tort is a civil wrong, Intentional mental distress:GAL

A TORT IS A CIVIL WRONG.

Tort law is part of civil (noncriminal) law. It concerns lawsuits (not prosecutions). These suits arise from injuries (wrongs) committed by one person, a group, or organization(s) against another or others. Torts can be intentional or not. They can be purposeful or negligent.

Here's what happens. You get hurt. Or,

someone treats you badly or unfairly. You want to "sue the bastards." Tort law answers the question: Is there someone to sue? Or, putting it in legalese, is there a remedy for every tort? Torts deal with civil lawsuits, excluding breaches of contract (K's). While torts are not part of criminal law, remember that the same action by


a defendant (D) can bring about both a criminal prosecution and a civil lawsuit.


For example, if Bill steals your TV, that's the crime of theft. It is also the tort of conversion. The district attorney can prosecute for the theft. You can sue for the conversion. Bill is the tort-feasor (doer of the tort!). With this as background, what are some torts?


Please refer to the following website:
Tort-Law: An Introduction

(http://www.findlaw.com/01topics/22tort/)


TYPES OF TORTS

Torts are divided into basic types:


1. Negligence
2. Intentional harm to a person
3. Intentional harm to tangible property
4. Strict liability
5. Nuisance
6. Harm to economic interests
7. Harm to intangible property interests

1. NEGLIGENCE

Negligence includes car accidents, slip-and-fall cases, malpractice, personal injury, and some product liability cases. The variety of negligence is very wide, and new torts are created all the time. While it is a common word, negligence has legal meaning. What is it? How does negligence become a tort? We start from the idea that negligence is carelessness, not being reasonable, et cetera. Here's how a tort in negligence is analyzed.


Every tort has three elements:


A. The D owes a legal duty to the plaintiff (P).

B. The D breaches that duty.

C. The breach causes injury either as a direct result of the negligent act or somewhat more indirectly, but foreseeable; that is, the injury was reasonably predictable following the negligent act.

Legally, we say there is a proximate cause between the breach and the injury.


These look like simple words-not too technical. But let's define what they mean in this context. First, what is a duty? One person's obligation to another. Duty is based on the relationship of the people involved. For example:


employer and employee;

innkeeper and guest;

business person/owner and customer;

host and social visitor;

manufacturer and consumer;

property owner and licensee, guest, trespasser, or trespasser who is younger than twelve years old

person in control of an instrument that can harm (e.g., a car) and a passenger or pedestrian or fellow driver.


All these cases have a different standard of care, of duty. It's different if the mailman slips on your steps or if a trespasser does. But, basically, the duty is to act reasonably. What is reasonable? (Ah, the sixty-four-thousand dollar question!)


Reasonable conduct:


An important concept in tort law but, as you can imagine, hard for P and D to agree upon. Lawyers use the "reasonable person standard". What would a reasonable person do? Note: You generally don't have a duty to a stranger. Thus, as harsh as it may be, if you see a stranger in serious trouble, you don't have a duty to help. However, laws are changing in this field. In fact, if you help, you better be reasonable! Because, by helping, you assume a duty!


Good Samaritan statutes:


Because it seems harsh to let doctors, nurses, and other medical professionals go about their way without helping strangers in distress, many states have enacted Good Samaritan statutes. The name comes from the Bible. These laws protect from lawsuit doctors and other medical professionals who aid an injured stranger in an emergency at the scene of an accident or injury. The duty of reasonable care does not apply. In such a case the P can sue the doctor (D) only if he was reckless or grossly negligent.


The reasonable person standard is an objective, not subjective, standard. A jury can decide if you were reasonable. "I was doing the best I could" or "I thought I was being reasonable" is not defenses if they do not meet the community's reasonableness standard. Standards are applied to the type of person you are. A reasonable adult. A reasonable lawyer. A reasonable scientist or shopkeeper. Persons with greater knowledge are held to a higher standard. The reasonableness standard does not apply to children unless they are doing adult activities. Thus, if a sixteen-year-old drives a car, he had better be reasonable.


These standards change all the time. For example, right now the community's standard for drinking and driving is changing dramatically in this country. It used to be viewed as almost funny; now, you'd better not do it, you'd better have a "designated driver" if you're planning to go out and drink, and on and on. All these new standards are being applied differently than they were twenty or even ten years ago. Next, what is a breach? It is a failure to act reasonably; a failure to use the amount of care a reasonable person would use in that situation.


Negligence occurs if you do something below the standard of what a reasonable person would do in those circumstances. What's the measure? A community standard or statute. Let's say that you are careless with someone to whom you owe a duty. Is that a tort? Not necessarily. Not unless the person is hurt by your negligence. If no one got hurt, you got lucky! Finally, what is causation? Something that causes something else. To figure out if there is the required causation in your case, you have to analyze it in several steps.


1. You have to prove a "but for" relation between the breach of duty and the injury. But for the breach, there would be no injury. For example, the floor in the store is slippery. You fall on it and break a bone. The slippery floor probably caused your fall.


If P gets hurt but the injury was not caused by D's action, then there is no tort. For example, you are in the store with your child. He runs away from you. You run after him and fall and break a bone. The floor was not slippery. The floor probably did not cause your fall. Probably no negligence on the store's part.


2. The injury has to be the direct result of the negligent act or of foreseeable intervening forces. The injury has to be caused proximately by the breach of duty. This means it has to be reasonably anticipated that if someone does X, someone can get hurt. If you drive and drink, you may cause an injury. If there is a banana peel on the floor in the store, someone may fall, et cetera. This is the proximate cause requirement.


If something else happens between the breach and the injury, it's hard to prove that the breach caused the injury. For example, if your neighbor takes down a wall and water comes into your basement as a result, it may be a tort. But if water doesn't come in for five years, it's hard to prove proximate cause because so many other things intervened during the five years. Or if there is an unusual flood up the street at the time the wall was removed, your neighbor may be able to prove that it was the flood, not the wall that caused the water in your basement. That might be what's termed "an act of God." Then you have no one to sue!


Other important terms in negligence torts:


Invitee: Someone you have, expressly or by implication, invited to your property. He may be a customer, servant, and friend. Generally, you are responsible for exercising reasonable care for his safety against latent defects on that part of your property to which he was invited. In addition you have a duty to make reasonable inspections to discover dangerous conditions and, thereafter, make them safe.


For example, in a store, invitees can come into the selling area but not the back, which is posted "FOR EMPLOYEES ONLY." There they would be trespassers.


Licensee: A person who comes onto your property with permission, but without invitation. Such a person has a right to be there but is there for his benefit, not yours: for example, a door-to-door salesman.


In the old common law you owed these folks less duty of care. Now, by statute in many states, the duty is the same as for invitees.


Trespasser: Someone on your property without invitation or license; someone who commits a trespass on your property. Generally, you owe him less care than an invitee or licensee but will be responsible for conduct that is grossly negligent. Thus you can't set an unmarked trap or leave a large unprotected hole on your property.


An exception is for children under twelve years old. You may be held responsible in their case for maintaining an attractive nuisance – as dangerous "artificial condition" on your property that a child may play on. If the child gets hurt, you may be liable, even if he is trespassing. For example, a swimming pool with an open gate or no fence at all. On the other hand, a tree the child climbs is probably not an "artificial condition," and you'd probably not be liable for an injury.


Res ipsa loquitur: Lovely Latin term to keep in your back pocket just for fun! Literally, this doctrine means, "the thing (res) speaks (loquitur) for itself (ipsa). " It's used in trying to prove that the D was negligent. Here, one can infer negligence without actually proving it, if (a) the accident would not have happened without negligence and (b) the D had exclusive control of the thing that injured the P. If the doctrine applies, the P has made a prima facie case and the jury cannot give a directed verdict for the D


Product liability: A manufacturer and seller of a defective product may be liable in negligence. In some cases they are liable also in strict liability.


Now for the other types of torts:


2. INTENTIONAL HARM TO A PERSON


A. Assault: The D intends to hurt or scare the P and the P believes he is in danger of being hurt at that moment.


If I point a gun at you and it scares you, that's an assault, even if it turns out to be a toy gun.


If I say, "Don't you ever do that again or I'll kill you," that is not an assault: words alone don't do it. Here there is no immediate threat of harm.


In an assault the D does not need to touch the P.


B. Battery: The D intends to offensively touch or hurt the P without the P's consent, and does so.


Even if the P is asleep, and the D offensively touches him, that's a battery - because it was without consent.


