Children's Tort Claims Act

Children’s Domestic Tort Claims

Ann M. Haralambie*

I. INTRODUCTION

Child abuse and neglect is a significant problem. Substantiated

cases of abuse and neglect involved more than 900,000 children in

2003.1 Children are often the forgotten potential plaintiffs in domestic

torts cases. However, they do often possess causes of action against

their parents or third parties. Statutes of limitation for most of these

claims are tolled until the children reach majority, so lawsuits may be

filed even years after the cause of action arose. The two primary cate-

gories of claims involve child abuse and custodial interference, with

each category giving rise to several distinct causes of action. This arti-

cle will outline those causes of action and provide some practical sug-

gestions to pursuing domestic tort claims by or on behalf of children.

II. THE NEED FOR A REMEDY

Children who are abused and neglected may continue to suffer

from ongoing abuse and neglect,2 but even if the circumstances

change, the damage done may have long-term effec

chronic abuse or living in a chaotic, violent household in the earliest

years of a child’s life can actually alter the development of neuronal

connections in a child’s brain, which may permanently affect the

child’s ongoing development.3 Some physical injuries result in perma-

nent physical disabilities. Abuse and neglect also shape a child’s self-

concept and ability to form safe and meaningful relationships, with

life-long consequences. Children who are raised without appropriate

models of safe parenting often are unable to provide effective parent-

* Copyright © 2005 by Ann M. Haralambie. This article is based on an article that first

appeared in Ann Haralambie, Kids’ Causes of Action, 27 FAM. ADVOC. 30 (2005) and on infor-

mation appearing in ANN M. HARALAMBIE, 2 HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOP-

TION CASES ch. 20 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2005) [hereinafter HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD

CUSTODY]. Ann Haralambie is a certified family law specialist in private practice in Tucson,

Arizona.

1. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT iii

(2003).

2. For a discussion of different types of abuse and neglect and how to prove them, see

HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, supra note *, at chs. 16-18. See also ANN M.

HARALAMBIE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE IN CIVIL CASES: A GUIDE TO CUSTODY AND TORT AC-

TIONS (1999); JOHN E.B. MYERS, MYERS ON EVIDENCE IN CHILD, DOMESTIC AND ELDER ABUSE

CASES (2005). For a more detailed discussion of the law and practice involving child abuse torts,

see DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT AND SEXUAL ABUSE chs. 3-5, 9 (rev. ed.

2005).

3. See, e.g., ROBIN KARR-MORSE & MEREDITH S. WILEY, GHOSTS FROM THE NURSERY:

TRACING THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE (1997).

525

Page 2

\\server05\productn\W\WBN\45-3\WBN306.txt

unknown

Seq: 2

27-JUN-06

14:07

526

Washburn Law Journal

[Vol. 45

ing for their own children and may perpetuate a cycle of abuse and

neglect.4

Most legal responses to child abuse during the child’s minority

either address the custody and visitation rights of the abusive parents

or involve a criminal prosecution. Intervention by child protective

services may result in the breakup of the family, often with the child

being removed from all things familiar and placed in the foster care

system. Such intervention may result in numerous changes in place-

ment and loss of relationships with family and friends, including the

separation of siblings. Children have few resources to assist them

once they “age out” of the system, and many become homeless or

incarcerated within the first year or two after leaving foster care.5

Unless the abuse is particularly severe, most child abuse and neg-

lect cases never involve criminal prosecution. Even when abuse is

prosecuted, victim restitution funds and orders are rarely sufficient to

cover the child’s long-term financial needs for medical and psychologi-

cal help. They certainly do not cover the more intangible losses suf-

fered by the child.

Tort law may provide an avenue for achieving redress for the

child victims of domestic violence and may provide the only remedy

for the long-term consequences of the abuse. When the tort is an in-

tentional one, punitive damages may be available. In addition to

monetary recovery, however, a successful tort action may also provide

therapeutic benefit for the child by holding the abuser accountable.

For other children, even if they wait to file until they are adults, re-

opening the issue may increase the damage. Therefore, any consider-

ation of filing a domestic tort on behalf of a child or an adult abused

as a child should include a careful weighing of all of the potential risks

and benefits.

III. IDENTIFYING CAUSES OF ACTION

A. Assault and Battery

Physical and sexual abuse give rise to causes of action for the

intentional assaults and batteries by the abuser. Battery requires a

showing that “(a) [the defendant] acts intending to cause a harmful or

offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an

imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) an offensive contact

4. See, e.g., Katherine C. Pears & Deborah M. Capaldi, Intergenerational Transmission of

Abuse: A Two-Generational Prospective Study of an At-Risk Sample, 25 CHILD ABUSE AND NEG-

LECT 1439 (2001).

5. See, e.g., Richard Wertheimer, Youth Who “Age Out” of Foster Care: Troubled Lives,

Troubling Prospects, CHILD TRENDS RESEARCH BRIEF (Child Trends, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 2002,

at 5.

Page 3

\\server05\productn\W\WBN\45-3\WBN306.txt

unknown

Seq: 3

27-JUN-06

14:07

2006]

Children’s Domestic Tort Claims

527

with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.”6 While the

act of battery must be intended, the abuser does not need to intend to

harm the child. Assault requires that “(a) [the defendant] acts in-

tending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the

other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a con-

tact, and (b) the other is thereby put in such imminent apprehen-

sion.”7

The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that “bodily

contact is offensive if it offends a reasonable sense of personal dig-

nity.”8

Physical9 and sexual10 child abuse clearly should satisfy this

requirement.

B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Physical and sexual abuse,11 the failure to protect a child from

such abuse, and custodial interference12 may also give rise to claims

for intentional infliction of emotional distress. That cause of action

requires proof that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly,

that the conduct was extreme or outrageous, that the wrongful con-

duct caused the emotional distress, and that the emotional distress was

severe.13

C. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Some states also recognize a cause of action for negligent inflic-

tion of emotional distress. Most physical and sexual abuse results in

emotional injury, even if the abuser was not aware of that conse-

6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965).

7. Id. § 21.

8. Id. § 19.

9. See, e.g., Gillett v. Gillett, 335 P.2d 736, 738 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (involving step-

mother who beat child so severely as to rupture her spleen and kidney, which had to be re-

moved); Treschman v. Treschman, 61 N.E. 961, 962 (Ind. App. 1901) (involving stepmother who

beat child on a number of occasions, causing significant loss of vision from damage to her optic

nerves); Doe v. Doe, 551 S.E.2d 257, 257 (S.C. 2001) (involving children who sued father for

assault and battery, who was criminally convicted of sexual abuse); Steber v. Norris, 206 N.W.

173, 174, 176 (Wis. 1925) (holding that damages of one dollar awarded to child against third

party custodian who whipped him with a twisted, rubber whip on his bare flesh were grossly

inadequate).

10. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 742 F.2d 1004, 1004-05 (6th Cir. 1984) (reversing dismissal of

child’s action against her adoptive father for three years of molestation); A.R.B. v. Elkin, 98

S.W.3d 99, 101-02, 104-05 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that “actual injury or damages is not a

required element of proof in an assault and battery action” and concluding it was error for trial

court to fail to award damages when father admitted touching his eleven-year-old son’s genitals

and having his son touch his genitals and admitted exposing his genitals to and masturbating in

front of his seven-year-old daughter); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 38 (Utah 1980) (allowing

child to recover $42,600 against adopted father for seven years of molestation).

11. See, e.g., L.C.H. v. T.S., 28 P.3d 915, 917-18 (Alaska 2001) (discussing child suit against

step-grandfather for sexual abuse and intentional infliction of emotional distress).

12. See, e.g., Pittman v. Grayson, 869 F. Supp. 1065, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (discussing fa-

ther’s suit against mother and international airline company for interference with custodial

rights, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment for removing his

daughter from the United States in violation of a custody order).

13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).

Page 4

\\server05\productn\W\WBN\45-3\WBN306.txt

unknown

Seq: 4

27-JUN-06

14:07

528

Washburn Law Journal

[Vol. 45

quence. It is the abuser’s lack of awareness of foreseeable emotional

injury that constitutes the gravamen of the tort of negligent, as op-

posed to intentional, infliction of emotional distress. Some courts will

not allow a negligence claim, however, when it is based on abusive

conduct that is clearly intentional. Moreover, courts may hold that an

insurance exclusion for intentional acts precludes coverage for negli-

gence claims based on clearly intentional acts, depending on the actual

language of the insurance policy.14

D. Negligent Infliction of Prenatal Injuries

Prenatal drug exposure can create lasting problems for children.15

Courts in various contexts are addressing the problems caused by

mothers’ illegal drug use during pregnancy. Most courts that have ad-

dressed the issue have declined to permit adjudication of the child as

dependent and neglected based solely on prenatal drug exposure.16

Similarly, most courts reject protective custody or other prenatal rem-

edies designed to safeguard viable fetuses from the mother’s drug

use.17 Whether such prenatal drug use gives rise to tort liability is still

14. See infra Part IV.E. (discussing insurance coverage).

15. See, e.g., DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, WHEN DRUG ADDICTS HAVE CHILDREN (1994);

MOTHERS, BABIES, AND COCAINE: THE ROLE OF TOXINS IN DEVELOPMENT (Michael Lewis &

Margaret Bendersky eds., 1995); JANET Y. THOMAS, EDUCATING DRUG-EXPOSED CHILDREN:

THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRACK-BABY CRISIS (2004); Vincent L. Smeriglio & Holly C. Wilcox,

Prenatal Drug Exposure and Child Outcome, 26 CLINICS IN PERINATOLOGY 1 (1999).

16. See, e.g., Starks v. State, 18 P.3d 342, 343, 348 (Okla. 2001); State ex rel. Angela M.W. v.

Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729, 740 (Wis. 1997).

17. See, e.g., T.H. v. Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 661 So. 2d 403, 404 (Fla.

Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting preventive bimonthly drug testing of pregnant mother of adjudi-

cated dependent child); Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d at 739 (rejecting protective custody of mother);

see generally Deborah Appel, Drug Use During Pregnancy: State Strategies to Reduce the Preva-

lence of Prenatal Drug Exposure, 5 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (1992) (discussing the effects

of prenatal drug exposure on the fetus, analyzing legislative and judicial responses to prenatal

drug use, and recommending a public health approach to the problem); Amy Kay Boatright,

Comment, State Control over the Bodies of Pregnant Women, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 903,

908 (2000-01) (analyzing the constitutional rights of pregnant women, reviewing state responses

to prenatal harm, and recommending “that the U.S. Supreme Court adopt a bright line rule . . .

that a fetus’ right to begin life with a sound mind and body is not assertable against its own

mother” by any means, including by detainment or supervision); Michael T. Flannery, Court-

Ordered Prenatal Intervention: A Final Means to the End of Gestational Substance Abuse, 30 J.

FAM. L. 519 (1991-92) (analyzing standards for intervention with substance-abusing pregnant

women; juxtaposing state, fetal, and maternal rights; and recommending that whether and when

a court should intervene be determined according to what is most protective of the child and

least intrusive to the mother, considering medical, social, financial, and psychological factors);

Ellen Marrus, Crack Babies and the Constitution: Ruminations About Addicted Pregnant Women

After Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 47 VILL. L. REV. 299 (2002) (discussing state options for

dealing with prenatal drug exposure and recommending an individualized determination that

includes consideration of the resources actually available); Steven J. Ondersma et al., Prenatal

Drug Exposure and Social Policy: The Search for an Appropriate Response, 5 CHILD MALTREAT-

MENT 93, 94, 106 (2000) (recommending development of an “empirically based national policy

regarding prenatal substance exposure”); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who

Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1425,

1432 (1991) (examining the experiences of pregnant “poor Black women” and arguing that

“punishing drug addicts who choose to carry their pregnancies to term unconstitutionally bur-

dens the right to autonomy over reproductive decisions,” helping “to perpetuate a racist

hierarchy”).

