, and it is not reconcilable with his own opinion in United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 1 S.Ct. 601, 27 L.Ed. 290. We are
controlled by the above cited decisions of the Supreme Court. That the
right of free speech and a free press, understood with the limitations to
prevent abuses which the law has always annexed to these freedoms, is
fundamental to the continuance of free political institutions, and is the
right both of citizens and other persons in the United States and the
several States needs no reassertion. The ground has been covered recently
and the right vindicated as against State action by federal power by
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, in such cases as Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660; De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353, 57 S.Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242,
57 S.Ct. 732, 81
L.Ed. 1066; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949;
Schneider v. State of New Jersey (Town of Irvington), 60 S.Ct. 146, 84
L.Ed. ___; Frank Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S.
496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423. But this effect of the Fourteenth
Amendment on State action, as has been shown, is not enough to bring
conspiracies of individuals within the punitive power of Congress under the
section we are discussing. Nor can the special mention of freedom of speech
and press in the First Amendment have that effect. The provision there is
"Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press." That the first ten amendments were intended as limitations on the
power of the federal government and are not grants of power to it has been
established from the beginning. A flat prohibition against the regulation
of a matter in one direction cannot result in endowing Congress with power
to regulate it in another direction. This amendment, while regarding
freedom in religion, in speaking and printing, and in assembling and
petitioning the government for redress of Page 151 grievances as
fundamental and precious to all, seeks only to forbid that Congress should
meddle therein. If Congress can make any law in behalf of these it is
because of some power elsewhere expressly granted, or because it is a law
necessary and proper to carry out such power. We are familiar with federal
laws touching on freedom of speech and press such as the Espionage Law of
1917, 40 Stats. 217 , which rested on the war power of Congress and the
general implied power to maintain the safety of
the Government. See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 39 S.Ct. 249,
63 L.Ed. 561; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed.
470. And we do not doubt that Congress may directly protect its citizens in
their right to assemble peaceably and petition the federal government for
redress, just as it may protect persons from unlawful violence while in
federal custody, under what are called the implied powers of Congress.
Federal elections might probably be directly protected by Congress
although no question of race, color, or previous condition of servitude
under the Fifteenth Amendment be present. But in the cases supposed
Congress would interfere directly only because of the necessity to maintain
a federal right in its integrity. Because the federal
government is a republican one in which the will of the people ought to
prevail, and because that will ought to be expressive of an informed public
opinion, the freedom of speaking and printing on subjects relating to that
government, its elections, its laws, its operations and its officers is
vital to it. Assuming that for this reason Congress, if it finds it
necessary, can legislate to maintain such freedom in that field, it does
not follow that Congress can legislate generally to preserve such freedom
in discussing religious affairs, or social or artistic matters, or matters
of purely State concern. Again, by Art. 4, Sect. 4, of the Constitution the
United States shall guarantee to every State a republican form of
government. Should a tyranny be set up in a State accompanied by a
suppression of free speech and press, conceivably the Congress might be
called on, temporarily in the execution of this guaranty, to pass a law
securing against individual
violence free speech in such State; but the section before us is not such
a law. The dividing line between the powers of the State and federal
governments in preserving these great general rights of persons, and the
difference between the rights and privileges of a citizen of the State and
of the United States, was clearly recognized in United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552, 23 L.Ed. 588, when the section under
discussion first came before the Supreme Court. It was there stated that
the right of assembly to petition Congress would be "an attribute of
national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed
by, the United States", and "if it had been alleged * * * that the object
of the defendants was to prevent a meeting for such a purpose, the case
would have been within the statute, and within the scope of the sovereignty of the
United States." But since the indictment only alleged generally that the
meeting was "for a lawful purpose", no crime was charged, because the
protection of the right of assembly in general was in the power of the
State. The other counts alleged conspiracies generally to deprive of the
equal protection of the law, and of life and liberty without due process
of law, and the Fourteenth Amendment was held not to extend federal power
as to those matters beyond the controlling of State action. On the
authority of the Cruikshank case the counts in the present indictment,
which do not disclose what the speaking and printing conspired against
related to, charge no offense, because the right to freely speak and print
about matters in general is not "secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States." The other counts which state the speaking and printing
related wholly to matters with which the City and County of Mobile were
concerned, and with which the
United States had no concern, expressly disclose the matter to have been
beyond the authority of Congress, and not a right or privilege protected
by the section. The demurrers to the indictment ought therefore to have
been sustained. The judgment is reversed, the conviction set aside, and the
cause remanded with direction to sustain the demurrers. Page 152 Page 178

Void Judgment any court anytime. Supreme Court Writ of Mandamus

CIVIL CASE NO: 009-02680-DM
Defendant/Counter Plaintiff, ) COA CASE NO: 292875
) COA CASE NO: 289312
)
****************************************

Denise Bruns Kim Alexander Bruns
Pro Se Litigant Pro Se Litigant



PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
FOR REVISORY REVIEW OF FRAUD, PERJURY, ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND ORDERS EXCEEDING JURISDICTION “on motion of a party filed at any time, the court may exercise revisory power and control over in case of fraud, mistake or irregularity.” (Lapeer Co Clerk v Lapeer Circuit Judges, 465 Mich 559 [2002]).’ as provided for by MCR 9.122(A) (2)
MOTION TO VOID JUDGMENTS ISSUED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
“There is no discretion to ignore lack of jurisdiction.” Joyce v. U.S. 474 2D 2). “Once jurisdiction is challenged, the court cannot proceed but rather, should dismiss the action.”
Melo v. US, 505 F2d 1026

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES………………………………………………………….……….4
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED…………………………………………….……...8
STANDARD OF REVIEW……………………………………………………………………9
JURISDICTIONALSTATEMENT………………………………………………………..….10
STATEMENT OF FACTS……….……………………………………………………………16
ISSUES……………….………………………………………………………………………..18
COMPLAINT ………………………………………………………………………….32
RELIEF SOUGHT……,……………………………………………………………………….33