When you sign a medical release before surgery, you are, in effect, consenting to the doctor's touching you. If he does the surgery to which you consented, that's not a battery. If he does more or different surgery that may be a battery-because he went beyond the scope of consent. Complicated, isn't it?


C. False imprisonment: The D intends to keep the P from freely moving about in an area that the P can't leave. If I'm driving my car with you in it, and you want to get out, and I don't stop, that may be false imprisonment. An intentional tort.


If a storekeeper keeps me on the suspicion of shoplifting but the suspicion was unreasonable, that may be false imprisonment.


D. Intentional mental distress: The D intentionally or recklessly causes P severe emotional distress.


If I know you are petrified of snakes and I leave one in your desk, that may be grounds for a suit based on intentional infliction of emotional/mental distress.


3. INTENTIONAL HARM TO TANGIBLE PROPERTY


A. Trespass to land: An intrusion by D onto P's land. No harm or intent needs to be proven. For example, if your neighbor builds a fence but it happens to sit on part of your property that’s a trespass, even if he did it unintentionally.


B. Trespass to chattels: The D interferes with P's right to possess his property. For example, the D takes P's property, uses it, perhaps damages it.


C. Conversion: An act that interferes with the owner's use of his property. Basically, it's the tort version of the crime of theft or destruction of property, which is serious enough so that the D should pay its full value to the P.


4. STRICT LIABILITY


If injured, the P does not need to prove any negligence on the D's part. With products he must prove that the product was not safe for its intended use and that he was injured by it. The duty to warn is often applied to potentially dangerous products. For example, crashworthiness of cars; hazards and side effects of medications. This is why cigarettes have warning labels. Even ladders now have warning signs on them! Are the products safe for their intended use?


Ultra hazardous activity: Owning certain types of animals, or engaging in certain types of activities. For example, firearms, if not commonly fired in the particular community or area. If anyone gets hurt, the D may be liable, even if he was not negligent.


5. NUISANCE


The D unreasonably interferes with the P's enjoyment of his property. This is where the neighbor's noisy parties come in! Or unsavory odors. Or flights overhead. Courts balance the type of area you are in, the nature of the harm, and the social value/utility of that activity. Airplanes must fly but parties can be quieter.


6. HARM TO ECONOMIC INTERESTS


A. Deceit:


Occurs if the D knowingly lies about an important fact that he intends to induce the P to rely on and which, in fact, the P does rely on. For example, right before trying to sell his house, the D patches over evidence of major water damage so that potential buyers can't see the damage.


B. Negligent misrepresentation:


It's like deceit, but applies to people in their trade or business or profession. It occurs if the D negligently provides false information to the P, a customer, on which the P relies to his detriment.


C. Interference with contractual relationships:


The D intentionally interferes with an ongoing business relationship between the P and someone else (the third party).


D. Intentional interference with advantageous relations:


The D interferes through tortious means (duress, fraud) where he had no business being in the first place. For example, the D fraudulently induces a change in a testator's will in which the P was to be a beneficiary.


7. HARM TO INTANGIBLE PROPERTY INTERESTS


A. Defamation: Occurs if D communicates information about P to others which is not truthful and hurts the P’s reputation. If the D was negligent, in not doing enough research or background checks, he may be liable.


Libel: If the defamation occurs in writing.


Slander: If the defamation is spoken. With famous people, public officials, or other people in the "public domain," only defamation done with malice (ill will) may be a tort.


B. Malicious prosecution:


If the P starts a criminal prosecution against the D without probable cause and with malice and the D wins, he may turn around and sue the P for malicious prosecution.


C. Invasion of privacy:


A wrongful intrusion into a person's private life, whether by others or by the government. For example, such an invasion may occur if unreasonable publicity is given to someone's private life. "It's not anyone else's business!" If someone takes your name or uses your picture without permission, especially for commercial use, that may be such an invasion.


Computers have brought the issue of the right to privacy to the fore: How much may government, industry, and other institutions lawfully know about us?


And there you have them: many of the major torts that exist in the early 21st century. Stay tuned as new ones emerge to meet changing social, economic, and personal needs. The law is ever changing and organic.

 

 

Legal Grind Press first release:

The Little Law Book is an adaptation of LEGALESE by Miriam Kurtzig Freedman (Dell 1990). The book is written for legal description and thus should not be relied upon in the execution of legal decisions. Since laws vary from State to State, we urge you to contact a legal professional in your ow

Laches (equity)

Laches (equity)

Laches (pronounced /ˈlætʃɨz/) (f. French, lâchesse, lâches) [1] is an equitable defense, or doctrine. The person invoking laches is asserting that an opposing party has "slept on its rights," and that, as a result of this delay, that other party is no longer entitled to its original claim. Put another way, failure to assert one’s rights in a timely manner can result in a claim's being barred by laches. Laches is a form of estoppel for delay. In Latin,

Vigilantibus non dormientibus æquitas subvenit.

Equity aids the vigilant, not the sleeping ones (that is, those who sleep on their rights).

In most contexts, an essential element of laches is the requirement that the party invoking the doctrine has changed its position as a result of the delay. In other words, the defendant is in a worse position now than at the time the claim should have been brought. For example, the delay in asserting the claim may have caused a great increase in the potential damages to be awarded, or assets that could earlier have been used to satisfy the claim may have been distributed in the meantime, or the property in question may already have been sold, or evidence or testimony may no longer be available to defend against the claim.

A defense lawyer raising the defense of laches against a motion for injunctive relief (a form of equitable relief) might argue that the plaintiff comes "waltzing in at the eleventh hour" when it is now too late to grant the relief sought, at least not without causing great harm that the plaintiff could have avoided. In certain types of cases (for example, cases involving time-sensitive matters, such as elections), a delay of even a few days is likely to be met with a defense of laches, even where the applicable statute of limitations might allow the type of action to be commenced within a much longer time period.

A successful defense of laches will find the court denying the request for equitable relief. However, even if equitable relief is not available, the party may still have an action at law if the statute of limitations has not run out.

Under the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, laches is an affirmative defense, which means that the burden of asserting laches is on the party responding to the claim to which it applies. “When the defense of laches is clear on the face of the complaint, and where it is clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts to avoid the insuperable bar, a court may consider the defense on a motion to dismiss.” Solow v. Nine West Group, 2001 WL 736794, *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2001); Simons v. United States, 452 F.2d 1110, 1116 (2d Cir. 1971) (affirming Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based, in part, on laches where papers “reveal no reason for the inordinate and prejudicial delay”)

Compared to statute of limitations

The defense of laches resembles, but is not entirely analogous to, a plea that the period of time allowed under a statute of limitations has expired. Laches essentially alleges prejudicial delay and unfairness in the context of a particular situation, whereas statutes of limitation tend to define a specific legally prescribed period of time (after the cause of action has accrued) within which a lawsuit for a particular type of cause of action may be commenced or after which the right to recovery is barred. Moreover, although a lawsuit commenced within the time allowed by a limitations period is valid no matter how long it takes for the action to proceed to trial, laches can sometimes be applied even in a situation where a lawsuit has been commenced and any delays would otherwise be reasonable. It is generally allowed by a court when a defendant could reasonably have believed that the plaintiff was not going to exercise his or her legal rights and acted on that belief to his or her detriment.

See also

Adverse possession

Estoppel by acquiescence

Equitable tolling

Submarine patent

References

^ Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Ed., (1989)

External links

Nair, Manisha Singh (2006) "Laches and Acquiescence" in Indian intellectual property law

Family Court Jury Trial

Statutory Grounds
            The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by Impartial jury (where impeachment is the only charge that is not to be heard before a jury) at which the grounds must be proven by clear and convincing evidence; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.

Forensic Interview violated Public Act 168 of 1997

Bolden’s forensic interview clearly violated Public Act 168 of 1997 and the  Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Statements made to interviewers  that serve primarily a forensic or investigative purpose are testimonial and are inadmissible pursuant to the Confrontation Clause.

             It is clearly established Nyela Bolden a professional failure to follow the proper Forensic Interview protocol and process during the November 21, 2007  interview “contaminated” the child witness, put words into his mouth of false allegations of abuse that really did not occur clearly establishing the minor child’s responses to questions were not reliable. (EX 26)

            As a result of the grossly negligent interview of OB, an ex parte petition was filed and expart order executed unlawful detention of AB placing her in the Fathers custody who had been substantiated twice for child abuse of AB’s siblings and abandoned his parental role in 2004.