Page 5

\\server05\productn\W\WBN\45-3\WBN306.txt

unknown

Seq: 5

27-JUN-06

14:07

2006]

Children’s Domestic Tort Claims

529

an unanswered question.18

E. Violation of Legislative Provision

An implied cause of action may exist based on the doctrine that

violation of a criminal statute is negligence per se. Restatement (Sec-

ond) of Torts, section 874A provides the following:

When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscrib-

ing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy

for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is

appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and

needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an

injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable ex-

isting tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing

tort action.19

In order to rely on this cause of action, the child must be an intended

beneficiary of protection extended by the statute. It is apparent that

the child is an intended beneficiary of criminal child abuse and neglect

laws, so when the abuse or neglect is sufficiently severe as to consti-

tute a criminal violation, an implied cause of action should apply. An

abused or neglected child is also an intended beneficiary of laws man-

dating certain persons to report suspicions of child abuse and neglect;

however, fewer courts have been willing to recognize a private cause

of action for failure to report.20 State law may give rise to a cause of

action against the child welfare agency for negligence in investigating

reports of child abuse.21

18. See generally Thomas M. Fleming, Right of Child to Action Against Mother for Infliction

of Prenatal Injuries, 78 A.L.R. 4TH 1082 (1990) (analyzing cases concerning a child’s cause of

action against his mother for prenatal personal injury).

19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A (1979).

20. See Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389, 390-91 (Cal. 1976) (holding that battered child is

entitled to sue physician for failure to report); Smith v. Jackson County Bd. of Educ., 608 S.E.2d

399, 403, 409-10 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that “the duty to report child abuse is not the type

of discretionary law enforcement function shielded by the public duty doctrine”); Doe v. Roman,

No. 2001-AP-05-0044, 2002 WL 31732468, *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2002) (discussing

mandatory reporting statute that “expressly imposes liability upon persons who fail to report,”

therefore no governmental immunity applies); cf. Ward v. Greene, 839 A.2d 1259, 1266-67, 1272-

73 (Conn. 2004) (noting that mandatory reporting law creates duty of care owed only to children

who are believed to have been abused or neglected); Marcelletti v. Bathani, 500 N.W.2d 124, 130

(Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (declining to extend statutory reporting duty to anyone other than the

abused child). But cf. Cuyler v. United States, 362 F.3d 949, 954-55 (7th Cir. 2004) (declining to

recognize a private cause of action for failure to report); C.B. v. Bobo, 659 So. 2d 98, 102 (Ala.

1995) (same); Fischer v. Metcalf, 543 So. 2d 785, 791 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (same); Borne v.

Nw. Allen County Sch. Corp., 532 N.E.2d 1196, 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (same); Kan. State

Bank & Trust Co. v. Specialized Transp. Servs, Inc., 819 P.2d 587, 604 (Kan. 1991) (same); Meyer

v. Lindala, 675 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (same); Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302,

314 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (same); Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 278 (N.H. 1995) (same); Paul-

son v. Sternlof, 15 P.3d 981, 984 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000) (same); Doe v. Marion, 605 S.E.2d 556,

562-63 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) (same); Arbaugh v. Bd. of Educ., 591 S.E.2d 235, 241 (W. Va. 2003)

(same).

21. See, e.g., Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788, 791 (Minn. 2005) (“[A] cause

of action can be maintained for negligence in the investigation . . . of child abuse and neglect

reports as required under [the child abuse reporting statute.]”); cf. Gilliam v. Dep’t of Soc. &

Health Servs., Child Protective Servs., 950 P.2d 20, 22 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the

Page 6

\\server05\productn\W\WBN\45-3\WBN306.txt

unknown

Seq: 6

27-JUN-06

14:07

530

Washburn Law Journal

[Vol. 45

F. Other Causes of Action for Abuse and Neglect

In some factual scenarios, physical and sexual abuse may involve

false imprisonment22 or negligent transmission of a sexually transmit-

ted disease. A non-abusing parent who fails to reasonably protect the

child may also be liable for a negligence tort.23 The child may have a

cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress for vio-

lence inflicted on another family member in the child’s presence if the

violence was extreme and outrageous and the child suffered severe

emotional distress.24 Some states recognize a cause of action against a

child welfare agency for negligent placement in foster care.25

Once

the child is in state custody, a “special relationship” may exist between

the agency and the child, giving rise to a duty to protect the foster

child.26

G. Intentional Interference with Custodial Rights

A number of jurisdictions recognize a cause of action arising out

of intentional interference with custodial rights, at least when the

plaintiff is the custodial parent.27

Fewer states recognize a cause of

state is not entitled to absolute immunity for negligent investigation that resulted in a depen-

dency action being filed against father for allegedly molesting his children).

22. For the elements of false imprisonment see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35

(1965).

23. See, e.g., Sipes v. Sipes, 936 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that the fact

that the child’s mother knew that his father abused him does not preclude a negligence claim for

her failure to protect him).

24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2) (1965).

25. See, e.g., Savage v. Utah Youth Vill., 104 P.3d 1242, 1246 (Utah 2004) (noting that a

placement agency has a special duty when placing children in foster homes to regard “the wel-

fare of the child being placed and other persons in the home [and that it] is a reasonably foresee-

able risk that a child with a known history of sexually abusing young children might sexually

abuse again if placed in a home with young children”).

26. Because of sovereign immunity, a child may be precluded from suing the state based

solely on negligence. Most actions against state agencies are pleaded as civil rights claims. See

infra Part III.H.

27. See, e.g., DiRuggiero v. Rodgers, 743 F.2d 1009, 1017 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying New

Jersey law); Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (applying District of Co-

lumbia law); Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 833-34 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying Maryland

law); Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998, 1005 (E.D. Wis. 1982), aff’d, 694 F.2d 489, 496 (7th Cir.

1982) (applying Wisconsin law); Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15, 18 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (applying

New York law); Rayford v. Rayford, 456 So. 2d 833, 834-35 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984); Surina v.

Lucey, 214 Cal. Rptr. 509, 513 (Ct. App. 1985); D & D Fuller CATV Constr., Inc. v. Pace, 780

P.2d 520, 524 (Colo. 1989) (en banc); Mathews v. Murray, 113 S.E.2d 232, 235 (Ga. Ct. App.

1960); Shields v. Martin, 706 P.2d 21, 22-23, 27 (Idaho 1985); Wolf v. Wolf, 690 N.W.2d 887, 892

(Iowa 2005); Brown v. Brown, 61 N.W.2d 656 (Mich. 1953); Kramer v. Leineweber, 642 S.W.2d

364, 366 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Plante v. Engel, 469 A.2d 1299, 1300 (N.H. 1983); LaGrenade v.

Gordon, 264 S.E.2d 757, 759 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); McBride v. Magnuson, 578 P.2d 1259, 1260

(Or. 1978) (en banc); Bedard v. Notre Dame Hosp., 151 A.2d 690, 692 (R.I. 1959); Silcott v.

Oglesby, 721 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Tex. 1986); In re Marriage of Hall, 607 P.2d 898, 901 (Wash. Ct.

App. 1980); Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 765 (W. Va. 1998). But see, e.g., Larson v. Dunn,

460 N.W.2d 39, 47 (Minn. 1990) (noting that no cause of action exists for intentional interference

with custodial rights); Zaharias v. Gammill, 844 P.2d 137, 138 (Okla. 1992) (refusing to recognize

the tort of intentional interference with custody, but pointing out that “Oklahoma already recog-

nizes a cause of action in the parent or legal guardian of a child for the abduction or enticement

of that child”); cf. Hoblyn v. Johnson, 55 P.3d 1219, 1227 (Wyo. 2002) (declining to recognize the

tort of intentional interference with custodial rights under the facts presented and stating that

Page 7

\\server05\productn\W\WBN\45-3\WBN306.txt

unknown

Seq: 7

27-JUN-06

14:07

2006]

Children’s Domestic Tort Claims

531

action for interference with visitation.28

Restatement (Second) of

Torts, section 700 describes the tort of causing a minor child to leave

or not to return home as follows: “One who, with knowledge that the

parent does not consent, abducts or otherwise compels or induces a

minor child to leave a parent legally entitled to its custody or not to

return to the parent after it has been left him, is subject to liability to

the parent.”29 Several states have recognized the section 700 tort.30 It

is interesting to note that the liability is to the parent and does not

directly include liability to the child himself. It may be argued, how-

ever, that the child is similarly injured by being deprived of the com-

panionship and care of the legally entitled custodian. The comment to

section 700 provides that the

temporary absence of a child who is too young to perform service or

the abduction of a hopeless invalid is actionable as well as the ab-

duction of a child who actually renders service to the parent. The

deprivation to the parent of the society of the child is itself an injury

that the law redresses.31

Custodial interference often constitutes a crime, thereby giving

rise to an implied civil cause of action based on violation of a criminal

statute.32 Custodial interference also may give rise to intentional or

negligent infliction of emotional distress. Some jurisdictions, how-

ever, find that a cause of action, which essentially alleges parental

alienation, is not recognized when a “heart balm” statute or case law

has abolished claims for alienation of affections.33 Custodial interfer-

ence theories have included false imprisonment,34 enticement,35 un-

lawful interference with custody,36 intentional infliction of emotional

even if the court “were inclined to recognize the tort . . . , the parents . . . failed to establish a

prima facie case that the elements . . . [had been] met”).

28. See, e.g., Owens v. Owens, 471 So. 2d 920, 921 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Hixon v.

Buchberger, 507 A.2d 607, 607 (Md. 1986); Politte v. Politte, 727 S.W.2d 198, 198 (Mo. Ct. App.

1987); McGrady v. Rosenbaum, 308 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Gleiss v. Newman, 415

N.W.2d 845, 846 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987); Cosner v. Ridinger, 882 P.2d 1243, 1247 (Wyo. 1994).

29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1977).

30. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 672 So. 2d 787, 789 (Ala. 1995); Robbins v.

Hamburger Home for Girls, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534, 539-40 (Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing the tort,

but holding that insufficient facts were pleaded to satisfy the elements in this case); Zamstein v.

Marvasti, 692 A.2d 781, 790 (Conn. 1997) (recognizing the tort, but holding that insufficient facts

were pleaded to satisfy the elements in this case); Stone v. Wall, 734 So. 2d 1038, 1049 (Fla.

1999); Wolf, 690 N.W.2d at 891; Kessel, 511 S.E.2d at 761-62; Cosner, 882 P.2d at 1247 (recogniz-

ing the tort, but holding that insufficient facts were pleaded to satisfy the elements in this case).

31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 cmt. d (1977). But see Larson, 460 N.W.2d at

47 (reversing appellate court’s recognition of a custodial parent’s custodial interference tort ac-

tion under section 700).

32. See discussion supra Part III.E. (regarding negligence based on violation of a legislative

enactment).

33. See, e.g., Bouchard v. Sundberg, 834 A.2d 744, 756-57 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003); Hyman v.

Moldovan, 305 S.E.2d 648, 649 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).

34. See, e.g., Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15, 18 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).

35. See, e.g., Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 833 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying Mary-

land law); Armstrong v. McDonald, 103 So. 2d 818, 819-20 (Ala. Ct. App. 1958).

36. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998, 1004 (E.D. Wis. 1982); Wood v. Wood, 338

N.W.2d 123, 124 (Iowa 1983); Plante v. Engel, 469 A.2d 1299, 1302 (N.H. 1983).