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Lapeer Co Clerk v Lapeer Circuit Judges, 465 Mich 559 [2002])………………………… 2
Joyce v. U.S. 474 2D 2)…………………………………………………….……………….2
Melo v. US, 505 F2d 1026…………………………..………………………..……………..2 30A Am Jur Judgments '' 44, 45………………………………………………..……………8
Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (C.A. 7 Ill. (1999)……..……………9
(Lapeer Co Clerk v Lapeer Circuit Judges, 465 Mich 559 [2002])……………..……..…….9
Rose v. Himely (1808) 4 Cranch 241, 2 L ed 608…………………………………..……….9
Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 US 714, 24 L ed 565…………………………………..………9
Thompson v. Whitman (1873) 18 Wall 457, 21 l ED 897……………………………..……9
Windsor v. McVeigh (1876) 93 US 274, 23 L ed 914………………………………….…...9
McDonald v. Mabee (1917) 243 US 90, 37 Sct 343, 61 L ed 608…………………….……9
(Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972)….…..9
Reynolds v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 80 S.W.2d 1087, 1092……….…9
Sramek v. Sramek, 17 Kan. App 2d 573, 576-7, 840 P. 2d 553 (1992)…………………….10
rev. denied 252 Kan. 1093(1993)…………………………………………………………...10
First Federal Commodity Trust Corp. v. Comm’r of Sec”.,272 Md.329,333(1974) ………11
Kraft, Supra, 35 Md. App. at 311…………………………………………………………..11
Ventresca, Supra, 266 Md. At 403…………………………………………………………12
Davis v. Attorney General of Md” No.123 (2009)………….………………………………13
Eyler. Quoting ”Bland vs. Hammond” 177 Md. App. 340, 347, 168 Md……………..……13
Davis v. Attorney General of Md” No.123 (2009)……………………………………….…13
Eyler. Quoting Weitz, Supra, 272 Ms. At 631………………………………………………13
Early v. Early, 338 Md. 639, 652(1995)…………………………………………………….13
Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (C.A. 7 Ill. (1999)………………….13
Fredman Brothers Funiture v. Dept. of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2D 202, 486 N.E. 2D 893(1985)..13
Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill. App. 3D 393(1962)………………………………………...13
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683,1687 (1974…13
Brown v. Vankeuren, 340 Ill. 118, 122 (1930)……………………………………………...13
Snowden v. Balt. Gas & Electric Co. 300 Md. 555, 559-60n.2(1984)………………………13
id at 560 n.2 quoting United States v. Fort Sill Apache Tribe, Stateb of Okla.,501 F2d 861, 863-64 (t. Cls, 1974). …………………………………………………………………………..…13
Davis v. Attorney General of Md” No.123 (2009)……………………………………………13
Eyler. quoting “Platt v. Platt”, 302 Md. 9, 13(1984)………………………………………….13
J.T. Masonry Co. v. Oxford Construction Srvs., Inc.”, 314 Md. 498, 506 (1989)……………13
Sabariego v Maverick, 124 US 261, 31 L Ed 430, 8 S Ct 461……………………………….14
(1 Freeman on Judgments, 120-c.)…………………………………………………………..14
Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962)……………14
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5-Triad Energy Corp. v. McNell, 110 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
Klug v. U.S., 620 F. Supp. 892 (D.S.C. 1985)……………………………………………….14
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 S Ct.1019………………………………………………….14
Pure Oil Co. v. City of Northlake, 10 Ill. 2D 241, 245, 140 N.E. 2D 289 (1956) …………..14
Hallberg v. Goldblatt Bros., 363 Ill. 25 (1936)………………………………………………14
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 – Triad Energy Corp. v. McNell 110 F.R.D. 382 (382 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)…………………………………………………………………………………………14
Stillwell v. Markham 10 P.2d 15, 16, 135 Kan. 206 (1932)……………………………….....15
Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray 120, cited in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872)..15
U.S. v. Will,449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980) …………………15
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)…………………………15
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958)……………………………………………15
Quinn v Mouw-Quinn, 552 NW2d 843 (SD, 1996)………………………………………........16
Clarke v Wayne Circuit Judge, 193 Mich 33; 159 NW 387 (1916)………………………........16
Johns v Johns, 178 Mich App 101, 106; 443 NW2d 446 (1989)………………………..……..21
Quinn v Mouw-Quinn, 552 NW2d 843 (SD, 1996)………………………………………........21
Burba v Burba (After Remand), 461 Mich 637, 643-645, 647; 610 NW2d 873 (2000)…..…...22
Macomb Co Dep’t of Social Services v Westerman, 250 Mich App 372, 377; 645 NW2d 710 (2002)……………………………………………………………………………………..……22
Evink v Evink, 214 Mich App 172, 175-176; 542 NW2d 328 (1995)………………………….22
People ex. re. Brzica v Village of Lake Barrington, 644 NE 2d 66 (Ill app. 2 dist. 1994)……..23
Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (C.A. 7 Ill. (1999)……………….........25
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974)………………….……………..25
Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill. App. 3D 393(1962) including the Fourth………….……….....25
Reynolds v. Bolunteer State Life Ins. Co., Tex. Civ.App., 80 S.W.2d 1087……………....…...27
Klugh v. U.S., D.C.S.C., 610 F Sup.892, 901…………………………..……………..…….…27
Brown v. Vankeuren, 340 Ill. 118, 122 (1930)…………………………………………..……..28
Rose v. Himely (1808) 4 Cranch 241, 2 L ed 608………………………………………..……..29
Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 US 714, 24 L ed 565……………………………………..…….…29
Thompson v. Whitman (1873) 18 Wall 457, 21 l ED 897……………………………..…….…29
Windsor v. McVeigh (1876) 93 US 274, 23 L ed 914………………………………..………...29
McDonald v. Mabee (1917) 243 US 90, 37 Sct 343, 61 L ed 608…………………..………...29
(Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972)……........29
Clarke v Wayne Circuit Judge, 193 Mich 33; 159 NW 387 (1916)……………………..……..31


Statutes Cited
MI. Code.” (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), 6-408 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article
(“CJ”), and Rule-535(b)………………………………………………………………..………12
Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(B) (4),………………………………………………..14
28 U.S.C.A., U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5……………………………………………………...14
Michigan Child Protection Law Act of 1975……………………………….…………………16
Michigan Supreme Court Custody Act…………………………………………..……………….…..21
False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. § 3729)……………………………………….…………………20
False Claims Act and (Title 31U.S.C. § 3729-3733)………………………..…………………22
18 USC - U.S. Code - Title 18: Crimes and Criminal Procedure (January 2004)….…………22
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment……………………………………………………………26
CHILD CUSTODY ACT OF 1970 Act 91 of 1970, 722.27a, Parenting time, Sec. 7a. (3)…..27
Federal Questions Case (28U.S.C. §1331)…………………………………………………….31
Diversity Case (28 U.S.C. §1332)………………………………………………….…………..31
42 U.S.C. §1983…………………………………………………………………….…………..31
1746 of title 28 United States Code…………………………………………………………….33


Court Rules Cited
MCR 9.122(A) (2)………………………………………………………………………………..2
MI. Code.” (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), 6-408 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”), and Rule-535(b)...…………………………………………………..……………………………15
MCL 552.23(1)……………………….………………………………………………………….17
MCL 552.605(2)…………………………………………………………………………………21
MCL 552.17(1)…………………………………………………………………………………..22
MCR 2.114(a) ……………………………………………………………………………………22


STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
A - WERE DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS USED TO UNLAWFULLY CHANGE CUSTODY
AND DESTROY THE DEFENDANTS?