6th Amendment Right to Confrom your accusers

Petitioner denied 6th Amendment Right to confront her accusers or to be confronted with the witnesses against her;
Crawford v. Washington: Eliminates a loophole policy, which violated the constitutional protections of the accused. Generally, Crawford bars the admission of testimonial hearsay statements against an accused unless the declarant is unavailable to appear at trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The Administrative Court did not adequately consider the Petitioners constitutional right to confrontation.
Petitioner Ms. Bruns name has been improperly added to the registry section 722.627(3) “if the investigation of a report fails to disclose evidence of abuse or neglect the information identifying the subject of the report shall be expunged from the central registry.” Pursuant to MCL 722.627 further provides that “[a] person who is the subject of a report of record….may request the department to expunge from the central registry a report or record in which no relevant and accurate evidence of abuse or neglect is found to exist.”
Pursuant to MCL 722.627 (5) & (6) Petitioner Ms. Bruns is the subject of a report or record made under this act and therefore may request the department to expunge an inaccurate report or record from the central registry and local office file which has been repeatedly denied July 21, 2010.
Pursuant to Haines v. Kerner 92 Sct 594, also See Power 914 F2d 1459 (11th Cir1990), "Pleadings in this case are being filed by Petitioner In Propria Persona, wherein pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicalities. Propria pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as practicing lawyers”. also See Hulsey v. Ownes 63 F3d 354 (5th Cir 1995). also See In Re: HALL v. BELLMON 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991) " however in artfully pleaded, the pro se complaint, we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle him to relief."

intentional tort/1st amendment right/outragios conduct

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress



Torts & Tort Law Basics

 



Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The Restatement (2nd) of Torts, section 46, states:

(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.

(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress:

(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in bodily harm.

So, IIED (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) has four parts:

outrageous conduct by the defendant,

the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress,

actual suffering of severe or extreme emotional distress, and

actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.

The law will not recognize a mere insult or emotional injury without some "plus factor": hence, the outrageous conduct requirement. Importantly, outrageous conduct will be found where the defendant knew the plaintiff to be particularly disposed to harm by the conduct; in other words, the defendant can't plead a defense of having performed similar conduct in front of others with no damage if he knew the conduct would be received differently.

The distress suffered must be what a "reasonable person" would undergo given the circumstances, though there is an exception for "eggshell plaintiffs." Furthermore, as the name implies, bodily harm is not a requirement - mental damage alone may be sufficient. Where there is an absence of physical damage, the courts will often look more closely at the outrageous conduct itself, and an action will like where the conduct was sufficient to presume emotional harm.

As far as intent goes, willful, wanton or reckless behavior, in deliberate disregard of potential distress, will fulfill the requirement. With the exception of close family members, as evidenced in section (2)(a) above, or those who witness the event (2)(b), transferred intent will usually not be applied. But, in such cases where a third party is damaged, the court may look to familiar foreseeability analyses and the extent of the willful, wanton, or reckless conduct

Children's Tort Claims Act

Children’s Domestic Tort Claims

Ann M. Haralambie*

I. INTRODUCTION

Child abuse and neglect is a significant problem. Substantiated

cases of abuse and neglect involved more than 900,000 children in

2003.1 Children are often the forgotten potential plaintiffs in domestic

torts cases. However, they do often possess causes of action against

their parents or third parties. Statutes of limitation for most of these

claims are tolled until the children reach majority, so lawsuits may be

filed even years after the cause of action arose. The two primary cate-

gories of claims involve child abuse and custodial interference, with

each category giving rise to several distinct causes of action. This arti-

cle will outline those causes of action and provide some practical sug-

gestions to pursuing domestic tort claims by or on behalf of children.

II. THE NEED FOR A REMEDY

Children who are abused and neglected may continue to suffer

from ongoing abuse and neglect,2 but even if the circumstances

change, the damage done may have long-term effec

chronic abuse or living in a chaotic, violent household in the earliest

years of a child’s life can actually alter the development of neuronal

connections in a child’s brain, which may permanently affect the

child’s ongoing development.3 Some physical injuries result in perma-

nent physical disabilities. Abuse and neglect also shape a child’s self-

concept and ability to form safe and meaningful relationships, with

life-long consequences. Children who are raised without appropriate

models of safe parenting often are unable to provide effective parent-

* Copyright © 2005 by Ann M. Haralambie. This article is based on an article that first

appeared in Ann Haralambie, Kids’ Causes of Action, 27 FAM. ADVOC. 30 (2005) and on infor-

mation appearing in ANN M. HARALAMBIE, 2 HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOP-

TION CASES ch. 20 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2005) [hereinafter HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD

CUSTODY]. Ann Haralambie is a certified family law specialist in private practice in Tucson,

Arizona.

1. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT iii

(2003).

2. For a discussion of different types of abuse and neglect and how to prove them, see

HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, supra note *, at chs. 16-18. See also ANN M.

HARALAMBIE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE IN CIVIL CASES: A GUIDE TO CUSTODY AND TORT AC-

TIONS (1999); JOHN E.B. MYERS, MYERS ON EVIDENCE IN CHILD, DOMESTIC AND ELDER ABUSE

CASES (2005). For a more detailed discussion of the law and practice involving child abuse torts,

see DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT AND SEXUAL ABUSE chs. 3-5, 9 (rev. ed.

2005).

3. See, e.g., ROBIN KARR-MORSE & MEREDITH S. WILEY, GHOSTS FROM THE NURSERY:

TRACING THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE (1997).

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[Vol. 45

ing for their own children and may perpetuate a cycle of abuse and

neglect.4

Most legal responses to child abuse during the child’s minority

either address the custody and visitation rights of the abusive parents

or involve a criminal prosecution. Intervention by child protective

services may result in the breakup of the family, often with the child

being removed from all things familiar and placed in the foster care

system. Such intervention may result in numerous changes in place-

ment and loss of relationships with family and friends, including the

separation of siblings. Children have few resources to assist them

once they “age out” of the system, and many become homeless or

incarcerated within the first year or two after leaving foster care.5

Unless the abuse is particularly severe, most child abuse and neg-

lect cases never involve criminal prosecution. Even when abuse is

prosecuted, victim restitution funds and orders are rarely sufficient to

cover the child’s long-term financial needs for medical and psychologi-

cal help. They certainly do not cover the more intangible losses suf-

fered by the child.

Tort law may provide an avenue for achieving redress for the

child victims of domestic violence and may provide the only remedy

for the long-term consequences of the abuse. When the tort is an in-

tentional one, punitive damages may be available. In addition to

monetary recovery, however, a successful tort action may also provide

therapeutic benefit for the child by holding the abuser accountable.

For other children, even if they wait to file until they are adults, re-

opening the issue may increase the damage. Therefore, any consider-

ation of filing a domestic tort on behalf of a child or an adult abused

as a child should include a careful weighing of all of the potential risks

and benefits.

III. IDENTIFYING CAUSES OF ACTION

A. Assault and Battery

Physical and sexual abuse give rise to causes of action for the

intentional assaults and batteries by the abuser. Battery requires a

showing that “(a) [the defendant] acts intending to cause a harmful or

offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an

imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) an offensive contact

4. See, e.g., Katherine C. Pears & Deborah M. Capaldi, Intergenerational Transmission of

Abuse: A Two-Generational Prospective Study of an At-Risk Sample, 25 CHILD ABUSE AND NEG-

LECT 1439 (2001).

5. See, e.g., Richard Wertheimer, Youth Who “Age Out” of Foster Care: Troubled Lives,

Troubling Prospects, CHILD TRENDS RESEARCH BRIEF (Child Trends, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 2002,

at 5.

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with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.”6 While the

act of battery must be intended, the abuser does not need to intend to

harm the child. Assault requires that “(a) [the defendant] acts in-

tending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the

other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a con-

tact, and (b) the other is thereby put in such imminent apprehen-

sion.”7

The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that “bodily

contact is offensive if it offends a reasonable sense of personal dig-

nity.”8

Physical9 and sexual10 child abuse clearly should satisfy this

requirement.

B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Physical and sexual abuse,11 the failure to protect a child from

such abuse, and custodial interference12 may also give rise to claims

for intentional infliction of emotional distress. That cause of action

requires proof that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly,

that the conduct was extreme or outrageous, that the wrongful con-

duct caused the emotional distress, and that the emotional distress was

severe.13

C. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Some states also recognize a cause of action for negligent inflic-

tion of emotional distress. Most physical and sexual abuse results in

emotional injury, even if the abuser was not aware of that conse-

6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965).