Page 8

\\server05\productn\W\WBN\45-3\WBN306.txt

unknown

Seq: 8

27-JUN-06

14:07

532

Washburn Law Journal

[Vol. 45

distress,37 outrageous conduct,38 abduction and concealment,39 caus-

ing a minor child to leave or not to return,40 and conspiracy.41 When

the cause of action is recognized, tort liability may also be imposed on

a third party who conspires with or aids a parent to do a criminal or

unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means in removing the child

from the custodial parent.42

H. Civil Rights Action

When the state has custody of a child, such as a child in foster

care, and the state actor’s negligence resulted in abuse, a civil rights

action might lie under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under the theory that the state

has formed a “special relationship” with the child in its custody. In

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,43 the

United States Supreme Court ruled that when the child is no longer in

state custody, there is no such “special relationship.” No federal civil

rights remedy will lie, therefore, even if child protective services inves-

tigated a complaint or returned the child to the parent negligently.44

37. See, e.g., Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that emotional dis-

tress tort will lie despite factual overtones of abolished tort of alienation of affection); Wasser-

man, 671 F.2d at 833; Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1107, 1108 (5th Cir. 1980); Kajtazi, 488 F.

Supp. at 20; Sheltra v. Smith, 392 A.2d 431, 431 (Vt. 1978).

38. See, e.g., Pankratz v. Willis, 744 P.2d 1182 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Cramlet v. Multimedia

Program Prod., Inc., No. 80-C-1737, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21704, *5 (D. Colo. Mar. 15, 1985).

39. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 93 Cal. Rptr. 617, 618 (Ct. App. 1971); Silcott v. Oglesby,

721 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Tex. 1986).

40. See, e.g., Lloyd, 539 F. Supp. at 1004.

41. See, e.g., Fenslage, 629 F.2d at 1110; Cramlet, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21704, at *1; Lloyd,

539 F. Supp. at 1003; Gibson, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 617.

42. See, e.g., Marshak v. Marshak, 628 A.2d 964, 970 (Conn. 1993); Plante v. Engel, 469

A.2d 1299, 1302 (N.H. 1983); Zaharias v. Gammill, 844 P.2d 137, 138 (Okla. 1992); Weirich v.

Weirich, 833 S.W.2d 942, 945 (Tex. 1992).

43. 489 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1989) (affirming lower court’s determination that no § 1983 cause

of action existed for a child once in foster care who was beaten to death by his father after being

returned to his custody).

44. See, e.g., Forrester v. Bass, 397 F.3d 1047, 1056, 1059 (8th Cir. 2005). In Forrester, the

court determined that social workers were entitled to qualified immunity and to summary judg-

ment. Id. at 1059. In making this determination, the court discussed state-created procedures,

which require investigations, law enforcement notification and intervention, direct observation

of subject children, and the provision of social services but “do not mandate the particular sub-

stantive outcomes” and “do not create ‘entitlements’ subject to constitutional protections under

the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 1056. In addition, the social worker’s “failure to conduct an

investigation, to contact law enforcement, and to verify the whereabouts of the boys, while erro-

neous, and maybe naive in retrospect, cannot be considered conscience-shocking.” Id. at 1059;

see also, e.g., S.S. v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that state social work-

ers were not liable for returning child home to father knowing that he associated with a

pedophile because the social workers did not increase her danger but only returned her to the

situation from which they had taken her); Powell v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 114 F.3d 1074,

1083 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that welfare agency and its employees were not liable for infant

killed after being returned to mother’s abusive home); Doe v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861,

864-65 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that a violation of Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act

(CAPTA) requirement of promptly investigating reports of child abuse does not give rise to

§ 1983 private cause of action because CAPTA is a funding act creating only generalized duties

similar to those in the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act for which a private right of

action was rejected by Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992)); Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 865 A.2d

428, 435, 438, 444 (Conn. 2005) (holding that no tort action lies for failure to remove children

because “the commissioner is not statutorily required to remove a child in imminent risk of

Page 9

\\server05\productn\W\WBN\45-3\WBN306.txt

unknown

Seq: 9

27-JUN-06

14:07

2006]

Children’s Domestic Tort Claims

533

The Court specifically stated that if the state had removed Joshua

DeShaney from his home and placed him in a state foster home, “we

might have a situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration or insti-

tutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect.”45

The

Court noted that several circuit courts of appeals had found state lia-

bility for failure to protect children in state foster homes who were

abused by their foster parents.46 Following DeShaney, several courts

have recognized that the state may have a duty to protect children

who are in foster care.47

Even after DeShaney, several states have

recognized liability based, not on the fact of a special relationship, but

rather on a state-created danger.48

physical harm pursuant to [child protection statutes and agency regulations],” but rather, “a

probable cause determination is discretionary”); cf. 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255,

1274 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act does not create a

private cause of action to allow foster children to sue to enforce its provisions).

45. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9.

46. Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 793 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (citing

Doe v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981)).

47. See, e.g., J.H. ex rel. Higgin v. Johnson, 346 F.3d 788, 792 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that a

plaintiff must demonstrate that the individual child welfare agency employees “had specific

‘knowledge or suspicion’ of the risk of sexual abuse facing the children [in their foster home] in

order to hold the defendants liable under § 1983” (quoting Lewis v. Anderson, 308 F.3d 768, 773

(7th Cir. 2002)); Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding

that foster child in state foster care has a due process right to personal safety); Norfleet v. Ark.

Dep’t of Human Servs., 796 F. Supp. 1194, 1201 (E.D. Ark. 1992); Kara B. ex rel. Albert v. Dane

County, 555 N.W.2d 630, 631, 635, 638 (Wis. 1996) (construing DeShaney and several other

cases, when read together, as recognizing a clearly established constitutional right to a reasona-

bly safe and secure foster home placement; stating that county officials did not have qualified

immunity under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action brought by children who were physically and sexually

abused in their foster home; and applying the professional judgment standard); cf. K.H. ex rel.

Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that child in state custody has the

right “not to be handed over by state officers to a foster parent or other custodian, private or

public, whom the state knows or suspects to be a child abuser”).

48. See, e.g., Currier v. Doran, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1279, 1282 (D.N.M. 1998) (denying

summary judgment when the state agency had taken custody of the child and then placed him in

the custody of his father, where he later died after his father threw boiling water on him, and

when the state had received several reports that the child was being abused but did not act to

remove him); Tazioly v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A.97-CV-1219, 1998 WL 633747, *5-6, *7

(E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1998) (denying summary judgment when state agency failed to respond to

numerous reports that the child was being abused after child “was treated for burns and contu-

sions, dehydration, a fractured . . . leg, and a fractured skull” and holding that “a state actor may

be held liable under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 in cases where the state terminates satisfactory foster

care and places a child in the custody of a [parent] with known propensities for violent and

bizarre behavior, thereby increasing the foreseeable risk of harm to the child”); Ford v. Johnson,

899 F. Supp. 227, 229-30, 233-34 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (denying summary judgment when county

agency had returned custody of child, who had been placed with department, back to father, who

later beat child to death and holding that state agents who unnecessarily exposed child to danger

could be found liable based on violation of child’s rights under due process clause). But see, e.g.,

Terry B. v. Gilkey, 229 F.3d 680, 682, 684 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that child welfare agency no

longer had an affirmative duty to protect the children once the probate court placed them in the

guardianship of their aunt and uncle even though the court ordered the agency to maintain an

open protective services case on the children and concluding that individual defendants were

“not liable on a theory of state-created danger for returning the children” with the alleged

knowledge that the aunt and uncle were abusive).

Page 10

\\server05\productn\W\WBN\45-3\WBN306.txt

unknown

Seq: 10

27-JUN-06

14:07

534

Washburn Law Journal

[Vol. 45

IV. BARRIERS TO CAUSES OF ACTION

A. Collateral Estoppel

When there has been a finding of abuse in a family law, child

welfare, or criminal action, that finding will generally collaterally es-

top the abuser from denying the abuse in a subsequent tort action,

provided that the abuser was a party to the previous action and actu-

ally litigated or had the opportunity to litigate the abuse issue.49 If the

defendant was convicted of a felony charge of abuse or custodial inter-

ference, then the conviction should be admissible in the tort action. If

the previous action involved a higher standard of proof, such as a ter-

mination of parental rights or a criminal action and the result favored

the defendant, then the plaintiff should be permitted to relitigate the

abuse in an action requiring proof only by a preponderance of the

evidence.

Collateral estoppel may also apply against a child plaintiff. If the

child was not represented by counsel in the previous action, however,

collateral estoppel may not apply to preclude the tort action. Finally,

the tort action may be pleaded in a way that involves different legal

issues. Given the different purposes and standards that apply in fam-

ily, child welfare, and criminal actions, plaintiffs should be able to

bring their tort actions under most circumstances.

B. Potential Defendants

Abusive or negligent parents are obvious potential defendants.

There may also be third party or institutional defendants, however,

even though the injury to the child was caused by a parent or other

household member. For example, under state mandatory reporting

laws, certain people are required to report suspected abuse or neglect.

Doctors, nurses, psychologists, counselors, teachers, and daycare

workers are among the groups most often included as mandated re-

porters. If any such person interacted with the child and had suspi-

cions that the child was being maltreated but did not report the

suspicion to child protective services or law enforcement, then the

breach of that duty may give rise to a child’s cause of action.50

Third parties, including parents, who facilitate the abuse may be

held liable. Parents may have liability for failure to protect children in

their care or to protect other children from foreseeable abuse by their

child or spouse. Third parties who contribute to the circumstances

surrounding the abuse may also be held liable under a negligence the-

49. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 551 S.E.2d 257, 258 (S.C. 2001) (holding that father’s conviction

for the sexual abuse collaterally estopped him from relitigating the facts of the abuse).

50. See supra Part III.E. (discussing liability for failure to report).

Page 11

\\server05\productn\W\WBN\45-3\WBN306.txt

unknown

Seq: 11

27-JUN-06

14:07

2006]

Children’s Domestic Tort Claims

535

ory. If the child was in state custody, then the state agency may also

be a defendant.

C. Statutes of Limitation and Repose

Statutes of limitation and repose are important in children’s do-

mestic torts. In most circumstances, statutes of limitation are tolled

during a child’s minority. However, such tolling may not apply to ac-

tions brought against governmental entities.51 There is a split of opin-

ion as to whether they may be tolled after the child reaches majority

based on delayed discovery, particularly as applied to child sexual

abuse.52

The delayed discovery issue may occur when the victim is

aware of the abuse, but not reasonably aware that the damages were

caused by the abuse, or when the victim does not recall the abuse

because of the trauma induced by it. Some states may permit tolling

the statute only in the second situation.

Statutes of repose apply differently.

A statute of repose . . . limits the time within which an action may

be brought and is not related to the accrual of any cause of action;

the injury need not have occurred, much less have been discovered.

Unlike an ordinary statute of limitations which begins running upon

accrual of the claim, the period contained in a statute of repose be-

gins when a specific event occurs, regardless of whether a cause of

action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted.53

The statute of repose may not be tolled during the child’s minority. A

number of states, however, have specific provisions in their statutes of

repose to permit later filing of a cause of action related to child

abuse.54

51. See, e.g., Artukovich v. Astendorf, 131 P.2d 831, 833-34 (Cal. 1942) (holding that, in the

absence of a statutory exemption, the claim-filing requirements of the government tort claims

act are applicable to minors and are not subject to tolling). But see, e.g., Rodriguez v. Superior

Court, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 295, 298 (Ct. App. 2003) (noting that legislative establishment of

Foster Family Home and Small Family Home Insurance Fund, which required foster parents to

file a claim with the fund before the statute of limitation for the underlying claim expired, consti-

tuted a statutory exemption tolling the statute of limitations during the foster child’s minority).