B – WAS FRAUD, PERJURY and VIOLATIONS OF FALSE CLAIMS ACT USED
BY PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS TO CHANGE CUSTODY?

C – WAS FRAUDULENT GAL & CPS REPORT USED TO UNLAWFULLY REMOVE THE
MINOR CHILD AND CHANGE OF CUSTODY?

D – WERE DEFENDANT’S PRO SE RIGHTS AND HER DEFENDANT’S RIGHTS
VIOLATED?

E - DID JUDGES CONTINUE AFTER JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGES WERE
SUBMITTED?
F – WAS THERE A PATTERN & PRACTICE OF EXTREME JUDICIAL BIAS?








STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE: Revisory Review of Fraud, Perjury, Abuse of Discretion and Orders Exceeding Jurisdiction
This Court in Melo v. US, 505 F2d 1026 succinctly explained:
“Once jurisdiction is challenged, the court cannot proceed when it clearly appears
that the court lacks jurisdiction, the court has no authority to reach merits, but rather, should dismiss the action,”
30A Am Jur Judgments '' 44, 45. “A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded a valid adjudication, but may be entirely disregarded, or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid,”









JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant’s petition for void judgment: “An order procured by fraud, can be attacked at
any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally, provided that the party is properly before the court,” Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (C.A. 7 Ill. (1999).
Void judgment issued in excess of jurisdiction: “There is no discretion to ignore lack of jurisdiction.” Joyce v. U.S. 474 2D 2). “Once jurisdiction is challenged, the court cannot proceed but rather, should dismiss the action.”
Melo v. US, 505 F2d 1026
Defendant’s petition for writ of mandamus: For Revisory Review of Fraud,
Perjury, Abuse of Discretion and Orders Exceeding Jurisdiction: “on motion of a party filed at any time, the court may exercise revisory power and control over in case of fraud, mistake or irregularity.” (Lapeer Co Clerk v Lapeer Circuit Judges, 465 Mich 559 [2002]).’ as provided for by MCR 9.122(A) (2)
“An order that exceeds the jurisdiction of the court, is void, or voidable, and can be attacked in any proceeding in any court where the validity of the judgment comes into issue” Rose v. Himely (1808) 4 Cranch 241, 2 L ed 608; Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 US 714, 24 L ed 565; Thompson v. Whitman (1873) 18 Wall 457, 21 l ED 897; Windsor v. McVeigh (1876) 93 US 274, 23 L ed 914; McDonald v. Mabee (1917) 243 US 90, 37 Sct 343, 61 L ed 608.
"a Court must vacate any judgment entered in excess of its jurisdiction," (Lubben v.
Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972)
“Void judgment is one which has no legal force or effect, invalidity of which may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected at any time and at any place directly or collaterally,” Reynolds v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 80 S.W.2d 1087, 1092.
- “Once jurisdiction is challenged, the court cannot proceed when it clearly appears
that the court lacks jurisdiction, the court has no authority to reach merits, but rather, should dismiss the action,” Melo v. US, 505 F2d 1026
- “A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded a valid adjudication, but
may be entirely disregarded, or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid,” 30A Am Jur Judgments '' 44, 45.
- “A judgment rendered by a court without personal jurisdiction over the
defendant is void. It is a nullity. A judgment shown to be void for lack of personal service on the defendant is a nullity,” Sramek v. Sramek, 17 Kan. App 2d 573, 576-7, 840 P. 2d 553 (1992) rev. denied 252 Kan. 1093(1993)
Therefore, Defendant/Counter submits that her void judgment and writ of mandamus lies properly before this Court.
Now comes the Defendant, Denise Bruns, a reluctant pro se litigant and victim of ineffective assistance of counsel, unlawful malicious prosecution, attorney fraud and perjury that usurped the judicial process, and a pattern and practice of extreme judicial bias that began with the Defendant Denise Bruns submission of her financial form informing the court she was a 15 (fifteen) year stay-at-home mother without any income the court being fully aware the plaintiff was the only source of income during the fifteen year marriage denied the defendant paid legal representation. The court being fully aware the plaintiff was the only source of income during the fifteen year marriage denied the defendant paid legal representation. Defendant Denise Bruns kept the family together during the two year period when Plaintiff deserted the family, and caused a nine-year divorce-custody battle to cover-up the kidnapping of her children under color of law by judicial appointees, lawyers and judges that profited financially. The felonies and offenses in the above-cited case threatens the Constitution, and Defendant Bruns preys the Michigan Supreme Court will interpret this pro se pleading as broadly as possible to ensure justice, and exercise revisory jurisdiction, review and correct “glaring injustice and irremediable injury” as a supervisory review of the unlawful hearings, void judicial orders.
Attorney Catherine Appel and Defendant’s oral requests and Motions to Void Judgment
December 26, 2002 continuing to o that have been suppressed and ignored, despite that they remain unchallenged and unadjudicated, yet the Court continued “on the merits” in excess of jurisdiction and unlawfully deprived Defendant of custody, and pursuant to the MI. Court of Appeals and US Supreme Court citations listed below (Pgs. 12-15) Defendant petitions this Court to perform a Revisory Review of orders based on fraud and perjury, orders that exceeded jurisdiction and abuse of judicial discretion as the irrefutable evidence herein was submitted to inferior Courts only to be suppressed, ignored or dismissed for fabricated procedural reasons to usurp the judicial process and deny justice.
Therefore, as a result of the Kent County, 17th Circuit Court and the MI. Court of Appeals and the Attorney Grievance Committee denying Defendant justice, “there is no remedy available in the inferior Courts” ”First Federal Commodity Trust Corp. v. Comm’r of Sec”.,272 Md.329,333(1974); Kraft, Supra, 35 Md. App. at 311, Defendant requests this Court exercise Supervisory Jurisdiction and review the merits and issue a Writ of Mandamus and; 1) issue orders to void judgments or vacate custody orders entered after November 9, 2004 that unlawfully awarded custody to Plaintiff based on overt fraud and perjury in “emergency ex-parte hearings” when no emergency existed (See Exhibits 5 & 6)(case #00-02680-DM), and immediately revert sole custody of the minor child, Alida Georgette Bruns, to Defendant Bruns as it existed before attorney fraud upon the Court and perjury robbed the Court of jurisdiction, refer the fraud upon the Court and perjury by Plaintiff and his corrupt attorneys “to the proper authorities” to prosecute their felonies, pursuant to the following rulings by the MI. Court of Appeals and the US Supreme Court and other well established citations issued regarding jurisdiction, fraud and perjury that usurped the judicial process.
1) SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION - MI COURT OF APPEALS
”First Federal Commodity Trust Corp. v. Comm’r of Sec.”, 272 Md.329, 333(1974); Kraft, Supra, 35 Md.App. at 311 states “Court’s Supervision grant a motion to vacate as and an appeal is necessary to vindicate rights wrongfully lost,” Ventresca, Supra, 266 Md. At 403”;
“Appeals of orders that are not final but treated as if they are,” Snowden v. Balt. Gas & Electric Co. 300 Md. 555, 559-60n.2(1984).
“All other rulings are intertwined with the Court’s decision to issue an arrest
warrant these rulings properly may be challenged,” See id at 560 n.2 quoting United States v.
Fort Sill Apache Tribe, Stateb of Okla.,501 F2d 861, 863-64 (t. Cls, 1974).
in appeal a Circuit Court’s judgment is governed by MI. Code.” (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), 6-408 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”), and Rule-535(b) “on motion of a party filed at any time , the court may exercise revisory power and control over in case of fraud, mistake or irregularity.”
“Once fraud, mistake, or irregularity has been shown, the court may vacate the judgment upon consideration of equitable factors, including whether the moving party has shown that he has acted in good faith and with ordinary diligence, and that he has meritorious cause of action or defense” “Davis v. Attorney General of Md” No.123 (2009) Eyler. quoting “Platt v. Platt”, 302 Md. 9, 13(1984); also see “J.T. Masonry Co. v. Oxford Construction Srvs., Inc.”, 314 Md. 498, 506 (1989). “We review the court’s exercise of discretion to vacate the judgment, upon consideration of the equitable factors for abuse” “Davis v. Attorney General of Md” No.123 (2009) Eyler. Quoting ”Bland vs. Hammond” 177 Md. App. 340, 347, 168 Md; and quoting Furthermore, an irregularity in the contemplating of Rule 2-535(b) is “not an error”, but a nonconformity of “process or procedure” “Davis v. Attorney General of Md” No.123 (2009) Eyler. Quoting Weitz, Supra, 272 Ms. At 631; Early v. Early, 338 Md. 639, 652(1995)
2) VOID ORDERS BASED ON FRAUD
“An order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either
directly or collaterally, provided that the party is properly before the court,” Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (C.A. 7 Ill. (1999).
“An order is void if fraud was committed in the procurement of jurisdiction,” Fredman Brothers Funiture v. Dept. of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2D 202, 486 N.E. 2D 893(1985)
“An order is void if it was procured by fraud upon the court,” In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill. App. 3D 393(1962)
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683,1687 (1974) states "when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States";
“A judgment is void if a defective petition was filed, ”Brown v. Vankeuren, 340
Ill. 118, 122 (1930)
“A judgment of a court without hearing the party or giving him an opportunity to be
heard is not a judicial determination of his rights, and is not entitled to respect in any other
tribunal” Sabariego v Maverick, 124 US 261, 31 L Ed 430, 8 S Ct 461
"If a court grants relief, which under the circumstances it hasn't any authority to grant, its judgment is to that extent void." (1 Freeman on Judgments, 120-c.)