7. Id. § 21.

8. Id. § 19.

9. See, e.g., Gillett v. Gillett, 335 P.2d 736, 738 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (involving step-

mother who beat child so severely as to rupture her spleen and kidney, which had to be re-

moved); Treschman v. Treschman, 61 N.E. 961, 962 (Ind. App. 1901) (involving stepmother who

beat child on a number of occasions, causing significant loss of vision from damage to her optic

nerves); Doe v. Doe, 551 S.E.2d 257, 257 (S.C. 2001) (involving children who sued father for

assault and battery, who was criminally convicted of sexual abuse); Steber v. Norris, 206 N.W.

173, 174, 176 (Wis. 1925) (holding that damages of one dollar awarded to child against third

party custodian who whipped him with a twisted, rubber whip on his bare flesh were grossly

inadequate).

10. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 742 F.2d 1004, 1004-05 (6th Cir. 1984) (reversing dismissal of

child’s action against her adoptive father for three years of molestation); A.R.B. v. Elkin, 98

S.W.3d 99, 101-02, 104-05 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that “actual injury or damages is not a

required element of proof in an assault and battery action” and concluding it was error for trial

court to fail to award damages when father admitted touching his eleven-year-old son’s genitals

and having his son touch his genitals and admitted exposing his genitals to and masturbating in

front of his seven-year-old daughter); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 38 (Utah 1980) (allowing

child to recover $42,600 against adopted father for seven years of molestation).

11. See, e.g., L.C.H. v. T.S., 28 P.3d 915, 917-18 (Alaska 2001) (discussing child suit against

step-grandfather for sexual abuse and intentional infliction of emotional distress).

12. See, e.g., Pittman v. Grayson, 869 F. Supp. 1065, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (discussing fa-

ther’s suit against mother and international airline company for interference with custodial

rights, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment for removing his

daughter from the United States in violation of a custody order).

13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).

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quence. It is the abuser’s lack of awareness of foreseeable emotional

injury that constitutes the gravamen of the tort of negligent, as op-

posed to intentional, infliction of emotional distress. Some courts will

not allow a negligence claim, however, when it is based on abusive

conduct that is clearly intentional. Moreover, courts may hold that an

insurance exclusion for intentional acts precludes coverage for negli-

gence claims based on clearly intentional acts, depending on the actual

language of the insurance policy.14

D. Negligent Infliction of Prenatal Injuries

Prenatal drug exposure can create lasting problems for children.15

Courts in various contexts are addressing the problems caused by

mothers’ illegal drug use during pregnancy. Most courts that have ad-

dressed the issue have declined to permit adjudication of the child as

dependent and neglected based solely on prenatal drug exposure.16

Similarly, most courts reject protective custody or other prenatal rem-

edies designed to safeguard viable fetuses from the mother’s drug

use.17 Whether such prenatal drug use gives rise to tort liability is still

14. See infra Part IV.E. (discussing insurance coverage).

15. See, e.g., DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, WHEN DRUG ADDICTS HAVE CHILDREN (1994);

MOTHERS, BABIES, AND COCAINE: THE ROLE OF TOXINS IN DEVELOPMENT (Michael Lewis &

Margaret Bendersky eds., 1995); JANET Y. THOMAS, EDUCATING DRUG-EXPOSED CHILDREN:

THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRACK-BABY CRISIS (2004); Vincent L. Smeriglio & Holly C. Wilcox,

Prenatal Drug Exposure and Child Outcome, 26 CLINICS IN PERINATOLOGY 1 (1999).

16. See, e.g., Starks v. State, 18 P.3d 342, 343, 348 (Okla. 2001); State ex rel. Angela M.W. v.

Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729, 740 (Wis. 1997).

17. See, e.g., T.H. v. Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 661 So. 2d 403, 404 (Fla.

Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting preventive bimonthly drug testing of pregnant mother of adjudi-

cated dependent child); Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d at 739 (rejecting protective custody of mother);

see generally Deborah Appel, Drug Use During Pregnancy: State Strategies to Reduce the Preva-

lence of Prenatal Drug Exposure, 5 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (1992) (discussing the effects

of prenatal drug exposure on the fetus, analyzing legislative and judicial responses to prenatal

drug use, and recommending a public health approach to the problem); Amy Kay Boatright,

Comment, State Control over the Bodies of Pregnant Women, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 903,

908 (2000-01) (analyzing the constitutional rights of pregnant women, reviewing state responses

to prenatal harm, and recommending “that the U.S. Supreme Court adopt a bright line rule . . .

that a fetus’ right to begin life with a sound mind and body is not assertable against its own

mother” by any means, including by detainment or supervision); Michael T. Flannery, Court-

Ordered Prenatal Intervention: A Final Means to the End of Gestational Substance Abuse, 30 J.

FAM. L. 519 (1991-92) (analyzing standards for intervention with substance-abusing pregnant

women; juxtaposing state, fetal, and maternal rights; and recommending that whether and when

a court should intervene be determined according to what is most protective of the child and

least intrusive to the mother, considering medical, social, financial, and psychological factors);

Ellen Marrus, Crack Babies and the Constitution: Ruminations About Addicted Pregnant Women

After Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 47 VILL. L. REV. 299 (2002) (discussing state options for

dealing with prenatal drug exposure and recommending an individualized determination that

includes consideration of the resources actually available); Steven J. Ondersma et al., Prenatal

Drug Exposure and Social Policy: The Search for an Appropriate Response, 5 CHILD MALTREAT-

MENT 93, 94, 106 (2000) (recommending development of an “empirically based national policy

regarding prenatal substance exposure”); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who

Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1425,

1432 (1991) (examining the experiences of pregnant “poor Black women” and arguing that

“punishing drug addicts who choose to carry their pregnancies to term unconstitutionally bur-

dens the right to autonomy over reproductive decisions,” helping “to perpetuate a racist

hierarchy”).

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an unanswered question.18

E. Violation of Legislative Provision

An implied cause of action may exist based on the doctrine that

violation of a criminal statute is negligence per se. Restatement (Sec-

ond) of Torts, section 874A provides the following:

When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscrib-

ing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy

for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is

appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and

needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an

injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable ex-

isting tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing

tort action.19

In order to rely on this cause of action, the child must be an intended

beneficiary of protection extended by the statute. It is apparent that

the child is an intended beneficiary of criminal child abuse and neglect

laws, so when the abuse or neglect is sufficiently severe as to consti-

tute a criminal violation, an implied cause of action should apply. An

abused or neglected child is also an intended beneficiary of laws man-

dating certain persons to report suspicions of child abuse and neglect;

however, fewer courts have been willing to recognize a private cause

of action for failure to report.20 State law may give rise to a cause of

action against the child welfare agency for negligence in investigating

reports of child abuse.21

18. See generally Thomas M. Fleming, Right of Child to Action Against Mother for Infliction

of Prenatal Injuries, 78 A.L.R. 4TH 1082 (1990) (analyzing cases concerning a child’s cause of

action against his mother for prenatal personal injury).

19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A (1979).

20. See Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389, 390-91 (Cal. 1976) (holding that battered child is

entitled to sue physician for failure to report); Smith v. Jackson County Bd. of Educ., 608 S.E.2d

399, 403, 409-10 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that “the duty to report child abuse is not the type

of discretionary law enforcement function shielded by the public duty doctrine”); Doe v. Roman,

No. 2001-AP-05-0044, 2002 WL 31732468, *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2002) (discussing

mandatory reporting statute that “expressly imposes liability upon persons who fail to report,”

therefore no governmental immunity applies); cf. Ward v. Greene, 839 A.2d 1259, 1266-67, 1272-

73 (Conn. 2004) (noting that mandatory reporting law creates duty of care owed only to children

who are believed to have been abused or neglected); Marcelletti v. Bathani, 500 N.W.2d 124, 130

(Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (declining to extend statutory reporting duty to anyone other than the

abused child). But cf. Cuyler v. United States, 362 F.3d 949, 954-55 (7th Cir. 2004) (declining to

recognize a private cause of action for failure to report); C.B. v. Bobo, 659 So. 2d 98, 102 (Ala.

1995) (same); Fischer v. Metcalf, 543 So. 2d 785, 791 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (same); Borne v.

Nw. Allen County Sch. Corp., 532 N.E.2d 1196, 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (same); Kan. State

Bank & Trust Co. v. Specialized Transp. Servs, Inc., 819 P.2d 587, 604 (Kan. 1991) (same); Meyer

v. Lindala, 675 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (same); Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302,

314 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (same); Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 278 (N.H. 1995) (same); Paul-

son v. Sternlof, 15 P.3d 981, 984 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000) (same); Doe v. Marion, 605 S.E.2d 556,

562-63 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) (same); Arbaugh v. Bd. of Educ., 591 S.E.2d 235, 241 (W. Va. 2003)

(same).