52. Compare Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951 (Ariz. 1998) (permitting use of the discovery rule);

Farris v. Compton, 652 A.2d 49 (D.C. 1994); Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989); Ault

v. Jasko, 637 N.E.2d 870 (Ohio 1994); Moriarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church of God, 534 S.E.2d

672 (S.C. 2000); Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1993), with M.H.D. v. Westminster Sch.,

172 F.3d 797 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying Georgia law and not permitting use of the discovery

rule); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying New York law); Baily v.

Lewis, 763 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1989). For a discussion of delayed discovery see DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE,

CONFLICT AND SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 2, § 4.30; HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUS-

TODY, supra note *, § 20.8; HARALAMBIE, supra note 2, at 87-90.

53. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 5, at 22 (1987).

54. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(7) (West 2002). The Florida statute provides that

[a]n action founded on alleged abuse . . . or incest . . . may be commenced at any time

within 7 years after the age of majority, or within 4 years after the injured person leaves

the dependency of the abuser, or within 4 years from the time of discovery by the

injured party of both the injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the

abuse, whichever occurs later.

Id. Under Virginia law, a cause of action accrues in actions

Page 12

\\server05\productn\W\WBN\45-3\WBN306.txt

unknown

Seq: 12

27-JUN-06

14:07

536

Washburn Law Journal

[Vol. 45

D. Immunity

Parents and those legally responsible for the care of children,

such as foster parents, have a privilege to reasonably discipline the

children, including administration of reasonable corporal punish-

ment.55 If the punishment is unnecessarily degrading, or inflicts seri-

ous or permanent harm, the privilege does not apply.56 Child abuse,

by definition, exceeds the reasonably accepted boundaries of parental

care and control and involves something more than “reasonable” cor-

poral punishment. Reasonableness takes into account the severity of

the child’s offense and the age and sex of the child.57 Further, if the

force is imposed primarily for a purpose other than proper training,

education, or discipline, then it is not privileged, even if it would have

been privileged if applied for a proper purpose.58

The parental immunity doctrine traditionally bars recovery for

torts committed by a parent against a minor child. That immunity was

conferred upon parents to further the public policy of “preserving do-

mestic tranquility” and is broader than the privilege of reasonable dis-

cipline.59

Child abuse itself may have already broken that domestic

tranquility.60 The Restatement (Second) of Torts rejects the doctrine

for injury to the person, whatever the theory of recovery, resulting from sexual abuse

occurring during the infancy or incapacity of the person, upon removal of the disability

of infancy . . . or, if the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the sexual abuse is

not then known, when the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the sexual

abuse is first communicated to the person by a licensed physician, psychologist, or

clinical psychologist.

VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-249(6) (2000).

55. See, e.g., People v. Whitehurst, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 35 (Ct. App. 1992); Commonwealth

v. Rubeck, 833 N.E.2d 650, 653 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005); In re Peter G., 774 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687

(App. Div. 2004) (Sullivan, J., concurring); State v. Adaranijo, 792 N.E.2d 1138, 1140 (Ohio Ct.

App. 2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147(1) (1965) (“A parent is privileged to ap-

ply such reasonable force or to impose reasonable confinement upon his child as he reasonably

believes to be necessary for its proper control, training, or education.”).

56. See, e.g., Nixon v. State, 773 So. 2d 1213, 1215-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); State v.

Kimberly B., 699 N.W.2d 641, 644, 649 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 150 cmt. e (1965).

57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 cmts. c-d (1965); see, e.g., Gillett v. Gillett,

335 P.2d 736, 737 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (“While it may seem repugnant to allow a minor to sue his

parent, we think it more repugnant to leave a minor child without redress for the damage he has

suffered by reason of his parent’s wilful [sic] or malicious misconduct.”).

58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 151 (1965). The comment to this section indi-

cates, for example, that the privilege would not apply if the force is imposed “to satisfy a violent

antipathy.” Id. § 151 cmt. a.

59. For a discussion of the parental immunity doctrine and its erosion see DOMESTIC TORTS:

FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT AND SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 2, § 3.22; DONALD T. KRAMER,

LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN §§ 9:7-9:9 (rev. 2d ed. 2005).

60. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 742 F.2d 1004, 1005 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that adoptive

father’s sexual molestation of child between the ages of eight and eleven was gross misconduct,

which “would be so destructive of a family’s parental relations as to eliminate the . . . public

policy behind the parental immunity rule”); Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So. 2d 264, 266 (Ala. 1989)

(noting exception to parental immunity for cases of sexual abuse when proven by clear and

convincing evidence); Henderson v. Woolley, 644 A.2d 1303, 1303 (Conn. 1994) (stating that

parental immunity does not bar “an action by a minor child against his or her parent for personal

injuries arising out of sexual abuse, sexual assault, or sexual exploitation”); Herzfeld v. Herzfeld,

781 So. 2d 1070, 1077-79 (Fla. 2001) (determining that parental immunity doctrine does not ap-

Page 13

\\server05\productn\W\WBN\45-3\WBN306.txt

unknown

Seq: 13

27-JUN-06

14:07

2006]

Children’s Domestic Tort Claims

537

of parental immunity except with respect to reasonable force or con-

finement for control, training, and education.61 Most states have ei-

ther abrogated the doctrine of parental immunity,62 particularly with

respect to intentional torts, or held that it never existed.63 Further, if

the civil action is filed after the child has become an adult, parental

immunity does not apply.64 Some courts have declined to recognize

parental immunity when the child is emancipated65 or the parental

rights have been terminated.

For children in state care, the state may have sovereign immunity.

Further, in DeShaney the United States Supreme Court held that the

state had no constitutional duty to protect a child who is not in state

care after receiving reports of possible abuse by a parent, but left open

the possibility of imposition of such a duty for children in the state’s

care.66 Following DeShaney, several courts have recognized that the

state may have a duty to protect children who are in foster care.67

E. Insurance Coverage

Many tort defendants, especially family members, lack assets suf-

ficient to justify the filing of an action. A major deterrent to the filing

ply to intentional sexual abuse); Eagan v. Calhoun, 698 A.2d 1097, 1098, 1104 (Md. 1997) (hold-

ing that father’s intentional killing of mother “constitutes an abandonment of the parental

relationship and of the broader family harmony, and, as a matter of judicial and legal policy, it

should not bar a wrongful death action by the remaining family members otherwise entitled to

bring such an action”); Doe v. Holt, 418 S.E.2d 511, 515 (N.C. 1992) (“[W]hen a parent steps

beyond the bounds of reasonable parental discretion and commits a willful and malicious act

which injures his or her child, [in this case the father’s repeated rapes and sexual molestation of

his children,] the parent negates the public policies [that] led to recognition of the parent-child

immunity doctrine . . . , and the doctrine does not shield the parent.”).

61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G(1) (1979).

62. See, e.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 13-14 (Alaska 1967); Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907

P.2d 43, 50 (Ariz. 1995) (en banc); Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 648, 653 (Cal. 1971) (en banc)

(replacing parental immunity with reasonable parent standard); Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416,

416 (D.C. 1987); Wagner v. Smith, 340 N.W.2d 255, 255 (Iowa 1983); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick,

611 P.2d 135, 141 (Kan. 1980); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921, 921 (Ky. 1970); Black v.

Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 635 (Me. 1979); Stamboulis v. Stamboulis, 519 N.E.2d 1299, 1301 (Mass.

1988); Sweeney v. Sweeney, 262 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Mich. 1978); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d

595, 596 (Minn. 1980); Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d 852, 852, 858 (Mo. 1991) (en banc)

(replacing parental immunity with reasonable parent standard); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle,

656 P.2d 820, 824 (Mont. 1983); Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013, 1018 (Nev. 1974); Vickers v.

Vickers, 242 A.2d 57, 58 (N.H. 1968); Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145, 1152 (N.J. 1983); Guess v.

Gulf Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 869, 871 (N.M. 1981); Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364, 367 (N.D. 1967);

Kirchner v. Crystal, 474 N.E.2d 275, 276 (Ohio 1984); Winn v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d 776, 785-86 (Or.

1984); Falco v. Pados, 282 A.2d 351, 353 (Pa. 1971); Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013, 1017 (R.I.

1982); Elam v. Elam, 268 S.E.2d 109, 111-12 (S.C. 1980); Wood v. Wood, 370 A.2d 191, 193 (Vt.

1977); Thomas v. Kells, 191 N.W.2d 872, 874 (Wis. 1971); cf. Sixkiller v. Summers, 680 P.2d 360

(Okla. 1984) (failing to abrogate parental immunity in case involving negligent supervision short

of willful misconduct).

63. See, e.g., Rousey, 528 A.2d at 416; Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah 1980).

64. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 616 (5th ed. 1984).

65. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Valdez, 427 P.2d 655, 659 (N.M. 1967); Logan v. Reaves, 354

S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tenn. 1962).

66. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 n.9 (1989).

67. See, e.g., Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1990); Norfleet ex

rel. Norfleet v. State of Ark. Dep’t. of Human Servs., 796 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1992); Kara

B. ex rel. Albert v. Dane County, 555 N.W.2d 630 (Wis. 1996).

Page 14

\\server05\productn\W\WBN\45-3\WBN306.txt

unknown

Seq: 14

27-JUN-06

14:07

538

Washburn Law Journal

[Vol. 45

of all kinds of domestic torts is the lack of insurance coverage out of

which to fund recovery for damages. For example, most homeowner’s

policies exclude coverage for intentional torts. When not precluded

by parental immunity, it is generally a good idea to plead at least one

negligence count, often negligent infliction of emotional distress, even

when the conduct itself appears to be intentional to permit recovery

against the tortfeasor’s homeowner’s insurance policy. Even when

framed as a negligence claim, however, many policies specifically ex-

clude coverage for child abuse generally or sexual abuse in particular,

and courts may construe policy exclusions for intentional acts as ex-

cluding coverage when the underlying action was intentional, regard-

less of the theory pleaded.68 Many liability policies for businesses and

organizations also include exclusions, particularly for child sexual

abuse.

68. See, e.g., EMCASCO Ins. Co. v. Diedrich, 394 F.3d 1091, 1096-97 (8th Cir. 2005) (stat-

ing that “the injury that gives rise to the state court lawsuit [for child molestation] was intended

by [the perpetrator] and clearly constitutes an intentional act within the policy exclusion” and

such exclusion also applies to the claim of the mother’s negligent supervision of the perpetrator);

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gilbert, 852 F.2d 449, 452 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that “the nature of the

[child sexual molestation] is such that an intent to cause at least some harm can be inferred as a

matter of law, and that as long as some harm is intended, it is immaterial that harm of a different

magnitude from that contemplated actually resulted”); Harden v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,

605 S.E.2d 37, 39 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that “exclusion from coverage for injury ‘the result

of’ willful and malicious acts makes clear that the policy excludes not only the claim based on

alleged acts of sexual abuse, but also any claim which has its genesis in or was ‘the result of’

those acts,” including the negligence claim against the perpetrator’s spouse “because it was ‘the

result of’ the alleged sexual abuse”); Pekin Ins. Co. v. Dial, 823 N.E.2d 986, 990-91 (Ill. App. Ct.