“When judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or they enforce a void order (an order issued by a judge without jurisdiction), they become trespassers of the law, and are engaged in treason,” The Court in Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962) held that "not every action by a judge is in exercise of his judicial function. ... it is not a judicial function for a judge to commit an intentional tort even though the tort occurs in the courthouse."
3) AUTHORITIES REGARDING DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS
“Void judgment is one where court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or entry
of order violated due process,” U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5-Triad Energy Corp. v. McNell, 110 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
- Judgment is a void judgment if the court that rendered the judgment lacked
jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process, Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(B) (4), 28 U.S.C.A., U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 – Klug v. U.S., 620 F. Supp. 892 (D.S.C. 1985).
- “A judgment is void if it violated due process,” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 S Ct.1019; Pure Oil Co. v. City of Northlake, 10 Ill. 2D 241, 245, 140 N.E. 2D 289 (1956) Hallberg v. Goldblatt Bros., 363 Ill. 25 (1936)
Void judgment where the court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or entry of
order violated due process, U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 – Triad Energy Corp. v. McNell 110
F.R.D. 382 (382 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
The subject-matter of a criminal offense is the crime itself. Subject-matter in its broadest
sense means the cause; the object; the thing in dispute. Stillwell v. Markham 10 P.2d 15, 16, 135
Kan. 206 (1932)
“Due Process is a requirement of the U.S. Constitution. Violation of the United States Constitution by a judge deprives that person from acting as a judge under the law. He/she is acting as a private person, and not in the capacity of being a judge,”:Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray 120, cited in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872)
“any judge who acts without jurisdiction is engaged in an act of treason,” U.S. v. Will,
449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821).
“Engaging in an act of treason against the United States Constitution by any citizen of the United States is an act of war against the United States,” Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958):
4) FACTS OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Kim Bruns and Defendant Denise Bruns were married on November 7, 1987.
Three children were born to the marriage, to wit, Josiah Alexander Bruns, Oliver Mitchell Bruns, Alida Georgette Bruns, dob, 5/27/1997, only custody and visitation as to Alida Georgette is in dispute in this matter.
Defendant Bruns, a 15 (fifteen) year stay-at-home mother who kept the family together during the two year period when Plaintiff deserted the family
October 13, 2004 and Amended November 9, 2004 orders: “The defendant shall have sole legal and physical custody of the parties minor children, because the court finds that the Plaintiff has abandoned his role as a parent.” (Exhibit 1) as the father did not attempt to contact the children until the defendant filed her petition); Quinn v Mouw-Quinn, 552 NW2d 843 (SD, 1996) Pursuant to law: Unfit parent: “One who failed to visit, provide support been abusive, neglected, or failed to provide proper care.
5) CASE HISTORY
On December 25, 1991 the plaintiffs pattern of documented domestic violence began with the charge of a non aggravated assault with 1 year probation against Defendant Bruns –see (Exhibits 2 – 8)
December 13, 1999 plaintiff admitted in writing to criminal sexual misconduct to the parties’ three minor children, “I did that with the boys also. It was her butt not her genially. Don’t start getting weird on me Denise but if you want me to stop, I will.” (Exhibit 4) The Michigan Child Protection Law Act of 1975 states that sexual misconduct includes but is not limited to any contact or inter-action between a child and an adult,
January 19, 2001, the Plaintiff (Kim Bruns) pinched the minor child Oliver Bruns, DOB 7/21/90 on his chest leaving a large bruise. This incident was reported to Child Protective Services their investigation substantiated the Plaintiff of child abuse. Clarke v Wayne Circuit Judge, 193 Mich 33; 159 NW 387 (1916).
Being fully advised of the above documented incidents of abuse by the Plaintiff the lower court appointed Guardian Ad Litem-Attorney Mary Benedict, as a “ringer”, on November 21, 2001 (Exhibit 9) to investigate the facts relating to the care, custody of the minor children Josiah Bruns dob 1/14/89, Oliver Bruns dob 7/21/90 and Alida Bruns dob 5/27/97.
Benedict’s investigation and report (Exhibit 9) began a pattern and practice of fraud upon the Court that usurped the judicial process and included false child abuse allegations, false attorney affidavits, and perjury used to maliciously prosecute defendant Bruns to cover up the kidnapping of the minor child under color of law. Specifically, GAL/Attorney ignored the minor children repeated reports of abuse by the plaintiff supported with evidence of material facts of his documented history of abuse, properly leaving the trial court to decide. (Police Reports Attached Exhibits 2-8)
6) ISSUE: PATTERN & PRACTICE OF EXTREME JUDICIAL BIAS – November 21, 2001 (Exhibit 10) the Parties were ordered to equally compensate the GAL-Attorney at the rate of $80.00 per hour, to further oppress Defendant financially and judicial malfeasance, in violation of: Chapter 215: Section 56A. Investigations; “The compensation shall be fixed by the Court and shall be paid by the commonwealth, together with any expense approved by the court, upon certificate to the state treasurer.” The judge’s order ignored the plaintiff’ was the sole source of support for the defendant a 15 (fifteen) year stay home mother. The judge denied Defendant, a fifteen year stay at home mother who kept the family together during the two years that Plaintiff deserted the family, alimony in violation of MCL 552.23(1) with another order exhibiting extreme judicial bias and another example of the pattern and practice of judicial wrong doings in an attempt to eliminate the defendant from the lives of her children.
GAL-Attorney Benedict and therapist Steven Griffioen agreed to conceal exculpatory evidence by only providing the children a safe place to express their feelings during the custody proceeding and keeping the children’s therapy records confidential and would not be brought into the custody dispute. February 14, 2002 (Exhibit 11) court ordered Griffioen by recommendation of Benedict custody evaluations to be performed by Dr. Griffioen. (Exhibit 12)
August 6, 2004 (Exhibit 13) the defendant a pro se litigant ordered to pay the GAL-Attorney Fees within 15 day. GAL-Attorney Benedict “I’m asking the court to order her to list the house for sale at a price to pay my fee, as well as the existing mortgage.” “I don’t care if Ms. Bruns gets anything out of the house at this point.” The defendant advised the court the Plaintiff had not voluntarily paid child support for the three minor children with the defendant since November 19, 2002. The defendant request for a quick claim deed to refinance the home and retroactive child support back to the entry of the consent judgment was denied. Referee Dok “it is not properly before this court. If Benedict forecloses on the defendant’s home where would she like the children to live? The defendant’s request for an evidentiary Hearing to reduce the GAL-Attorney bill was denied.
October 28, 2005 (Exhibit 14), reintroduction therapy after plaintiff abandoned his parental role court denied the minor children confidentiality. Plaintiff’s Attorney Irons petitioned a show cause the martial home hadn’t been sold or refinanced and the defendant was ordered by Judge Carpenter to sign a release disclosing the minor children’s therapy records. The request for a quick claim was denied on August 6, 2004 defendant could not proceed without the plaintiff and Attorney Irons cooperation to execute the quick claim deed. September 26, 2008: The defendant having sole, legal physical custody of the minor child Alida paid $427.20 dollars for her to continue attending Tri-unity Unity Christian School. (Exhibit 15) October 10, 2008 (Exhibit 16), The Plaintiff did not have custody and arbitrarily changed the minor children’s schools, the proper procedure to change schools would have been to file a motion. The Defendant’s Attorney Catherine Appel asked the court to hold the Plaintiff in contempt. Judge Carpenter denied charging the plaintiff in contempt and further responded “According to case law, change custody on and ex parte or a temporary basis. Reality is even though Mr. Bruns technically is given extended parenting time opposed to some type of custody , at this time he is the person the child is spending days and night. I believe it would be very inappropriate and very destabilizing to change her school setting in a couple of weeks we will have completion of the evidence in the trial and I’ll be in a position to make a long-term decision. Defendant concluded “Bias—that’s bias Carpenter”
January 11, 2006 (Exhibit 17) Motion to determine responsibility for uninsured health care expensed was adjourned, defendants Attorney James Kraayeveld did not appear, the motions was never rescheduled. Do to ineffective counsel the defendant shall reimburse the Plaintiffs attorney fees $350.00. The defendant properly submitted Dr. Makedonski therapy bills for the minor children in compliance with the FOC’s recommendation and order. Plaintiff was not held responsible for children’s therapy bills.
FOC on December 11, 2007 abated defendant’s child support 100%. Referee Komar: “Judge Carpenter is doing and issued and order consistent with what she has in Mind.” “I’m not going to make any changes to what she is doing, it’s inappropriate for me to step in and do something for a couple months.” Judge Carpenter Ordered on December 11, 2008, March 14, 2009, April 25, 2009, October 24, 2009 (Transcript Exhibit 18) child support for Alida was not to be abated. October 10, 2008 Attorney Appel asked Judge Carpenter to enforced two previous child support orders. Attorney Appel: “There are two prior orders. The last I checked, the court speaks through its orders except today when legal custody means nothing.” Judge Carpenter:’ I believe that the motion is not timely. All aspects of issues relating to the children are before the court in a trial status. Defendant’s request reinstatement of child support in compliance with courts orders denied