21. See, e.g., Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788, 791 (Minn. 2005) (“[A] cause

of action can be maintained for negligence in the investigation . . . of child abuse and neglect

reports as required under [the child abuse reporting statute.]”); cf. Gilliam v. Dep’t of Soc. &

Health Servs., Child Protective Servs., 950 P.2d 20, 22 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the

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F. Other Causes of Action for Abuse and Neglect

In some factual scenarios, physical and sexual abuse may involve

false imprisonment22 or negligent transmission of a sexually transmit-

ted disease. A non-abusing parent who fails to reasonably protect the

child may also be liable for a negligence tort.23 The child may have a

cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress for vio-

lence inflicted on another family member in the child’s presence if the

violence was extreme and outrageous and the child suffered severe

emotional distress.24 Some states recognize a cause of action against a

child welfare agency for negligent placement in foster care.25

Once

the child is in state custody, a “special relationship” may exist between

the agency and the child, giving rise to a duty to protect the foster

child.26

G. Intentional Interference with Custodial Rights

A number of jurisdictions recognize a cause of action arising out

of intentional interference with custodial rights, at least when the

plaintiff is the custodial parent.27

Fewer states recognize a cause of

state is not entitled to absolute immunity for negligent investigation that resulted in a depen-

dency action being filed against father for allegedly molesting his children).

22. For the elements of false imprisonment see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35

(1965).

23. See, e.g., Sipes v. Sipes, 936 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that the fact

that the child’s mother knew that his father abused him does not preclude a negligence claim for

her failure to protect him).

24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2) (1965).

25. See, e.g., Savage v. Utah Youth Vill., 104 P.3d 1242, 1246 (Utah 2004) (noting that a

placement agency has a special duty when placing children in foster homes to regard “the wel-

fare of the child being placed and other persons in the home [and that it] is a reasonably foresee-

able risk that a child with a known history of sexually abusing young children might sexually

abuse again if placed in a home with young children”).

26. Because of sovereign immunity, a child may be precluded from suing the state based

solely on negligence. Most actions against state agencies are pleaded as civil rights claims. See

infra Part III.H.

27. See, e.g., DiRuggiero v. Rodgers, 743 F.2d 1009, 1017 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying New

Jersey law); Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (applying District of Co-

lumbia law); Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 833-34 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying Maryland

law); Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998, 1005 (E.D. Wis. 1982), aff’d, 694 F.2d 489, 496 (7th Cir.

1982) (applying Wisconsin law); Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15, 18 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (applying

New York law); Rayford v. Rayford, 456 So. 2d 833, 834-35 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984); Surina v.

Lucey, 214 Cal. Rptr. 509, 513 (Ct. App. 1985); D & D Fuller CATV Constr., Inc. v. Pace, 780

P.2d 520, 524 (Colo. 1989) (en banc); Mathews v. Murray, 113 S.E.2d 232, 235 (Ga. Ct. App.

1960); Shields v. Martin, 706 P.2d 21, 22-23, 27 (Idaho 1985); Wolf v. Wolf, 690 N.W.2d 887, 892

(Iowa 2005); Brown v. Brown, 61 N.W.2d 656 (Mich. 1953); Kramer v. Leineweber, 642 S.W.2d

364, 366 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Plante v. Engel, 469 A.2d 1299, 1300 (N.H. 1983); LaGrenade v.

Gordon, 264 S.E.2d 757, 759 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); McBride v. Magnuson, 578 P.2d 1259, 1260

(Or. 1978) (en banc); Bedard v. Notre Dame Hosp., 151 A.2d 690, 692 (R.I. 1959); Silcott v.

Oglesby, 721 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Tex. 1986); In re Marriage of Hall, 607 P.2d 898, 901 (Wash. Ct.

App. 1980); Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 765 (W. Va. 1998). But see, e.g., Larson v. Dunn,

460 N.W.2d 39, 47 (Minn. 1990) (noting that no cause of action exists for intentional interference

with custodial rights); Zaharias v. Gammill, 844 P.2d 137, 138 (Okla. 1992) (refusing to recognize

the tort of intentional interference with custody, but pointing out that “Oklahoma already recog-

nizes a cause of action in the parent or legal guardian of a child for the abduction or enticement

of that child”); cf. Hoblyn v. Johnson, 55 P.3d 1219, 1227 (Wyo. 2002) (declining to recognize the

tort of intentional interference with custodial rights under the facts presented and stating that

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action for interference with visitation.28

Restatement (Second) of

Torts, section 700 describes the tort of causing a minor child to leave

or not to return home as follows: “One who, with knowledge that the

parent does not consent, abducts or otherwise compels or induces a

minor child to leave a parent legally entitled to its custody or not to

return to the parent after it has been left him, is subject to liability to

the parent.”29 Several states have recognized the section 700 tort.30 It

is interesting to note that the liability is to the parent and does not

directly include liability to the child himself. It may be argued, how-

ever, that the child is similarly injured by being deprived of the com-

panionship and care of the legally entitled custodian. The comment to

section 700 provides that the

temporary absence of a child who is too young to perform service or

the abduction of a hopeless invalid is actionable as well as the ab-

duction of a child who actually renders service to the parent. The

deprivation to the parent of the society of the child is itself an injury

that the law redresses.31

Custodial interference often constitutes a crime, thereby giving

rise to an implied civil cause of action based on violation of a criminal

statute.32 Custodial interference also may give rise to intentional or

negligent infliction of emotional distress. Some jurisdictions, how-

ever, find that a cause of action, which essentially alleges parental

alienation, is not recognized when a “heart balm” statute or case law

has abolished claims for alienation of affections.33 Custodial interfer-

ence theories have included false imprisonment,34 enticement,35 un-

lawful interference with custody,36 intentional infliction of emotional

even if the court “were inclined to recognize the tort . . . , the parents . . . failed to establish a

prima facie case that the elements . . . [had been] met”).

28. See, e.g., Owens v. Owens, 471 So. 2d 920, 921 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Hixon v.

Buchberger, 507 A.2d 607, 607 (Md. 1986); Politte v. Politte, 727 S.W.2d 198, 198 (Mo. Ct. App.

1987); McGrady v. Rosenbaum, 308 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Gleiss v. Newman, 415

N.W.2d 845, 846 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987); Cosner v. Ridinger, 882 P.2d 1243, 1247 (Wyo. 1994).

29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1977).

30. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 672 So. 2d 787, 789 (Ala. 1995); Robbins v.

Hamburger Home for Girls, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534, 539-40 (Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing the tort,

but holding that insufficient facts were pleaded to satisfy the elements in this case); Zamstein v.

Marvasti, 692 A.2d 781, 790 (Conn. 1997) (recognizing the tort, but holding that insufficient facts

were pleaded to satisfy the elements in this case); Stone v. Wall, 734 So. 2d 1038, 1049 (Fla.

1999); Wolf, 690 N.W.2d at 891; Kessel, 511 S.E.2d at 761-62; Cosner, 882 P.2d at 1247 (recogniz-

ing the tort, but holding that insufficient facts were pleaded to satisfy the elements in this case).

31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 cmt. d (1977). But see Larson, 460 N.W.2d at

47 (reversing appellate court’s recognition of a custodial parent’s custodial interference tort ac-

tion under section 700).

32. See discussion supra Part III.E. (regarding negligence based on violation of a legislative

enactment).

33. See, e.g., Bouchard v. Sundberg, 834 A.2d 744, 756-57 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003); Hyman v.

Moldovan, 305 S.E.2d 648, 649 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).

34. See, e.g., Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15, 18 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).

35. See, e.g., Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 833 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying Mary-

land law); Armstrong v. McDonald, 103 So. 2d 818, 819-20 (Ala. Ct. App. 1958).

36. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998, 1004 (E.D. Wis. 1982); Wood v. Wood, 338

N.W.2d 123, 124 (Iowa 1983); Plante v. Engel, 469 A.2d 1299, 1302 (N.H. 1983).