2005) (“The factual allegations of the complaint, rather than the legal theory under which the

action is brought, determine whether there is a duty to defend.” In addition, “[a]n insurance

company is under no duty to defend or indemnify an insured who sexually abuses a minor,

because the nature of the conduct itself establishes as a matter of law that the insured expected

or intended to injure the victim.”); Doe v. Mires, 741 So. 2d 842, 845 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (“The

sexual molestation of a child is . . . a deliberate, intentional act, and the emotional and physical

damage is such a fundamental and natural consequence of the molestation that any predator

must be held to realize that damage will result.” (quoting Smith v. Perkins, 651 So. 2d 292 (La.

Ct. App. 1994)); Montgomery County Bd. of Educ. v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 840 A.2d 220, 229

(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (“‘[S]exual activity between an adult and a minor child [is] . . . injuri-

ous per se’ and is a tort that is ‘only committed intentionally’ by the adult.” (quoting Pettit v.

Erie Ins. Exchange, 709 A.2d 1287, 1287 (Md. 1998)); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mugavero, 589 N.E.2d

365, 370 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that injury is inherent in child sexual abuse, and since the abuse

was intentional, the injuries were intentionally caused as a matter of law); State Farm Lloyds v.

C.M.W., 53 S.W.3d 877, 888, 891 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that “intent to injure will be

inferred as a matter of law in cases involving sexual abuse of a minor,” “regardless of the legal

theories attached to them”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Vose, 869 A.2d 97, 102 (Vt. 2004) (holding that

an act of “child abuse ‘is not the type of act that only occasionally results in harm—it is inher-

ently harmful,’” and intent will be inferred as a matter of law (quoting Serecky v. Nat’l Grange

Mut. Ins., 857 A.2d 775 (Vt. 2004)); St. Michelle v. Robinson, 759 P.2d 467, 470 (Wash. Ct. App.

1988) (holding that father’s sexual abuse of his daughter was clearly intentional, therefore, the

facts did not support the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress); Tara N. ex rel. Kum-

mer v. Economy Fire & Cas. Ins. Co, 540 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (barring recovery

for psychological and bodily injuries to the child, mother’s loss of consortium, child’s medical

expenses and loss of earning capacity in case filed against grandparents who negligently super-

vised visitation between the child and her father due to policy exclusion for bodily injury arising

out of an expected, anticipated, or foreseeable sexual act).

Page 15

\\server05\productn\W\WBN\45-3\WBN306.txt

unknown

Seq: 15

27-JUN-06

14:07

2006]

Children’s Domestic Tort Claims

539

F. Preserving Children’s Domestic Tort Claims

Because child abuse and custodial interference involve tort liabil-

ity under at least some theory, an attorney involved in any case con-

cerning those issues, whether in a family law, child welfare, or other

context, must recognize the issues and inform the client or the client’s

guardian of the tort action to preserve the claims, even if the attorney

does not intend to initiate the action. The attorney should provide

this notice in writing. Failure to do so may expose the attorney to

malpractice liability.

Family law attorneys who are not experienced in handling tort

cases may be professionally and financially ill-equipped to handle a

tort action related to a family law or child welfare case. In such a

situation, the attorney should refer the client to a competent tort at-

torney or recommend that she seek such counsel, emphasizing that a

statute of limitations is involved. Associating tort counsel may be an

excellent way to address these cases, with one attorney having the ex-

perience of tort litigation, and the finances to handle the litigation,

while the other attorney has the expertise in the substantive child

abuse or custodial inference issues.

Evidence developed during the family law or child welfare case

may prove to be very important in a tort action, whether pursued at

the same time or years later. Witness depositions and statements,

photographs, medical and psychological records, criminal and child

welfare court records, and other evidence should be collected when

appropriate. File destruction policies should take into consideration

the possibility that such file materials may be necessary or useful in

the event that the child wishes to pursue the tort claims as an adult.

V. CONCLUSION

While family law attorneys most often address the immediate

concerns involved in child abuse cases—finding an appropriate custo-

dial placement for the child and ensuring adequate protection—it is

important to recognize that the circumstances presented in the family

law or child welfare case also give rise to potential tort claims, which

should be identified and preserved. Even if the tort action is not pur-

sued at the time, the attorney should anticipate that an action may be

filed in the future.

Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI-2)

When a custody evaluation is conducted by a psychologist, the revised version of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI-2) is often used as part of the evaluation process. The MMPI-2, like other traditional psychological tests, was not designed to be used in custody evaluations and arguably should not be used for such purpose except "when specific problems or issues that these tests were designed to measure appear salient in the case."

If it used, Erickson notes that "great care must be taken" as "a misinterpretation could result in placing custody of a child with a batterer, which could put the child at severe risk."

Erickson reviews research on the use of MMPI evaluations with battered women and found that that the psychological stress that battered women suffer may result in MMPI scores that do not accurately evaluate their ability to parent.

State of Michigan
State Office of Administrative hearings and rules


In the matter of Docket No. 2008-835
Petitioner, Agency No. v.


Kent County Agency: Department of Human Services
Department of Human Services,
Respondent, Case Type: Reconsideration

_____________________________


PETITION FOR EXPUNGMENT
OF PETITIONER’S NAME FROM CENTRAL REGISTRY

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Petitioners name has been improperly added to the registry section 722.627(3) “if the investigation of a report fails to disclose evidence of abuse or neglect the information identifying the subject of the report shall be expunged from the central registry.” Pursuant to MCL 722.627 further provides that “[a] person who is the subject of a report of record….may request the department to expunge from the central registry a report or record in which no relevant and accurate evidence of abuse or neglect is found to exist.”
Pursuant to MCL 722.627 (5) & (6) Petitioners is the subject of a report or record made under this act and therefore may request the department to expunge an inaccurate report or record from the central registry and local office file.
And, (6) “If the department refuses a request for amendment or expunction under subsection (5), or fails to act within 30 days after receiving the request, the department shall hold a hearing to determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the report or record in whole or in part should be amended or expunged from the central registry on the grounds that the report or record is not relevant or accurate evidence of abuse or neglect. The hearing shall be held before a hearing officer appointed by the department and shall be conducted as prescribed by the administrative procedures act of 1969, 1969 PA 306, MCL 24.201 to 24.328.
Pursuant to Haines v. Kerner 92 Sct 594, also See Power 914 F2d 1459 (11th Cir1990), "Pleadings in this case are being filed by Petitioner In Propria Persona, wherein pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicalities. Propria pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as practicing lawyers”. also See Hulsey v. Ownes 63 F3d 354 (5th Cir 1995). also See In Re: HALL v. BELLMON 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991) " however in artfully pleaded, the pro se complaint, we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."
Petitioner a pro se litigant presents relevant and Accurate Evidence the facts attached as exhibits are plead with federal rule 26 “”
sufficient to expunge her name which have been has been improperly added to the registry section MCL 722.627(3) the information identifying the subject of the report shall be expunged from the central registry.” in which “no relevant and accurate evidence of abuse or neglect is found”.
RELEVANT AND ACCURATE EVIDENCE
The facts are being pled with particularity as required by Federal Rule 26. (C) (i) a written statement that the person has signed or otherwise adopted or approved; or
(ii) a contemporaneous stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording — or a transcription of it — that recites substantially verbatim the person's oral statement.
In direct contrast to Nyela Bolden’s original allegations OBs Affidavit states: July 28, 2008, “I would like to correct and put on the record that my mother has never abuse me or any of my siblings. The Child Protective Service Worker Nyela Bolden and the agency exaggerated and pushed the situation far beyond a point of reason. She accused my mother of abuse to my brother and Sister.” (Exhibit 26)
“Kent County CPS has investigated the Petitioners has been investigated 26 times, 16 which were screened out 10 investigated and none substantiated. On September 8, 2008 CPS Nyela Bolden recanted her original testimony and the report was erred, which “she did not correct and she could not substantiate her original allegations.”
CPS Nyela Bolden and the agency December 5, 2007 report is void and should be stricken in its entirety as it is contain speculation, fabrication and inadmissible hearsay:
Risk assessment narratives
On September 8, 2008 Nyela Bolden recantation of her original allegations could not be substantiated is corroborated by OBs affidavit and AB’s repeated requests to return home with the Petitioner because she is in regular conflict with her father.
Forensic Interview should be struck and the record corrected:
Specifically, on November 21, 2007 CPS Nyela Bolden December 5, 2007 reported “I utilizing the Forensic Interviewing Method Also, present was his father and Step mother” (Exhibit 21)
It is clearly established Nyela Bolden a professional failure to follow the proper Forensic Interview protocol and process during the November 21, 2007 interview “contaminated” the child witness, put words into his mouth of false allegations of abuse that really did not occur clearly establishing the minor child’s responses to questions were not reliable. (EX 26)
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL
Pursuant toMCL712A.17c (7) and Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) requires the state to provide and appoint a lawyer Guardian Ad Litem to represent “ALL” the children OB (DOB 7/21/90) and AB (5/27/97).
Failure to appoint legal representation for the minor children (names) violates and deprives them of due process and public policy supports a child’s right to counsel: pursuant to MCL 722.630, MCL 712A.17c (7) and MCR 3.915(B)(2) and a meaningful relationship with their mother.
The December 11, 2008 decision and order merely generalized, unsubstantiated claims speculative statements of belief and inadmissible hearsay none of which are based on personal knowledge, such reports do not create genuine issues of material fact as to those claims. Thomas v. Int’l Bus. Machs., 48 F.3d 478, 485 (10th Cir. 1995). The December 11, 2008 order applied no accurate and relevant evidence. See Carey, 500 F. Supp. at 583. It contains statement without factual support, prefaced by phrases as may not be included in an order “I believe” or “upon information and belief” or those made upon an “understanding,” are properly subject to a motion to strike. Tavery v.United States, 32 F.3d 1423, 1426 n.4 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Carey v. Beans, 500 F. Supp. 580, 583 (E.D. Pa. 1980). (See Exhibit Attached)
Third party’s description of a witness’s supposed testimony is not suitable for Petitioners name to be placed on Central Registry Category II for future Child Abuse.
The judge must render a decision that is just, according to the evidence viewed against the plain language of the Law.
A child’s statements were hearsay and inadmissible at trial under the U.S. Supreme Court case, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), because the child did not testify at the November 13, 2008 Administrative Hearing and there was no opportunity for cross-examination of the child. The child's statements were inadmissible, the child welfare agency failed to present preponderance evidence that the child had been abused.
Pursuant to MCL 722.627 further provides that Petitioner “[a] person who is the subject of a report of record….may request the department to expunge from the central registry a report or record in which no relevant and accurate evidence of abuse or neglect is found to exist.”
Petitioner characterizes errors on evidentiary rulings as reviewed under a denovo standard when the abuse of discretion standard clearly applies. Moreover, all the parties failed to adequately identify purported errors at the time of the November 21, 2007 original interview, December 5, 2007 report, or the December 11, 2008 Administrative hearing, decision and order. Ms. Bruns has provided adequate records to demonstrate error, not to mention prejudicial error as shown in this case just alleging abuse, neglect and threatened harm is not enough to place her name on central registry as a category II high risk for future abuse.
Prayer for Relief:
The facts clearly presented conclude the excluded evidence and violations of due process and public policy supports a child’s right to counsel would have changed the outcome of the December 11, 2008 hearing.
A) Kent County CPS Nyela Bolden and the agency were on a witch hunt after investigating Petitioners family 26 times since 1994, 16 were screened out, 10 investigated and none substantiated.
B) Kent County CPS Nyela Bolden a professional failure to follow the proper Forensic Interview protocol and process “contaminated” the child witness, put words into his mouth of false allegations of abuse that really did not occur. (Ex)
C) Failure to appoint legal representation for Oliver and Alida violated and deprived them of due process and public policy supports a child’s right to counsel.
D) On September 8, 2008 CPS Bolden recanted her original allegations, testified her December 5, 2007 report was erred, which “she did not correct and “there are “NO” substantiations against the Petitioner's corroborated by OB's affidavit and her criminal history returned with no results.