7) ISSUE B: WERE FRAUD, PERJURY and VIOLATIONS OF FALSE CLAIMS ACT USED BY GAL-ATTORNEY, PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS TO CHANGE CUSTODY?
CUSTODY ORDERS
December 14, 2001 (Exhibit 19) Gal- Attorney Benedict a “ringer” “Emergency” Petition for a change of custody declaring the defendant was “mentally abusive “and “a threat to the minor children.” Judge Carpenter issued a restraining order and forced into supervised visitation based on fraudulent allegations – contained no first-hand evidence of any kind to support Benedict’s claim that Defendant Bruns had abused neglected or mentally harmed her children. Therefore, the emergency motion “on its face” is legally insufficient absent of first-hand evidence or knowledge, and overtly violates the False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. § 3729). The histrionics and hearsay it contains “is legally insufficient” and, by law, does not provide probable cause to convene an “emergency” immediate removal without due process of law. Since this time the defendant has been forced to defend herself against a pattern of false allegations of child abuse whose due process rights have been violated, Defendant pro se rights have been violated and those of her minor children as Defendant Bruns’ original lawyers took her money and sold her out, and failed to submit to the Court that Defendant is a good parent who has injured no one and broken no law, The lower court did not have jurisdiction to entertain a change of custody when there was no emergency and did not have probable cause that any “emergency” existed. The Michigan Court of Appeals and the US Supreme Court have ruled repeatedly that “when jurisdiction is challenged” the merits of the case are to be halted and jurisdiction addressed before continuing “on the merits.