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distress,37 outrageous conduct,38 abduction and concealment,39 caus-

ing a minor child to leave or not to return,40 and conspiracy.41 When

the cause of action is recognized, tort liability may also be imposed on

a third party who conspires with or aids a parent to do a criminal or

unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means in removing the child

from the custodial parent.42

H. Civil Rights Action

When the state has custody of a child, such as a child in foster

care, and the state actor’s negligence resulted in abuse, a civil rights

action might lie under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under the theory that the state

has formed a “special relationship” with the child in its custody. In

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,43 the

United States Supreme Court ruled that when the child is no longer in

state custody, there is no such “special relationship.” No federal civil

rights remedy will lie, therefore, even if child protective services inves-

tigated a complaint or returned the child to the parent negligently.44

37. See, e.g., Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that emotional dis-

tress tort will lie despite factual overtones of abolished tort of alienation of affection); Wasser-

man, 671 F.2d at 833; Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1107, 1108 (5th Cir. 1980); Kajtazi, 488 F.

Supp. at 20; Sheltra v. Smith, 392 A.2d 431, 431 (Vt. 1978).

38. See, e.g., Pankratz v. Willis, 744 P.2d 1182 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Cramlet v. Multimedia

Program Prod., Inc., No. 80-C-1737, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21704, *5 (D. Colo. Mar. 15, 1985).

39. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 93 Cal. Rptr. 617, 618 (Ct. App. 1971); Silcott v. Oglesby,

721 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Tex. 1986).

40. See, e.g., Lloyd, 539 F. Supp. at 1004.

41. See, e.g., Fenslage, 629 F.2d at 1110; Cramlet, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21704, at *1; Lloyd,

539 F. Supp. at 1003; Gibson, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 617.

42. See, e.g., Marshak v. Marshak, 628 A.2d 964, 970 (Conn. 1993); Plante v. Engel, 469

A.2d 1299, 1302 (N.H. 1983); Zaharias v. Gammill, 844 P.2d 137, 138 (Okla. 1992); Weirich v.

Weirich, 833 S.W.2d 942, 945 (Tex. 1992).

43. 489 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1989) (affirming lower court’s determination that no § 1983 cause

of action existed for a child once in foster care who was beaten to death by his father after being

returned to his custody).

44. See, e.g., Forrester v. Bass, 397 F.3d 1047, 1056, 1059 (8th Cir. 2005). In Forrester, the

court determined that social workers were entitled to qualified immunity and to summary judg-

ment. Id. at 1059. In making this determination, the court discussed state-created procedures,

which require investigations, law enforcement notification and intervention, direct observation

of subject children, and the provision of social services but “do not mandate the particular sub-

stantive outcomes” and “do not create ‘entitlements’ subject to constitutional protections under

the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 1056. In addition, the social worker’s “failure to conduct an

investigation, to contact law enforcement, and to verify the whereabouts of the boys, while erro-

neous, and maybe naive in retrospect, cannot be considered conscience-shocking.” Id. at 1059;

see also, e.g., S.S. v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that state social work-

ers were not liable for returning child home to father knowing that he associated with a

pedophile because the social workers did not increase her danger but only returned her to the

situation from which they had taken her); Powell v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 114 F.3d 1074,

1083 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that welfare agency and its employees were not liable for infant

killed after being returned to mother’s abusive home); Doe v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861,

864-65 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that a violation of Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act

(CAPTA) requirement of promptly investigating reports of child abuse does not give rise to

§ 1983 private cause of action because CAPTA is a funding act creating only generalized duties

similar to those in the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act for which a private right of

action was rejected by Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992)); Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 865 A.2d

428, 435, 438, 444 (Conn. 2005) (holding that no tort action lies for failure to remove children

because “the commissioner is not statutorily required to remove a child in imminent risk of

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The Court specifically stated that if the state had removed Joshua

DeShaney from his home and placed him in a state foster home, “we

might have a situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration or insti-

tutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect.”45

The

Court noted that several circuit courts of appeals had found state lia-

bility for failure to protect children in state foster homes who were

abused by their foster parents.46 Following DeShaney, several courts

have recognized that the state may have a duty to protect children

who are in foster care.47

Even after DeShaney, several states have

recognized liability based, not on the fact of a special relationship, but

rather on a state-created danger.48

physical harm pursuant to [child protection statutes and agency regulations],” but rather, “a

probable cause determination is discretionary”); cf. 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255,

1274 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act does not create a

private cause of action to allow foster children to sue to enforce its provisions).

45. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9.

46. Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 793 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (citing

Doe v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981)).

47. See, e.g., J.H. ex rel. Higgin v. Johnson, 346 F.3d 788, 792 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that a

plaintiff must demonstrate that the individual child welfare agency employees “had specific

‘knowledge or suspicion’ of the risk of sexual abuse facing the children [in their foster home] in

order to hold the defendants liable under § 1983” (quoting Lewis v. Anderson, 308 F.3d 768, 773

(7th Cir. 2002)); Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding

that foster child in state foster care has a due process right to personal safety); Norfleet v. Ark.

Dep’t of Human Servs., 796 F. Supp. 1194, 1201 (E.D. Ark. 1992); Kara B. ex rel. Albert v. Dane

County, 555 N.W.2d 630, 631, 635, 638 (Wis. 1996) (construing DeShaney and several other

cases, when read together, as recognizing a clearly established constitutional right to a reasona-

bly safe and secure foster home placement; stating that county officials did not have qualified

immunity under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action brought by children who were physically and sexually

abused in their foster home; and applying the professional judgment standard); cf. K.H. ex rel.

Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that child in state custody has the

right “not to be handed over by state officers to a foster parent or other custodian, private or

public, whom the state knows or suspects to be a child abuser”).

48. See, e.g., Currier v. Doran, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1279, 1282 (D.N.M. 1998) (denying

summary judgment when the state agency had taken custody of the child and then placed him in

the custody of his father, where he later died after his father threw boiling water on him, and

when the state had received several reports that the child was being abused but did not act to

remove him); Tazioly v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A.97-CV-1219, 1998 WL 633747, *5-6, *7

(E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1998) (denying summary judgment when state agency failed to respond to

numerous reports that the child was being abused after child “was treated for burns and contu-

sions, dehydration, a fractured . . . leg, and a fractured skull” and holding that “a state actor may

be held liable under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 in cases where the state terminates satisfactory foster

care and places a child in the custody of a [parent] with known propensities for violent and

bizarre behavior, thereby increasing the foreseeable risk of harm to the child”); Ford v. Johnson,

899 F. Supp. 227, 229-30, 233-34 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (denying summary judgment when county

agency had returned custody of child, who had been placed with department, back to father, who

later beat child to death and holding that state agents who unnecessarily exposed child to danger

could be found liable based on violation of child’s rights under due process clause). But see, e.g.,

Terry B. v. Gilkey, 229 F.3d 680, 682, 684 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that child welfare agency no

longer had an affirmative duty to protect the children once the probate court placed them in the

guardianship of their aunt and uncle even though the court ordered the agency to maintain an

open protective services case on the children and concluding that individual defendants were

“not liable on a theory of state-created danger for returning the children” with the alleged

knowledge that the aunt and uncle were abusive).

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IV. BARRIERS TO CAUSES OF ACTION

A. Collateral Estoppel

When there has been a finding of abuse in a family law, child

welfare, or criminal action, that finding will generally collaterally es-

top the abuser from denying the abuse in a subsequent tort action,

provided that the abuser was a party to the previous action and actu-

ally litigated or had the opportunity to litigate the abuse issue.49 If the

defendant was convicted of a felony charge of abuse or custodial inter-

ference, then the conviction should be admissible in the tort action. If

the previous action involved a higher standard of proof, such as a ter-

mination of parental rights or a criminal action and the result favored

the defendant, then the plaintiff should be permitted to relitigate the

abuse in an action requiring proof only by a preponderance of the

evidence.

Collateral estoppel may also apply against a child plaintiff. If the

child was not represented by counsel in the previous action, however,

collateral estoppel may not apply to preclude the tort action. Finally,

the tort action may be pleaded in a way that involves different legal

issues. Given the different purposes and standards that apply in fam-

ily, child welfare, and criminal actions, plaintiffs should be able to

bring their tort actions under most circumstances.

B. Potential Defendants

Abusive or negligent parents are obvious potential defendants.

There may also be third party or institutional defendants, however,

even though the injury to the child was caused by a parent or other

household member. For example, under state mandatory reporting

laws, certain people are required to report suspected abuse or neglect.