This court must expunge Petitioners name from Central Registry unless it can prove and establish a preponderance of evidence and facts in support of the claims in the December 5, 2007 report and December 11, 2008 order which would not entitle Ms. Bruns to relief of expungement.

I DECLARE THAT THE STATEMENTS ABOVE ARE TRUE TO THE BEST OF MY INFORMATION, KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF.
Dated this_______Day of November, 2010 Respectfully submitted,

_____________________________
Petitioner, Pro Se Litigant

Under Title 5 USC, Commerce, public offices or officials can be sanctioned

The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 gives immunity in Administrative Court to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) only when an action is brought by the people against a public, agency or corporate official / department. Under Title 5 USC, Commerce, public offices or officials can be sanctioned.

Rate

National Archive On Child Welfare Fraud

There are very few attorneys knowledgeable in matters 1983 claims. Attorneys should not take cases which they are not qualified, accepting payment would qualify as fraudulent representation.
In such a case file a 1983 against a non-governmental agency because it is a quasi-governmental agency.  In this instance, you must show that there was a contractual arrangement where the agency is an extended arm of the state.  
Simply but, you just explain that the agency was licensed and funded by the state as a sub-recipient of federal funding.
Absolute immunity is 11th amendment.  If you can show under color of law malicious, wanton, malfeasance, intentional...you can have the state waive its right to any kind of immunity.  This is why you are to name the heads of the State departments in their individual and professional capacities just in case you are kicked out on the immunity issue.
Immunity does not cover individual capacities and even with identification, they are still liable.
I spoke with Beverly Tran she said, attorneys need to remain silent on matters of which they lack sophistication. Go to the

National Archive On Child Welfare Fraud.  There you may review actual complaints and case law.

Misrepresentation is a crime when there is a contract and money is exchanged.
A clients right to review documents prior to submission.
Mikhail Albuseiri submitted a brief that suppressed the fraud perjury breached the contract by taking a case he wasn't qualified to take, refused to communicate with the client and only submitted a Brief after receiving notice of case dismissal.

COA Oral Arguments Attorney Mikhail Albuseiri needed to remain silent on matters of which he lacked sophistication when offered the opportunity to speak with his client to clarify the facts he declined. The client was clearly misrepresented by an attorney that misrepresented to the client qualified to take her case. I would highly recommend if you are considering hiring this attorney don't.
Any questions please e mail dwins07@gmail.com.

National Archive On Child Welfare Fraud

There are very few attorneys knowledgeable in matters 1983 claims. You can file a 1983 against a non-governmental agency because it is a quasi-governmental agency.  In this instance, you must show that there was a contractual arrangement where the agency is an extended arm of the state.  
Simply but, you just explain that the agency was licensed and funded by the state as a sub-recipient of federal funding.
Absolute immunity is 11th amendment.  If you can show under color of law malicious, wanton, malfeasance, intentional...you can have the state waive its right to any kind of immunity.  This is why you are to name the heads of the State departments in their individual and professional capacities just in case you are kicked out on the immunity issue.
Immunity does not cover individual capacities and even with indemnification, they are still liable.
I spoke with Beverly Tran she said,attorneys need to remain silent on matters of which they lack sophistication. Go to the

National Archive On Child Welfare Fraud.  There you may review actual complaints and case law.

Petition for Expungement of Name from Central Registry/ 42 U.S.C 1983

State of Michigan
State Office of Administrative hearings and rules


In the matter of Docket No. 2008-835
D Bruns
Petitioner, Agency No. X0654322P

v.


Kent County Agency: Department of Human Services
Department of Human Services,
Respondent, Case Type: Reconsideration

_____________________________


PETITION FOR EXPUNGMENT
OF PETITIONER’S NAME FROM CENTRAL REGISTRY

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Petitioner Ms. Bruns name has been improperly added to the registry section 722.627(3) “if the investigation of a report fails to disclose evidence of abuse or neglect the information identifying the subject of the report shall be expunged from the central registry.” Pursuant to MCL 722.627 further provides that “[a] person who is the subject of a report of record….may request the department to expunge from the central registry a report or record in which no relevant and accurate evidence of abuse or neglect is found to exist.”
Pursuant to MCL 722.627 (5) & (6) Petitioner Ms. Bruns is the subject of a report or record made under this act and therefore may request the department to expunge an inaccurate report or record from the central registry and local office file.
And, (6) “If the department refuses a request for amendment or expunction under subsection (5), or fails to act within 30 days after receiving the request, the department shall hold a hearing to determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the report or record in whole or in part should be amended or expunged from the central registry on the grounds that the report or record is not relevant or accurate evidence of abuse or neglect. The hearing shall be held before a hearing officer appointed by the department and shall be conducted as prescribed by the administrative procedures act of 1969, 1969 PA 306, MCL 24.201 to 24.328.
Pursuant to Haines v. Kerner 92 Sct 594, also See Power 914 F2d 1459 (11th Cir1990), "Pleadings in this case are being filed by Petitioner In Propria Persona, wherein pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicalities. Propria pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as practicing lawyers”. also See Hulsey v. Ownes 63 F3d 354 (5th Cir 1995). also See In Re: HALL v. BELLMON 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991) " however in artfully pleaded, the pro se complaint, we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."
Ms. Bruns a pro se litigant presents relevant and Accurate Evidence the facts attached as exhibits are plead with federal rule 26 “”
sufficient to expunge her name which have been has been improperly added to the registry section MCL 722.627(3) the information identifying the subject of the report shall be expunged from the central registry.” in which “no relevant and accurate evidence of abuse or neglect is found”.
RELEVANT AND ACCURATE EVIDENCE
The facts are being pled with particularity as required by Federal Rule 26. (C) (i) a written statement that the person has signed or otherwise adopted or approved; or
(ii) a contemporaneous stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording — or a transcription of it — that recites substantially verbatim the person's oral statement.
In direct contrast to Bolden’s original allegations the then minor child and now adult's Affidavit states: July 28, 2008, “I would like to correct and put on the record that my mother has never abuse me or any of my siblings. The Child Protective Service Worker exaggerated and pushed the situation far beyond a point of reason. She accused my mother of abuse to my brother and Sister.” (Exhibit 26)
“Kent County CPS has investigated the Petitioner Ms. Bruns has been investigated 26 times, 16 which were screened out 10 investigated and none substantiated criminal history returned with nothing. On September 8, 2008 CPS Bolden recanted her original allegations testifying her report was erred, which “she did not correct and she could not substantiate her original allegations.”
CPS Nyela Bolden and the agency December 5, 2007 report is void and should be stricken in its entirety as it is contain speculation, fabrication and inadmissible hearsay:
Risk assessment narratives
On September 8, 2008 Bolden recantation of her original allegations could not be substantiated is corroborated by the minor child now adult child's affidavit and AB's repeated requests to return home with the Petitioner because she is in regular conflict with her father.
Forensic Interview should be struck and the record corrected:
Specifically, on November 21, 2007 CPS Bolden December 5, 2007 reported “I utilizing the Forensic Interviewing Method Also, present was his father K Bruns and Step mother S Bruns.” (Exhibit 21)
It is clearly established Nyela Bolden a professional failure to follow the proper Forensic Interview protocol and process during the November 21, 2007 interview “contaminated” the child witness, put words into his mouth of false allegations of abuse that really did not occur clearly establishing the minor child’s responses to questions were not reliable. (EX 26)
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL
Pursuant to MCL712A.17c (7) and Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) requires the state to provide and appoint a lawyer Guardian Ad Litem to represent “ALL” the children OB (DOB 7/21/90) and AB (5/27/97).
Failure to appoint legal representation for both minor children violates and deprives them of due process and public policy supports a child’s right to counsel: pursuant to MCL 722.630, MCL 712A.17c (7) and MCR 3.915(B)(2) and a meaningful relationship with their mother.
The December 11, 2008 Jones decision and order merely generalized, unsubstantiated claims speculative statements of belief and inadmissible hearsay none of which are based on personal knowledge, such reports do not create genuine issues of material fact as to those claims. Thomas v. Int’l Bus. Machs., 48 F.3d 478, 485 (10th Cir. 1995). The December 11, 2008 order applied no accurate and relevant evidence. See Carey, 500 F. Supp. at 583. It contains statement without factual support, prefaced by phrases as may not be included in an order “I believe” or “upon information and belief” or those made upon an “understanding,” are properly subject to a motion to strike. Tavery v.United States, 32 F.3d 1423, 1426 n.4 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Carey v. Beans, 500 F. Supp. 580, 583 (E.D. Pa. 1980). (See Exhibit Attached)
Third party’s description of a witness’s supposed testimony is not suitable for Petitioners name to be placed on Central Registry Category II for future Child Abuse.
The judge must render a decision that is just, according to the evidence viewed against the plain language of the Law.
A child’s statements were hearsay and inadmissible at trial under the U.S. Supreme Court case, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), because the child did not testify at the November 13, 2008 Administrative Hearing and there was no opportunity for cross-examination of the child. The child's statements were inadmissible, the child welfare agency failed to present preponderance evidence that the child had been abused.
Pursuant to MCL 722.627 further provides that Petitioner Ms. Bruns “[a] person who is the subject of a report of record….may request the department to expunge from the central registry a report or record in which no relevant and accurate evidence of abuse or neglect is found to exist.”
Ms. Bruns characterizes errors on evidentiary rulings as reviewed under a denovo standard when the abuse of discretion standard clearly applies. Moreover, all the parties failed to adequately identify purported errors at the time of the November 21, 2007 original interview, December 5, 2007 report, or the December 11, 2008 Administrative hearing, decision and order. Ms. Bruns has provided adequate records to demonstrate error, not to mention prejudicial error as shown in this case just alleging abuse, neglect and threatened harm is not enough to place her name on central registry as a category II high risk for future abuse.
Prayer for Relief:
The facts clearly presented conclude the excluded evidence and violations of due process and public policy supports a child’s right to counsel would have changed the outcome of the December 11, 2008 hearing.
A) Kent County CPS Bolden and the agency were on a witch hunt after investigating Petitioner Ms. Bruns 26 times since 1994, 16 were screened out, 10 investigated and none substantiated and a clean criminal history.
B) Kent County CPS Bolden a professional failure to follow the proper Forensic Interview protocol and process “contaminated” the child witness, put words into his mouth of false allegations of abuse that really did not occur. (Ex)
C) Failure to appoint legal representation for the two minor children (add names when submitting to the court) violated and deprived them of due process and public policy supports a child’s right to counsel.
D) On September 8, 2008 CPS Bolden recanted her original allegations, testified her December 5, 2007 report was erred, which “she did not correct and “there are “NO” substantiations against the Petitioner Ms. Bruns corroborated by the then minor and now adult child's affidavit and her criminal history returned with no results.

This court must expunge Ms.Bruns name from Central Registry unless it can prove and establish a preponderance of evidence and facts in support of the claims in the December 5, 2007 report and December 11, 2008 order which would not entitle Ms. Bruns to relief of expungement.

I DECLARE THAT THE STATEMENTS ABOVE ARE TRUE TO THE BEST OF MY INFORMATION, KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF.
Dated this_______Day of November, 2010

Respectfully submitted,

_____________________________
Denise M. Bruns, Pro Se Litigant
616-260-5479

Services to Families in Crisis-as mandated by 42 U.S.C § 671 (a) (15)

From Join-Hands.com

SERVICES TO FAMILIES IN CRISIS - AS MANDATED BY 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a) (15) and 672 (a) (1) - an agency cannot be reimbursed for the cost of a child's out-of-home care unless the reasonable efforts requirement is met.