8) ISSUE D: CONSENT JUDGMENT
November 19, 2002 (Exhibit 20) the parties entered a consent judgment for a change in custody. Defendant was always the primary caretaker of the children and support would be awarded to neither party. “[a]n agreement by the parties regarding support will not suspend the authority of the court to enter a support order.” Johns v Johns, 178 Mich App 101, 106; 443 NW2d 446 (1989).

October 13 and November 9, 2004: (Exhibit 1) “The defendant shall have sole legal and physical custody of the parties minor children, because the court finds that the Plaintiff has abandoned his role as a parent.” as the father did not attempt to contact the children until the defendant filed her petition); Quinn v Mouw-Quinn, 552 NW2d 843 (SD, 1996) (Exhibit 4) Pursuant to law: , Unfit parent: “One who failed to visit, provide support been abusive, neglected, or failed to provide proper care. Michigan Supreme Court Custody Act provides, in pertinent part: “There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has a history of perpetrating domestic violence against the other parent, a child, may not be awarded sole legal custody, sole physical custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical custody of a child. A parent has a history of perpetrating domestic violence if the court finds that, during one incident of domestic violence, the parent caused serious physical injury or the court finds that the parent has engaged in more than one incident of domestic violence. The presumption may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence.” obligated to enter a support order in compliance with the consent judgment and the children’s rights and entitlement to support obligation of the plaintiff.
Judge Carpenter had a statutory duty and is required to comply with MCL 552.605(2) to follow the criteria set forth in the Michigan Child Support Formula Manual (“MCSFM”), when modifying a child support award. Burba v Burba (After Remand), 461 Mich 637, 643-645, 647; 610 NW2d 873 (2000). The consent judgment was contrary to the well-established principle and public policy of the state of Michigan that parents may not bargain away their children’s right and entitlement to support, by obligation of the plaintiff. Macomb Co Dep’t of Social Services v Westerman, 250 Mich App 372, 377; 645 NW2d 710 (2002); Evink v Evink, 214 Mich App 172, 175-176; 542 NW2d 328 (1995). Judge Carpenter October 13, 2004 and November 9, 2004 order violated MCL 552.17(1), it effectively nullified the plaintiff’s child support obligation, contrary to the child support formula, and “as the circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children require,” (Exhibit 1)
9) ISSUE B: WERE FRAUD, PERJURY and VIOLATIONS OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND 18 USC - U.S. Code AND MCR 2.114 (a) WILLFULLY USED TO CHANGE CUSTODY?
December 11, 2007 Ex Parte Motion (Exhibit 21) Attorney Irons “ringer” “Emergency” Petition for a change of custody declaring Child Protective Services Bolden’s report (Exhibit 21)found the defendant had “abused, neglected and threatened harmed “her minor child Alida. Attorney Irons and Plaintiff Bruns certified as true and accurate procured by fraudulent allegations of child abuse, restraining orders and supervised visitation orders were issued. The Plaintiff’s affidavit, (Exhibit 22) certified as true and accurate was prima facia procured by fraudulent allegations of child abuse the “Emergency” Petition – contained no first-hand evidence or knowledge of any kind to support their claim that Defendant Bruns had abused neglected or mentally harmed her daughter. Therefore, the affidavit “on its face” is legally insufficient, and overtly violates the False Claims Act and (Title 31U.S.C. § 3729-3733), 18 USC - U.S. Code - Title 18: Crimes and Criminal Procedure (January 2004) and MCR 2.114(a)
The histrionics and hearsay it contains “is legally insufficient” and, by law, does not provide probable cause to convene an “emergency” ex-parte hearing. The lower court did not have jurisdiction to convene an ex-parte hearings when there was no emergency and did not receive probable cause that any “emergency” existed. The Plaintiff has a documented history of abuse MOLESTATION and abandonment towards the Defendant and children, (Exhibits attached) according to law that alone gives no rights to custody of the minor child, when the Defendant HAS NO PROVEN HISTORY OF ABUSE, MOLESTATION AND ABANDONEMENT OF THE CHILDREN. This cannot be disputed.
September 8, 2008 CPS Bolden (Exhibit 24) testified her report was erred, which she did not correct. In fact she could not substantiate neglect, emotional abuse or threatened harm. The lower court lost subject matter jurisdiction based on the CPS Bolden’s retraction, which negated the allegation for a change in circumstance. In People ex. re. Brzica v Village of Lake Barrington, 644 NE 2d 66 (Ill app. 2 dist. 1994) it was stated that orders lacked jurisdiction over parties or subject matter lacks inherent power to enter judgment.
December 11, 2008 (Exhibit 25) Decision and Order by Administrative Law Judge C. David Jones reviewed the evidence and determined: “The evidence on the record does not show child abuse or neglect of Alida. There is no evidence of actual harm, negligent treatment or that the Petitioner placed Alida at an unreasonable risk and the great weight of evidence there was no threatened harm. Petitioner’s dispute was resolved by the time CPS investigation. Indeed Alida reported no neglect or abuse (although in regular conflict with her father); she wanted to continue living with Petitioner.” (Exhibit 25)
July, 28, 2009 Oliver Bruns retracted his allegations of abuse and further reported the “CPS exaggerated and pushed the situation far beyond a point of reason.” (Exhibit 26)
CPS Bolden and Oliver Bruns retractions (Exhibit 24 & 26) of their allegations against the defendant, Administrative Law Judge David C. Jones reviewed the evidence and determined she was innocent the change of custody was unwarranted and “unfounded”. (See Exhibits 24-26)
Despite the fact the defendant had two previous Psychological evaluations (Exhibit 27 & 28) the most recent Psychological Evaluation by Dr. Jarchow’s (Exhibit 29) and Dr. Makedonsky whose credentials as an expert witness have been accepted in Michigan, testified September 8, 2008 “the mother/child relationship is positive and appropriate”. Based on clinical knowledge its Dr Makedonski’s (Transcript Exhibit 30) opinion that “it’s in Alida’s best interest to return to live with her mother, separation anxiety will be detrimental to Alida.” It is not unreasonable to assume that Plaintiff Bruns and corrupt Attorneys Joan Irons and corrupt Judges Carpenter and Referee Komar ignored and suppressed Makedonski’s testimony and Interim Report to unlawfully get rid of the defendant so that Plaintiff Kim Bruns could “take her child away
December 2, 2007 (Exhibit 31) custody order awarding custody to the plaintiff was unlawful based on his Psychological Evaluation, (Exhibit 32) CPS Bolden’s September 8, 2008 retraction of her abuse allegations, Oliver Bruns 7-28-09 retraction, December 11, 2008 order and recommendation of Administrative Law Judge C.David Jones “Petitioner’s dispute was resolved by the time CPS investigation. (Exhibit 25)
Alida reported no neglect or abuse (although in regular conflict with her father); she wanted to continue living with Petitioner.” September 8, 2008: Dr. Makedonsky expert witness testimony and interim report. ( Exhibit 30) “the mother/child relationship is positive and appropriate”. Based on clinical knowledge “it’s in Alida’s best interest to return to live with her mother, separation anxiety will be detrimental to Alida.” Pursuant to: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AMENDMENT (C) Section 71.004 for the U.S. Constitution which states: the court shall not appoint as sole managing conservator a party who has a history of committing family violence.
- MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT CUSTODY ACT provides, in pertinent part: “There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has a history of perpetrating domestic violence against the other parent, a child, may not be awarded sole legal custody, sole physical custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical custody of a child. “An order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally, provided that the party is properly before the court,” Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (C.A. 7 Ill. (1999). The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) states "when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States";
Judge Carpenter, Attorney Joan Irons and Plaintiff Bruns all have engaged in a pattern and practice of human trafficking based on fraud, perjury, false child abuse reports, motions, attorney affidavits, ex parte orders violating due process, and civil and constitutional rights all under the color of law. (Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill. App. 3D 393(1962) including the Fourth, Fourteenth Amendments and other violations of the False Claims Act, (31 U.S.C. § 3729) and 18 USC - U.S. Code - Title 18: Crimes and Criminal Procedure (January 2004) and MCR 2.114(a)
December 2, 2008 custody order is void pursuant to: 1) The Plaintiff has a documented history of abuse MOLESTATION and abandonment towards the Defendant and children, (Exhibits attached) 2) according to law that alone gives no rights to custody of the minor child this cannot be disputed. 3) VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AMENDMENT (C) Section 71.004 for the U.S. Constitution states: the court shall not appoint as sole managing conservator a party who has a history of committing family violence. 4) MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT CUSTODY ACT provides, in pertinent part: “There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has a history of perpetrating domestic violence against the other parent, a child, may not be awarded sole legal custody, sole physical custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical custody of a child. 10) ISSUE A: WAS A PATTERN & PRACTICE OF DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS USED TO UNLAWFULLY DESTROY THE DEFENDANT BRUNS?
Secret Hearings Violate Due Process
June 3, 2009 (Exhibit 33) Attorney Irons petitions and “emergency” ex parte hearings alleging the defendant attempted to abduct the minor child from a school event which parents were invited and the minor child Alida was involved. Attorney Irons affidavit, (Exhibit 34) certified as true and accurate was prima facia procured by fraudulent allegations of child abduction issued an order to suspend any and all contact between the minor child and the defendant until further order of this court. “Emergency” Petition – contained no first-hand evidence or knowledge of any kind but instead contained false claims, fraud, histrionics and “quotes” from unnamed third parties to support her claim that Defendant Bruns had attempted to abduct the minor child and that the defendant was not invited to the school event at Michigan Adventure. Therefore, the emergency petition “on its face” is legally insufficient, absent of probable cause and overtly violates the False Claims Act and (Title 31U.S.C. § 3729-3733), 18 USC - U.S. Code - Title 18: Crimes and Criminal Procedure (January 2004), MCR 2.114(a) and CHILD CUSTODY ACT OF 1970 Act 91 of 1970, 722.27a, Parenting time, Sec. 7a. (3)
June 19, 2009 (Exhibit 35) the docket reflects the defendant Bruns petitioned the court for a void judgment, re-instate visitation of the June 3, 2009 restraining order as the court did not have jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter pursuant to Reynolds v. Bolunteer State Life Ins. Co., Tex. Civ.App., 80 S.W.2d 1087, Klugh v. U.S., D.C.S.C., 610 F Sup.892, 901.
Despite the exculpatory evidence (Exhibits 36) Referee Komar dismissed the motion with no delegation of authority cited to support the ruling “ The Defendant argues this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide on this issue” “Defendant is strongly cautioned about making representations to the court that have no basis in law or fact, “Defendant offered no creditable explanation her pleading have no basis in law or fact, no reasonable reading or interpretation of that same order could lead the defendant to believe that contacting the minor child was permissible.”
The defendant’s “I would be granted a hearing or jury trial o this evidence.” Referee Komar “I don’t think you’ll get a jury trial. You might get an evidentiary hearing, thought.
“When judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or they enforce a void order (an order issued by a judge without jurisdiction), they become trespassers of the law, and are engaged in treason,”
The Court in Bolunteer State Life Ins. Co., Tex. Civ.App., 80 S.W.2d 1087, Klugh v. U.S., D.C.S.C., 610 F Sup.892, 901.Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962) held that "not every action by a judge is in exercise of his judicial function it is not a judicial function for a judge to commit an intentional tort even though the tort occurs in the courthouse."
Attorney Irons June 2, 2009 Affidavit (Exhibit 34) certified as true and accurate was absent first-hand knowledge as she is not a party to the action. “A judgment is void if a defective petition was filed,”Brown v. Vankeuren, 340 Ill. 118, 122 (1930). The pleading was insufficient “robbed the Court of jurisdiction. A secret hearing convened under color of law held to usurp justice and falsely condemn Defendant Bruns.
The case docket reflects that on July 17, 2009 (Exhibit 37) the defendant’ request a denovo review of the June 19, 2009 order, void judgment and reinstate visitation which is a constitutional right according to Michigan parenting time guidelines of the unlawful June 2, 2009 Ex Parte order.
Judge Carpenter denied the defendant a denovo review based on her request had expired even though her motion was filed properly, the court clerk decided it wasn’t the proper signature. (Exhibit38) The defendant was stifled in all her attempts to present the facts being advised “You don’t have a right to reargue your appeal.”
Judge Carpenter advised the defendant “she has made it very difficult to determine or to establish a routine which is not one that creates conflict and is distressing to Alida it continues to be problematic.” Defendant was further advised: “Ms. Bruns if you do not discontinue your litigation I will have you escorted from the court room.” The intent was to have Defendant incarcerated.
Judge Carpenter willfully suppressed and ignored the prima facia exculpatory evidence (Exhibits 39) that proved the Defendant Bruns innocents and Attorney Irons allegations of fraud upon the court are founded in fact and well documented. This is another act of this court and attorney Irons to destroy the defendant’s relationship with her child. Pursuant to “An order that exceeds the jurisdiction of the court, is void, or voidable, and can be attacked in any proceeding in any court where the validity of the judgment comes into issue” Rose v. Himely (1808) 4 Cranch 241, 2 L ed 608; Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 US 714, 24 L ed 565; Thompson v. Whitman (1873) 18 Wall 457, 21 l ED 897; Windsor v. McVeigh (1876) 93 US 274, 23 L ed 914; McDonald v. Mabee (1917) 243 US 90, 37 Sct 343, 61 L ed 608. "a Court must vacate any judgment entered in excess of its jurisdiction," (Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972) Judge Carpenter dismissed the motion with no delegation of authority cited to support the ruling (Exhibit 23 & 25).
11) ISSUE E: Malicious Prosecution
From the beginning of this case Judge Carpenter changed custody, issued restraining ordered supervised visitation all based on fraudulent reports , prima facia affidavits and motions all in violation of 18 USC - U.S. Code - Title 18: Crimes and Criminal Procedure (January 2004) and MCR 2.114(a) the exculpatory evidence proved that Defendant Bruns was innocent of child abuse, neglect, threatened harm and attempted abduction of the minor child. Judge Carpenter and Referee Komar knowingly suppressed the defendant’s innocence despite the fact that the Defendant had three psychological evaluations stating the she could effectively parent her children, and despite the fact that the Plaintiff has a documented history of abuse and molestation to which he has admitted and despite the fact that he was court ordered to attend therapy before he could be considered as a custodial parent.