Doctors, nurses, psychologists, counselors, teachers, and daycare

workers are among the groups most often included as mandated re-

porters. If any such person interacted with the child and had suspi-

cions that the child was being maltreated but did not report the

suspicion to child protective services or law enforcement, then the

breach of that duty may give rise to a child’s cause of action.50

Third parties, including parents, who facilitate the abuse may be

held liable. Parents may have liability for failure to protect children in

their care or to protect other children from foreseeable abuse by their

child or spouse. Third parties who contribute to the circumstances

surrounding the abuse may also be held liable under a negligence the-

49. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 551 S.E.2d 257, 258 (S.C. 2001) (holding that father’s conviction

for the sexual abuse collaterally estopped him from relitigating the facts of the abuse).

50. See supra Part III.E. (discussing liability for failure to report).

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ory. If the child was in state custody, then the state agency may also

be a defendant.

C. Statutes of Limitation and Repose

Statutes of limitation and repose are important in children’s do-

mestic torts. In most circumstances, statutes of limitation are tolled

during a child’s minority. However, such tolling may not apply to ac-

tions brought against governmental entities.51 There is a split of opin-

ion as to whether they may be tolled after the child reaches majority

based on delayed discovery, particularly as applied to child sexual

abuse.52

The delayed discovery issue may occur when the victim is

aware of the abuse, but not reasonably aware that the damages were

caused by the abuse, or when the victim does not recall the abuse

because of the trauma induced by it. Some states may permit tolling

the statute only in the second situation.

Statutes of repose apply differently.

A statute of repose . . . limits the time within which an action may

be brought and is not related to the accrual of any cause of action;

the injury need not have occurred, much less have been discovered.

Unlike an ordinary statute of limitations which begins running upon

accrual of the claim, the period contained in a statute of repose be-

gins when a specific event occurs, regardless of whether a cause of

action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted.53

The statute of repose may not be tolled during the child’s minority. A

number of states, however, have specific provisions in their statutes of

repose to permit later filing of a cause of action related to child

abuse.54

51. See, e.g., Artukovich v. Astendorf, 131 P.2d 831, 833-34 (Cal. 1942) (holding that, in the

absence of a statutory exemption, the claim-filing requirements of the government tort claims

act are applicable to minors and are not subject to tolling). But see, e.g., Rodriguez v. Superior

Court, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 295, 298 (Ct. App. 2003) (noting that legislative establishment of

Foster Family Home and Small Family Home Insurance Fund, which required foster parents to

file a claim with the fund before the statute of limitation for the underlying claim expired, consti-

tuted a statutory exemption tolling the statute of limitations during the foster child’s minority).

52. Compare Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951 (Ariz. 1998) (permitting use of the discovery rule);

Farris v. Compton, 652 A.2d 49 (D.C. 1994); Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989); Ault

v. Jasko, 637 N.E.2d 870 (Ohio 1994); Moriarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church of God, 534 S.E.2d

672 (S.C. 2000); Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1993), with M.H.D. v. Westminster Sch.,

172 F.3d 797 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying Georgia law and not permitting use of the discovery

rule); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying New York law); Baily v.

Lewis, 763 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1989). For a discussion of delayed discovery see DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE,

CONFLICT AND SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 2, § 4.30; HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUS-

TODY, supra note *, § 20.8; HARALAMBIE, supra note 2, at 87-90.

53. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 5, at 22 (1987).

54. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(7) (West 2002). The Florida statute provides that

[a]n action founded on alleged abuse . . . or incest . . . may be commenced at any time

within 7 years after the age of majority, or within 4 years after the injured person leaves

the dependency of the abuser, or within 4 years from the time of discovery by the

injured party of both the injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the

abuse, whichever occurs later.

Id. Under Virginia law, a cause of action accrues in actions

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D. Immunity

Parents and those legally responsible for the care of children,

such as foster parents, have a privilege to reasonably discipline the

children, including administration of reasonable corporal punish-

ment.55 If the punishment is unnecessarily degrading, or inflicts seri-

ous or permanent harm, the privilege does not apply.56 Child abuse,

by definition, exceeds the reasonably accepted boundaries of parental

care and control and involves something more than “reasonable” cor-

poral punishment. Reasonableness takes into account the severity of

the child’s offense and the age and sex of the child.57 Further, if the

force is imposed primarily for a purpose other than proper training,

education, or discipline, then it is not privileged, even if it would have

been privileged if applied for a proper purpose.58

The parental immunity doctrine traditionally bars recovery for

torts committed by a parent against a minor child. That immunity was

conferred upon parents to further the public policy of “preserving do-

mestic tranquility” and is broader than the privilege of reasonable dis-

cipline.59

Child abuse itself may have already broken that domestic

tranquility.60 The Restatement (Second) of Torts rejects the doctrine

for injury to the person, whatever the theory of recovery, resulting from sexual abuse

occurring during the infancy or incapacity of the person, upon removal of the disability

of infancy . . . or, if the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the sexual abuse is

not then known, when the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the sexual

abuse is first communicated to the person by a licensed physician, psychologist, or

clinical psychologist.

VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-249(6) (2000).

55. See, e.g., People v. Whitehurst, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 35 (Ct. App. 1992); Commonwealth

v. Rubeck, 833 N.E.2d 650, 653 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005); In re Peter G., 774 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687

(App. Div. 2004) (Sullivan, J., concurring); State v. Adaranijo, 792 N.E.2d 1138, 1140 (Ohio Ct.

App. 2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147(1) (1965) (“A parent is privileged to ap-

ply such reasonable force or to impose reasonable confinement upon his child as he reasonably

believes to be necessary for its proper control, training, or education.”).

56. See, e.g., Nixon v. State, 773 So. 2d 1213, 1215-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); State v.

Kimberly B., 699 N.W.2d 641, 644, 649 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 150 cmt. e (1965).

57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 cmts. c-d (1965); see, e.g., Gillett v. Gillett,

335 P.2d 736, 737 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (“While it may seem repugnant to allow a minor to sue his

parent, we think it more repugnant to leave a minor child without redress for the damage he has

suffered by reason of his parent’s wilful [sic] or malicious misconduct.”).

58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 151 (1965). The comment to this section indi-

cates, for example, that the privilege would not apply if the force is imposed “to satisfy a violent

antipathy.” Id. § 151 cmt. a.

59. For a discussion of the parental immunity doctrine and its erosion see DOMESTIC TORTS:

FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT AND SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 2, § 3.22; DONALD T. KRAMER,

LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN §§ 9:7-9:9 (rev. 2d ed. 2005).

60. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 742 F.2d 1004, 1005 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that adoptive

father’s sexual molestation of child between the ages of eight and eleven was gross misconduct,

which “would be so destructive of a family’s parental relations as to eliminate the . . . public

policy behind the parental immunity rule”); Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So. 2d 264, 266 (Ala. 1989)

(noting exception to parental immunity for cases of sexual abuse when proven by clear and

convincing evidence); Henderson v. Woolley, 644 A.2d 1303, 1303 (Conn. 1994) (stating that

parental immunity does not bar “an action by a minor child against his or her parent for personal

injuries arising out of sexual abuse, sexual assault, or sexual exploitation”); Herzfeld v. Herzfeld,

781 So. 2d 1070, 1077-79 (Fla. 2001) (determining that parental immunity doctrine does not ap-

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537

of parental immunity except with respect to reasonable force or con-

finement for control, training, and education.61 Most states have ei-

ther abrogated the doctrine of parental immunity,62 particularly with

respect to intentional torts, or held that it never existed.63 Further, if

the civil action is filed after the child has become an adult, parental

immunity does not apply.64 Some courts have declined to recognize

parental immunity when the child is emancipated65 or the parental

rights have been terminated.

For children in state care, the state may have sovereign immunity.

Further, in DeShaney the United States Supreme Court held that the

state had no constitutional duty to protect a child who is not in state

care after receiving reports of possible abuse by a parent, but left open

the possibility of imposition of such a duty for children in the state’s

care.66 Following DeShaney, several courts have recognized that the

state may have a duty to protect children who are in foster care.67

E. Insurance Coverage

Many tort defendants, especially family members, lack assets suf-

ficient to justify the filing of an action. A major deterrent to the filing

ply to intentional sexual abuse); Eagan v. Calhoun, 698 A.2d 1097, 1098, 1104 (Md. 1997) (hold-

ing that father’s intentional killing of mother “constitutes an abandonment of the parental

relationship and of the broader family harmony, and, as a matter of judicial and legal policy, it

should not bar a wrongful death action by the remaining family members otherwise entitled to

bring such an action”); Doe v. Holt, 418 S.E.2d 511, 515 (N.C. 1992) (“[W]hen a parent steps

beyond the bounds of reasonable parental discretion and commits a willful and malicious act

which injures his or her child, [in this case the father’s repeated rapes and sexual molestation of

his children,] the parent negates the public policies [that] led to recognition of the parent-child

immunity doctrine . . . , and the doctrine does not shield the parent.”).