§ 671. State plan for foster care and adoption assistance

* (a) Requisite features of State plan

In order for a State to be eligible for payments under this part, it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which -
o (1) provides for foster care maintenance payments in accordance with section 672 of this title and for adoption assistance in accordance with section 673 of this title;
o (2) provides that the State agency responsible for administering the program authorized by subpart 1 of part B of this subchapter shall administer, or supervise the administration of, the program authorized by this part;
o (3) provides that the plan shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory upon them;
o (4) provides that the State shall assure that the programs at the local level assisted under this part will be coordinated with the programs at the State or local level assisted under parts A and B of this subchapter, under subchapter XX of this chapter, and under any other appropriate provision of Federal law;
o (5) provides that the State will, in the administration of its programs under this part, use such methods relating to the establishment and maintenance of personnel standards on a merit basis as are found by the Secretary to be necessary for the proper and efficient operation of the programs, except that the Secretary shall exercise no authority with respect to the selection, tenure of office, or compensation of any individual employed in accordance with such methods;
o (6) provides that the State agency referred to in paragraph (2) (hereinafter in this part referred to as the "State agency") will make such reports, in such form and containing such information as the Secretary may from time to time require, and comply with such provisions as the Secretary may from time to time find necessary to assure the correctness and verification of such reports;
o (7) provides that the State agency will monitor and conduct periodic evaluations of activities carried out under this part;
o (8) provides safeguards which restrict the use of or disclosure of information concerning individuals assisted under the State plan to purposes directly connected with (A) the administration of the plan of the State approved under this part, the plan or program of the State under part A, B, or D of this subchapter (including activities under part F of this subchapter) or under subchapter I, V, X, XIV, XVI (as in effect in Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands), XIX, or XX of this chapter, or the supplemental security income program established by subchapter XVI of this chapter, (B) any investigation, prosecution, or criminal or civil proceeding, conducted in connection with the administration of any such plan or program, (C) the administration of any other Federal or federally assisted program which provides assistance, in cash or in kind, or services, directly to individuals on the basis of need, (D) any audit or similar activity conducted in connection with the administration of any such plan or program by any governmental agency which is authorized by law to conduct such audit or activity, and (E) reporting and providing information pursuant to paragraph (9) to appropriate authorities with respect to known or suspected child abuse or neglect; and the safeguards so provided shall prohibit disclosure, to any committee or legislative body (other than an agency referred to in clause (D) with respect to an activity referred to in such clause), of any information which identifies by name or address any such applicant or recipient; except that nothing contained herein shall preclude a State from providing standards which restrict disclosures to purposes more limited than those specified herein, or which, in the case of adoptions, prevent disclosure entirely;
o (9) provides that the State agency will -
+ (A) report to an appropriate agency or official, known or suspected instances of physical or mental injury, sexual abuse or exploitation, or negligent treatment or maltreatment of a child receiving aid under part B of this subchapter or this part under circumstances which indicate that the child's health or welfare is threatened thereby; and
+ (B) provide such information with respect to a situation described in subparagraph (A) as the State agency may have;
o (10) provides for the establishment or designation of a State authority or authorities which shall be responsible for establishing and maintaining standards for foster family homes and child care institutions which are reasonably in accord with recommended standards of national organizations concerned with standards for such institutions or homes, including standards related to admission policies, safety, sanitation, and protection of civil rights, and provides that the standards so established shall be applied by the State to any foster family home or child care institution receiving funds under this part or part B of this subchapter;
o (11) provides for periodic review of the standards referred to in the preceding paragraph and amounts paid as foster care maintenance payments and adoption assistance to assure their continuing appropriateness;
o (12) provides for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for benefits available pursuant to this part is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness;
o (13) provides that the State shall arrange for a periodic and independently conducted audit of the programs assisted under this part and part B of this subchapter, which shall be conducted no less frequently than once every three years;
o (14) provides (A) specific goals (which shall be established by State law on or before October 1, 1982) for each fiscal year (commencing with the fiscal year which begins on October 1, 1983) as to the maximum number of children (in absolute numbers or as a percentage of all children in foster care with respect to whom assistance under the plan is provided during such year) who, at any time during such year, will remain in foster care after having been in such care for a period in excess of twenty-four months, and (B) a description of the steps which will be taken by the State to achieve such goals;
o (15) effective October 1, 1983, provides that, in each case, reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his home;
o (16) provides for the development of a case plan (as defined in section 675(1) of this title) for each child receiving foster care maintenance payments under the State plan and provides for a case review system which meets the requirements described in section 675(5)(B) of this title with respect to each such child; and
o (17) provides that, where appropriate, all steps will be taken, including cooperative efforts with the State agencies administering the plans approved under parts A and D of this subchapter, to secure an assignment to the State of any rights to support on behalf of each child receiving foster care maintenance payments under this part.
* (b) Approval of plan by Secretary

The Secretary shall approve any plan which complies with the provisions of subsection (a) of this section.

(Amendment to above)

COATS (AND WYDEN) AMENDMENT NO. 4909 (Senate - July 18, 1996)

[Page: S8227]

Mr. ROTH (for Mr. Coats, for himself and Mr. Wyden) proposed an amendment to the bill, S. 1956, supra; as follows:

At the end of chapter 7, of subtitle A, of title II, add the following:

SEC. . KINSHIP CARE.

Section 471(a) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 671(a)) is amended--

(1) by striking `and' at the end of paragraph (16);

(2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (17) and inserting `; and'; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

`(18) provides that States shall give preference to an adult relative over a non-related caregiver when determining a placement for a child, provided that the relative caregiver meets all relevant State child protection standards.

END
§ 672. Foster care maintenance payments program

* (a) Qualifying children

Each State with a plan approved under this part shall make foster care maintenance payments (as defined in section 675(4) of this title) under this part with respect to a child who would meet the requirements of section 606(a) of this title or of section 607 of this title but for his removal from the home of a relative (specified in section 606(a) of this title), if -
o (1) the removal from the home occurred pursuant to a voluntary placement agreement entered into by the child's parent or legal guardian, or was the result of a judicial determination to the effect that continuation therein would be contrary to the welfare of such child and (effective October 1, 1983) that reasonable efforts of the type described in section 671(a)(15) of this title have been made;
o (2) such child's placement and care are the responsibility of
+ (A) the State agency administering the State plan approved under section 671 of this title, or (B) any other public agency with whom the State agency administering or supervising the administration of the State plan approved under section 671 of this title has made an agreement which is still in effect;
o (3) such child has been placed in a foster family home or child-care institution as a result of the voluntary placement agreement or judicial determination referred to in paragraph (1); and
o (4) such child -
+ (A) received aid under the State plan approved under section 602 of this title in or for the month in which such agreement was entered into or court proceedings leading to the removal of such child from the home were initiated, or
+ (B)(i) would have received such aid in or for such month if application had been made therefor, or (ii) had been living with a relative specified in section 606(a) of this title within six months prior to the month in which such agreement was entered into or such proceedings were initiated, and would have received such aid in or for such month if in such month he had been living with such a relative and application therefor had been made. In any case where the child is an alien disqualified under section 1255a(h), 1160(f), or 1161(d)(7) (FOOTNOTE 1) of title 8 from receiving aid under the State plan approved under section 602 of this title in or for the month in which such agreement was entered into or court proceedings leading to the removal of the child from the home were instituted, such child shall be considered to satisfy the requirements of paragraph (4) (and the corresponding requirements of section 673(a)(2)(B) of this title), with respect to that month, if he or she would have satisfied such requirements but for such disqualification.

(FOOTNOTE 1) See References in Text note below.
* (b) Additional qualifications

Foster care maintenance payments may be made under this part only on behalf of a child described in subsection (a) of this section who is -
o (1) in the foster family home of an individual, whether the payments therefor are made to such individual or to a public or nonprofit private child-placement or child-care agency, or
o (2) in a child-care institution, whether the payments therefor are made to such institution or to a public or nonprofit private child-placement or child-care agency, which payments shall be limited so as to include in such payments only those items which are included in the term "foster care maintenance payments" (as defined in section 675(4) of this title).
* (c) "Foster family home" and "child-care institution" defined

For the purposes of this part, (1) the term "foster family home" means a foster family home for children which is licensed by the State in which it is situated or has been approved, by the agency of such State having responsibility for licensing homes of this type, as meeting the standards established for such licensing; and (2) the term "child-care institution" means a nonprofit private child-care institution, or a public child-care institution which accommodates no more than twenty-five children, which is licensed by the State in which it is situated or has been approved, by the agency of such State responsible for licensing or approval of institutions of this type, as meeting the standards established for such licensing, but the term shall not include detention facilities, forestry camps, training schools, or any other facility operated primarily for the detention of children who are determined to be delinquent.
* (d) Children removed from their homes pursuant to voluntary placement agreements

Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, Federal payments may be made under this part with respect to amounts expended by any State as foster care maintenance payments under this section, in the case of children removed from their homes pursuant to voluntary placement agreements as described in subsection (a) of this section, only if (at the time such amounts were expended) the State has fulfilled all of the requirements of section 627(b) of this title.
* (e) Placements in best interest of child

No Federal payment may be made under this part with respect to amounts expended by any State as foster care maintenance payments under this section, in the case of any child who was removed from his or her home pursuant to a voluntary placement agreement as described in subsection (a) of this section and has remained in voluntary placement for a period in excess of 180 days, unless there has been a judicial determination by a court of competent jurisdiction (within the first 180 days of such placement) to the effect that such placement is in the best interests of the child.
* (f) "Voluntary placement" and "voluntary placement agreement" defined

For the purposes of this part and part B of this subchapter, (1) the term "voluntary placement" means an out-of-home placement of a minor, by or with participation of a State agency, after the parents or guardians of the minor have requested the assistance of the agency and signed a voluntary placement agreement; and (2) the term "voluntary placement agreement" means a written agreement, binding on the parties to the agreement, between the State agency, any other agency acting on its behalf, and the parents or guardians of a minor child which specifies, at a minimum, the legal status of the child and the rights and obligations of the parents or guardians, the child, and the agency while the child is in placement.
* (g) Revocation of voluntary placement agreement

In any case where -
o (1) the placement of a minor child in foster care occurred pursuant to a voluntary placement agreement entered into by the parents or guardians of such child as provided in subsection (a) of this section, and
o (2) such parents or guardians request (in such manner and form as the Secretary may prescribe) that the child be returned to their home or to the home of a relative, the voluntary placement agreement shall be deemed to be revoked unless the State agency opposes such request and obtains a judicial determination, by a court of competent jurisdiction, that the return of the child to such home would be contrary to the child's best interests.
* (h) Aid to families with dependent children

For purposes of subchapters XIX and XX of this chapter, any child with respect to whom foster care maintenance payments are made under this section shall be deemed to be a dependent child as defined in section 606 of this title and shall be deemed to be a recipient of aid to families with dependent children under part A of this subchapter. For purposes of the preceding sentence, a child whose costs in a foster family home or child-care institution are covered by the foster care maintenance payments being made with respect to his or her minor parent, as provided in section 675(4)(B) of this title, shall be considered a child with respect to whom foster care maintenance payments are made under this section.

REASONABLE EFFORTS MANDATES - a "safeguard' to parents and children that families not be traumatized due to needless separation from each other

* ...by inexperienced, ill-trained or racially-socioeconomically-gender biased Child Protection caseworkers or officials.