12) ISSUE E: DID JUDGES CONTINUE TO ADJUDICATE AFTER JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGES WERE SUBMITTED?
Defendant Bruns Attorney Catherine Appel challenged Judge Carpenter’s authority to remove the children from the defendant custody on December 14, 2001 (Exhibit 19) without evidence or proof of neglect or abuse. Judge Carpenter advised Attorney Appel “If you don’t like my ruling you can always file and Appeal”
The docket reveals Judge Carpenter did not correct the court record by returning the minor children to the defendant’s custody. Judge Carpenter did not report GAL-Attorney Benedict, Attorney Richard Roane or Attorney Joan Irons and Kim Bruns fraud upon the court and perjury “to the proper authorities” as mandated by Judicial Canons and she did not sanction GAL-Attorney Benedict, Attorney Roane or Attorney Irons in any way for knowingly representing a guilty party and perpetrating a fraud upon the court.
Instead, the docket reveals Judge Carpenter knowingly awarded custody of the minor
child to Kim Bruns, who has a documented history of abuse. Awarding custody to a parent with a history of domestic violence and non-aggravated assault in violation of the judge’s mandate “to act in the best interest of the child.” Violates the VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AMENDMENT (C) Section 71.004 for the U.S. Constitution” and “MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT CUSTODY ACT”
13) ISSUE COMPLAINT
This complaint is effective, because the transcript and evidence are riddled with false accusations by all aforementioned judicial appointees’ toward the Defendant (Denise Bruns). The lower court assigned ringers: Aforementioned state employees appointed by the trial judge failed to separate fact from accusation and twist the evidence in favor of the Plaintiff (Kim Bruns). Clarke v Wayne Circuit Judge, 193 Mich 33; 159 NW 387 (1916). All continue to conspire to destroy the defendant’s relationship with her daughter. The lower court awarded custody to an unfit parent in violation of a Prima facie tort by awarding custody to an unfit parent ignoring substantial evidence to return the minor child to the defendant’s home where she was not abuse. The lower court intentional ignored evidence and intentionally maliciously prosecuted the defendant for fraudulent child abuse allegations, inflicted harm on the minor child and the defendant resulting in mental and emotional abuse, denial of legal representation, and costly legal fees for defending herself against false claims of abuse and protecting the minor child from further abuse from the plaintiff and the trial court. The lower court has intentionally extended this case for their own financial gain.
This complaint is both a Federal Questions Case (28U.S.C. §1331) and a Diversity Case (28 U.S.C. §1332) for losses and damages - and an ongoing child custody.
This is a complaint for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983 with pendant state claims, against the trial court, the defendant Denise Bruns submission of her financial form informing the court she was a 15 (fifteen) year stay-at-home mother without any income the court being fully advised the plaintiff was the only source of income during the fifteen year marriage denied the defendant paid legal representation, falsely accused of child abuse by judicial appointees legal professionals retained by this court, the plaintiff and municipality, and corporate conspirators, a certain judge in the lower court. The defendant was a victim of ineffective assistance of counsel, unlawful malicious prosecution, attorney fraud and perjury that usurped the judicial process, and a pattern and practice of extreme judicial bias.
For declaratory and injunctive relief – Certain judicial appointees, in conspiracy with each other, violated the Defendant and the minor children’s protected First Amendment right to civil redress, their right to a jury trial and due process rights by a pattern and practice of fraud, deceit, perjury, falsifying and manipulating official court records, and other depraved and degenerate acts including the seditious act of corrupt judges who work with Michigan Bar members in courtrooms to deny victims of the family court schemes any meaningful remedy, and, thereby, conspire to destroy the Constitution and civil redress.
14) RELIEF SOUGHT
Writ of Mandamus: issue orders to void judgments or vacate custody orders entered unlawfully awarded custody to Plaintiff based on overt fraud and perjury in “emergency ex-parte hearings” when no emergency existed, Abuse of Discretion and Orders Exceeding Jurisdiction: November 21, 2001, December 14, 2001, August 6, 2004,
October 28, 2005, January 11, 2006, December 2, 2007, December 11, 2007,
December 2, 2008, June 2, 2009 June 3, 2009, June 19, 2009, July 17, 2009.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court:
(1) RELIEF FROM INFERIOR STATE COURT’S FRAUD PERJURY: Exercise its Power of Superintending Control, and corroborated by the Exhibits allow Defendant relief from the above-listed violations of jurisdiction, issue the following orders
(2) the Rulings were void because they were made in unlawfully convened secret hearings
(3) The above orders Falsely accused the defendant of child abuse are void, based on the finding of the corroboration of Chief Administrative Judge Jones and CPS Worker retractions of her fraud, perjury of abuse and neglect allegations.
(4) The defendant has been cleared of all allegations of abuse.
(5) Pursuant to October 13 and November 9, 2004 order (Exhibit 1): Return the minor child Alida immediate to the sole legal & physical custody of the defendant as it existed before the fraud and perjury orders that exceeded jurisdiction unlawfully removed custody,
(6) Prosecute the Plaintiff Kim Bruns and Attorney Joan L. Irons under section - 1746 of title 28 United States Code – False Claims Act, willfully subscribes as true any material matter declaration, certificate, verification or statement under penalty of perjury is guilty and shall law be fined or imprisoned not more than 5 years or both.