61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G(1) (1979).

62. See, e.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 13-14 (Alaska 1967); Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907

P.2d 43, 50 (Ariz. 1995) (en banc); Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 648, 653 (Cal. 1971) (en banc)

(replacing parental immunity with reasonable parent standard); Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416,

416 (D.C. 1987); Wagner v. Smith, 340 N.W.2d 255, 255 (Iowa 1983); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick,

611 P.2d 135, 141 (Kan. 1980); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921, 921 (Ky. 1970); Black v.

Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 635 (Me. 1979); Stamboulis v. Stamboulis, 519 N.E.2d 1299, 1301 (Mass.

1988); Sweeney v. Sweeney, 262 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Mich. 1978); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d

595, 596 (Minn. 1980); Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d 852, 852, 858 (Mo. 1991) (en banc)

(replacing parental immunity with reasonable parent standard); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle,

656 P.2d 820, 824 (Mont. 1983); Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013, 1018 (Nev. 1974); Vickers v.

Vickers, 242 A.2d 57, 58 (N.H. 1968); Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145, 1152 (N.J. 1983); Guess v.

Gulf Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 869, 871 (N.M. 1981); Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364, 367 (N.D. 1967);

Kirchner v. Crystal, 474 N.E.2d 275, 276 (Ohio 1984); Winn v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d 776, 785-86 (Or.

1984); Falco v. Pados, 282 A.2d 351, 353 (Pa. 1971); Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013, 1017 (R.I.

1982); Elam v. Elam, 268 S.E.2d 109, 111-12 (S.C. 1980); Wood v. Wood, 370 A.2d 191, 193 (Vt.

1977); Thomas v. Kells, 191 N.W.2d 872, 874 (Wis. 1971); cf. Sixkiller v. Summers, 680 P.2d 360

(Okla. 1984) (failing to abrogate parental immunity in case involving negligent supervision short

of willful misconduct).

63. See, e.g., Rousey, 528 A.2d at 416; Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah 1980).

64. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 616 (5th ed. 1984).

65. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Valdez, 427 P.2d 655, 659 (N.M. 1967); Logan v. Reaves, 354

S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tenn. 1962).

66. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 n.9 (1989).

67. See, e.g., Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1990); Norfleet ex

rel. Norfleet v. State of Ark. Dep’t. of Human Servs., 796 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1992); Kara

B. ex rel. Albert v. Dane County, 555 N.W.2d 630 (Wis. 1996).

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of all kinds of domestic torts is the lack of insurance coverage out of

which to fund recovery for damages. For example, most homeowner’s

policies exclude coverage for intentional torts. When not precluded

by parental immunity, it is generally a good idea to plead at least one

negligence count, often negligent infliction of emotional distress, even

when the conduct itself appears to be intentional to permit recovery

against the tortfeasor’s homeowner’s insurance policy. Even when

framed as a negligence claim, however, many policies specifically ex-

clude coverage for child abuse generally or sexual abuse in particular,

and courts may construe policy exclusions for intentional acts as ex-

cluding coverage when the underlying action was intentional, regard-

less of the theory pleaded.68 Many liability policies for businesses and

organizations also include exclusions, particularly for child sexual

abuse.

68. See, e.g., EMCASCO Ins. Co. v. Diedrich, 394 F.3d 1091, 1096-97 (8th Cir. 2005) (stat-

ing that “the injury that gives rise to the state court lawsuit [for child molestation] was intended

by [the perpetrator] and clearly constitutes an intentional act within the policy exclusion” and

such exclusion also applies to the claim of the mother’s negligent supervision of the perpetrator);

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gilbert, 852 F.2d 449, 452 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that “the nature of the

[child sexual molestation] is such that an intent to cause at least some harm can be inferred as a

matter of law, and that as long as some harm is intended, it is immaterial that harm of a different

magnitude from that contemplated actually resulted”); Harden v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,

605 S.E.2d 37, 39 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that “exclusion from coverage for injury ‘the result

of’ willful and malicious acts makes clear that the policy excludes not only the claim based on

alleged acts of sexual abuse, but also any claim which has its genesis in or was ‘the result of’

those acts,” including the negligence claim against the perpetrator’s spouse “because it was ‘the

result of’ the alleged sexual abuse”); Pekin Ins. Co. v. Dial, 823 N.E.2d 986, 990-91 (Ill. App. Ct.

2005) (“The factual allegations of the complaint, rather than the legal theory under which the

action is brought, determine whether there is a duty to defend.” In addition, “[a]n insurance

company is under no duty to defend or indemnify an insured who sexually abuses a minor,

because the nature of the conduct itself establishes as a matter of law that the insured expected

or intended to injure the victim.”); Doe v. Mires, 741 So. 2d 842, 845 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (“The

sexual molestation of a child is . . . a deliberate, intentional act, and the emotional and physical

damage is such a fundamental and natural consequence of the molestation that any predator

must be held to realize that damage will result.” (quoting Smith v. Perkins, 651 So. 2d 292 (La.

Ct. App. 1994)); Montgomery County Bd. of Educ. v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 840 A.2d 220, 229

(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (“‘[S]exual activity between an adult and a minor child [is] . . . injuri-

ous per se’ and is a tort that is ‘only committed intentionally’ by the adult.” (quoting Pettit v.

Erie Ins. Exchange, 709 A.2d 1287, 1287 (Md. 1998)); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mugavero, 589 N.E.2d

365, 370 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that injury is inherent in child sexual abuse, and since the abuse

was intentional, the injuries were intentionally caused as a matter of law); State Farm Lloyds v.

C.M.W., 53 S.W.3d 877, 888, 891 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that “intent to injure will be

inferred as a matter of law in cases involving sexual abuse of a minor,” “regardless of the legal

theories attached to them”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Vose, 869 A.2d 97, 102 (Vt. 2004) (holding that

an act of “child abuse ‘is not the type of act that only occasionally results in harm—it is inher-

ently harmful,’” and intent will be inferred as a matter of law (quoting Serecky v. Nat’l Grange

Mut. Ins., 857 A.2d 775 (Vt. 2004)); St. Michelle v. Robinson, 759 P.2d 467, 470 (Wash. Ct. App.

1988) (holding that father’s sexual abuse of his daughter was clearly intentional, therefore, the

facts did not support the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress); Tara N. ex rel. Kum-

mer v. Economy Fire & Cas. Ins. Co, 540 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (barring recovery

for psychological and bodily injuries to the child, mother’s loss of consortium, child’s medical

expenses and loss of earning capacity in case filed against grandparents who negligently super-

vised visitation between the child and her father due to policy exclusion for bodily injury arising

out of an expected, anticipated, or foreseeable sexual act).

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2006]

Children’s Domestic Tort Claims

539

F. Preserving Children’s Domestic Tort Claims

Because child abuse and custodial interference involve tort liabil-

ity under at least some theory, an attorney involved in any case con-

cerning those issues, whether in a family law, child welfare, or other

context, must recognize the issues and inform the client or the client’s

guardian of the tort action to preserve the claims, even if the attorney

does not intend to initiate the action. The attorney should provide

this notice in writing. Failure to do so may expose the attorney to

malpractice liability.

Family law attorneys who are not experienced in handling tort

cases may be professionally and financially ill-equipped to handle a

tort action related to a family law or child welfare case. In such a

situation, the attorney should refer the client to a competent tort at-

torney or recommend that she seek such counsel, emphasizing that a

statute of limitations is involved. Associating tort counsel may be an

excellent way to address these cases, with one attorney having the ex-

perience of tort litigation, and the finances to handle the litigation,

while the other attorney has the expertise in the substantive child

abuse or custodial inference issues.

Evidence developed during the family law or child welfare case

may prove to be very important in a tort action, whether pursued at

the same time or years later. Witness depositions and statements,

photographs, medical and psychological records, criminal and child

welfare court records, and other evidence should be collected when

appropriate. File destruction policies should take into consideration

the possibility that such file materials may be necessary or useful in

the event that the child wishes to pursue the tort claims as an adult.

V. CONCLUSION

While family law attorneys most often address the immediate

concerns involved in child abuse cases—finding an appropriate custo-

dial placement for the child and ensuring adequate protection—it is

important to recognize that the circumstances presented in the family

law or child welfare case also give rise to potential tort claims, which

should be identified and preserved. Even if the tort action is not pur-

sued at the time, the attorney should anticipate that an action may be

filed in the future.