IN THE EVENT OF 'EMERGENCY REMOVAL' of a child from his home - a "safeguard' to parents and children that due process will be guaranteed by informed, unbiased judiciaries, who are to mandate accountability for 'reasonable efforts', that 'Child Protection' agencies be mandated:

* to prove compliance with 'reasonable efforts' and not merely accept a preprinted form submitted by Child Protection agencies, for a 'rubber-stamped approval' by the court , thereby denying the parent and child due process rights to present evidence to the contrary.

The family courts, almost without fail - accepts preprinted 'reasonable efforts' forms from caseworkers...without question
TITLE I--REASONABLE EFFORTS AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION PLACEMENTS

SEC. 101. CLARIFICATION OF THE REASONABLE EFFORTS REQUIREMENT.

(a) In General.--Section 471(a)(15) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 671(a)(15)) is amended to read as follows:

''(15) provides that--

''(A) in determining reasonable efforts to be made with respect to a child, as described in this paragraph, and in making such reasonable efforts, the child's health and safety shall be the paramount concern;
''(B) except as provided in subparagraph (D), reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify families--

''(i) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removing the child from the child's home; and
''(ii) to make it possible for a child to safely return to the child's home;

''(C) if continuation of reasonable efforts of the type described in subparagraph (B) is determined to be inconsistent with the permanency plan for the child, reasonable efforts shall be made to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the permanency plan, and to complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the child;
''(D) reasonable efforts of the type described in subparagraph (B) shall not be required to be made with respect to a parent of a child if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that--

''(i) the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances (as defined in State law, which definition may include but need not be limited to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse);
''(ii) the parent has--

''(I) committed murder (which would have been an offense under section 1111(a) of title 18, United States Code, if the offense had occurred in the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States) of another child of the parent;
''(II) committed voluntary manslaughter (which would have been an offense under section 1112(a) of title 18, United States Code, if the offense had occurred in the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States) of another child of the parent;
''(III) aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder or such a voluntary manslaughter; or
''(IV) committed a felony assault that results in serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the parent; or

''(iii) the parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily;

''(E) if reasonable efforts of the type described in subparagraph (B) are not made with respect to a child as a result of a determination made by a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with subparagraph (D)--

''(i) a permanency hearing (as described in section 475(5)(C)) shall be held for the child within 30 days after the determination; and
''(ii) reasonable efforts shall be made to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the permanency plan, and to complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the child; and

''(F) reasonable efforts to place a child for adoption or with a legal guardian may be made concurrently with reasonable efforts of the type described in subparagraph (B);''.

(b) Definition of Legal Guardianship.--Section 475 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 675) is amended by adding at the end the following:

''(7) The term 'legal guardianship' means a judicially created relationship between child and caretaker which is intended to be permanent and self-sustaining as evidenced by the transfer to the caretaker of the following parental rights with respect to the child: protection, education, care and control of the person, custody of the person, and decisionmaking. The term 'legal guardian' means the caretaker in such a relationship.''.

(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 472(a)(1) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 672(a)(1)) is amended by inserting ''for a child'' before ''have been made''.
(d) Rule of Construction.--Part E of title IV of such Act (42 U.S.C. 670-679) is amended by inserting after section 477 the following:

42 USC 678

''SEC. 478. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

''Nothing in this part shall be construed as precluding State courts from exercising their discretion to protect the health and safety of children in individual cases, including cases other than those described in section 471(a)(15)(D).''.

SEC. 102. INCLUDING SAFETY IN CASE PLAN AND CASE REVIEW SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS.

Title IV of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) is amended--

42 USC 622.

(1) in section 422(b)(10)(B) --

(A) in clause (iii)(I), by inserting ''safe and'' after ''where''; and
(B) in clause (iv), by inserting ''safely'' after ''remain''; and

42 USC 675.

(2) in section 475 --

(A) in paragraph (1)--

(i) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ''safety and'' after ''discussion of the''; and
(ii) in subparagraph (B)--

(I) by inserting ''safe and'' after ''child receives''; and
(II) by inserting ''safe'' after

(B) in paragraph (5)--

(i) in subparagraph (A), in the matter preceding clause (i), by inserting ''a safe setting that is'' after ''placement in''; and
(ii) in subparagraph (B)--

(I) by inserting ''the safety of the child,'' after ''determine''; and
(II) by inserting ''and safely maintained in'' after ''returned to''.



SEC. 103. STATES REQUIRED TO INITIATE OR JOIN PROCEEDINGS TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS FOR CERTAIN CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE.

(a) Requirement for Proceedings.--Section 475(5) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 675(5)) is amended--

(1) by striking ''and'' at the end of subparagraph (C);
(2) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (D) and inserting ''; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:

''(E) in the case of a child who has been in foster care under the responsibility of the State for 15 of the most recent 22 months, or, if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined a child to be an abandoned infant (as defined under State law) or has made a determination that the parent has committed murder of another child of the parent, committed voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent, aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder or such a voluntary manslaughter, or committed a felony assault that has resulted in serious bodily injury to the child or to another child of the parent, the State shall file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child's parents (or, if such a petition has been filed by another party, seek to be joined as a party to the petition), and, concurrently, to identify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified family for an adoption, unless--

''(i) at the option of the State, the child is being cared for by a relative;
''(ii) a State agency has documented in the case plan (which shall be available for court review) a compelling reason for determining that filing such a petition would not be in the best interests of the child; or
''(iii) the State has not provided to the family of the child, consistent with the time period in the State case plan, such services as the State deems necessary for the safe return of the child to the child's home, if reasonable efforts of the type described in section 471(a)(15)(B)(ii) are required to be made with respect to the child.''.

(b) Determination of Beginning of Foster Care.--Section 475(5) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 675(5)), as amended by subsection (a), is amended--

(1) by striking ''and'' at the end of subparagraph (D);
(2) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (E) and inserting ''; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:

''(F) a child shall be considered to have entered foster care on the earlier of--

''(i) the date of the first judicial finding that the child has been subjected to child abuse or neglect; or
''(ii) the date that is 60 days after the date on which the child is removed from the home.''.

42 USC 675 note.

(c) Transition Rules.--

(1) New foster children.--In the case of a child who enters foster care (within the meaning of section 475(5)(F) of the Social Security Act) under the responsibility of a State after the date of the enactment of this Act--

(A) if the State comes into compliance with the amendments made by subsection (a) of this section before the child has been in such foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months, the State shall comply with section 475(5)(E) of the Social Security Act with respect to the child when the child has been in such foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months; and
(B) if the State comes into such compliance after the child has been in such foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months, the State shall comply with such section 475(5)(E) with respect to the child not later than 3 months after the end of the first regular session of the State legislature that begins after such date of enactment.

(2) Current foster children.--In the case of children in foster care under the responsibility of the State on the date of the enactment of this Act, the State shall--

(A) not later than 6 months after the end of the first regular session of the State legislature that begins after such date of enactment, comply with section 475(5)(E) of the Social Security Act with respect to not less than \1/3\ of such children as the State shall select, giving priority to children for whom the permanency plan (within the meaning of part E of title IV of the Social Security Act) is adoption and children who have been in foster care for the greatest length of time;
(B) not later than 12 months after the end of such first regular session, comply with such section 475(5)(E) with respect to not less than \2/3\ of such children as the State shall select; and
(C) not later than 18 months after the end of such first regular session, comply with such section 475(5)(E) with respect to all of such children.

(3) Treatment of 2-year legislative sessions.--For purposes of this subsection, in the case of a State that has a 2-year legislative session, each year of the session is deemed to be a separate regular session of the State legislature.
(4) Requirements treated as state plan requirements.--For purposes of part E of title IV of the Social Security Act, the requirements of this subsection shall be treated as State plan requirements imposed by section 471(a) of such Act.

42 USC 675 note.

(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section or in part E of title IV of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 670 et seq.), as amended by this Act, shall be construed as precluding State courts or State agencies from initiating the termination of parental rights for reasons other than, or for timelines earlier than, those specified in part E of title IV of such Act, when such actions are determined to be in the best interests of the child, including cases where the child has experienced multiple foster care placements of varying durations.



SEC. 104. NOTICE OF REVIEWS AND HEARINGS; OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.

Section 475(5) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 675(5)), as amended by section 103, is amended--

(1) by striking ''and'' at the end of subparagraph (E);
(2) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (F) and inserting ''; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:

''(G) the foster parents (if any) of a child and any preadoptive parent or relative providing care for the child are provided with notice of, and an opportunity to be heard in, any review or hearing to be held with respect to the child, except that this subparagraph shall not be construed to require that any foster parent, preadoptive parent, or relative providing care for the child be made a party to such a review or hearing solely on the basis of such notice and opportunity to be heard.''.

SEC. 105. USE OF THE FEDERAL PARENT LOCATOR SERVICE FOR CHILD WELFARE SERVICES.

Section 453 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 653) is amended--

(1) in subsection (a)(2)--

(A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by inserting ''or making or enforcing child custody or visitation orders,'' after ''obligations,''; and (B) in subparagraph (A)--

(i) by striking ''or'' at the end of clause (ii);
(ii) by striking the comma at the end of clause (iii) and inserting ''; or''; and
(iii) by inserting after clause (iii) the following:
''(iv) who has or may have parental rights with respect to a child,''; and

(2) in subsection (c)--

(A) by striking the period at the end of paragraph

(3) and inserting ''; and''; and

(B) by adding at the end the following:

''(4) a State agency that is administering a program operated under a State plan under subpart 1 of part B, or a State plan approved under subpart 2 of part B or under part E.''.

SEC. 106. CRIMINAL RECORDS CHECKS FOR PROSPECTIVE FOSTER AND ADOPTIVE PARENTS.

Section 471(a) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 671(a)) is amended--

(1) by striking ''and'' at the end of paragraph (18);
(2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (19) and inserting ''; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
''(20)(A) unless an election provided for in subparagraph (B) is made with respect to the State, provides procedures for criminal records checks for any prospective foster or adoptive parent before the foster or adoptive parent may be finally approved for placement of a child on whose behalf foster care maintenance payments or adoption assistance payments are to be made under the State plan under this part, including procedures requiring that--

''(i) in any case in which a record check reveals a felony conviction for child abuse or neglect, for spousal abuse, for a crime against children (including child pornography), or for a crime involving violence, including rape, sexual assault, or homicide, but not including other physical assault or battery, if a State finds that a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that the felony was committed at any time, such final approval shall not be granted; and
''(ii) in any case in which a record check reveals a felony conviction for physical assault, battery, or a drug-related offense, if a State finds that a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that the felony was committed within the past 5 years, such final approval shall not be granted; and

''(B) subparagraph (A) shall not apply to a State plan if the Governor of the State has notified the Secretary in writing that the State has elected to make subparagraph (A) inapplicable to the State, or if the State legislature, by law, has elected to make subparagraph (A) inapplicable to the State.''.



SEC. 107. DOCUMENTATION OF EFFORTS FOR ADOPTION OR LOCATION OF A PERMANENT HOME.

Section 475(1) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 675(1)) is amended--

(1) in the last sentence--

(A) by striking ''the case plan must also include''; and
(B) by redesignating such sentence as subparagraph (D) and indenting appropriately; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:
''(E) In the case of a child with respect to whom the permanency plan is adoption or placement in another permanent home, documentation of the steps the agency is taking to find an adoptive family or other permanent living arrangement for the child, to place the child with an adoptive family, a fit and willing relative, a legal guardian, or in another planned permanent living arrangement, and to finalize the adoption or legal guardianship. At a minimum, such documentation shall include child specific recruitment efforts such as the use of State, regional, and national adoption exchanges including electronic exchange systems.''.